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THE ROLE OF 'SHARED MEMORIES' IN SHAPING NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS:

A Comparative Historical Analysis of the Flemish and Québécois Nationalist Movements

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Abstract

The Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements diverge in terms of their structural nature; for example, Flemish nationalism developed as a Christian democratic movement, whereas contemporary Québécois nationalism was galvanized around a secular-leftist ideology. There is also a significant contrast in the socio-demographic, economic, and political realities of Flanders in Belgium compared to those of Québec in Canada. However, despite the differing influences on the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, they have developed and maintained very similar nationalist profiles. Both nationalist movements are defined by a sense of ethno-linguistic distinctness, both have a paralleling nationalist discourse focused on the need to preserve and protect the language and culture of the national community, and both have been focused on obtaining a redistribution of cultural and political power through constructing an alternative political structure from that of the federal state.

This thesis proposes that the mirroring nationalist profiles of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements can be traced to the development of a similar type of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which was initially established by nationalists wanting to rectify the effects of a linguistically based 'cultural division of labour'. As a means of instrumentalizing and perpetuating this sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, both Flemish and Québécois nationalists have relied on evocating and shaping key 'shared memories' found within the historical narrative of the national community. These shared memories, as well as their symbolic representations, reflect sentiments of struggle, injustice, and victimization, and have been vital for Flemish and Québécois nationalists in maintaining their paralleling expressions of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest in Flanders and in Québec.

Keywords: Flanders, Flemish, Québec, Québécois, cultural division of labour, ethno-linguistic, nations, nationalism, nationalism of protest, nationalist movement, shared memoires, symbols.

Résumé

Les mouvements nationalistes flamands et québécois divergent en concernant leur structure; par exemple le nationalisme flamand s'est développé comme un mouvement chrétien-démocrate, alors que le nationalisme québécois contemporain s'est galvanisé autour d'une idéologie laïque de gauche. Par ailleurs, il existe un contraste entre les poids sociodémographique, politique et économique portés par la région de Flandres en Belgique, et ceux portés dans la province du Québec au Canada.

Cependant, malgré les influences divergentes structurelles et systémiques, les mouvements nationalistes flamand et québécois ont développé et maintenu des profils très similaires. Par exemple, les deux mouvements nationalistes se définissent par une distinction ethnolinguistique, les deux ont un discours nationaliste parallèle axé sur la nécessité de préserver et de protéger la langue et la culture de la communauté nationale, et les deux se concentrent sur l'obtention d'une redistribution des pouvoirs culturels et politiques.

Dans ce mémoire, nous proposons que le profil nationaliste ressemblant du mouvement nationaliste flamand et québécois puisse être expliqué par le développement d'un « nationalisme ethnolinguistique de contestation », qui était initialement mis en place par les nationalistes flamands et québécois cherchant à corriger les effets d'une « division culturelle du travail ». Ce sentiment d'un nationalisme de contestation ethnolinguistique est instrumentalisé et perpétué par les nationalistes flamands et québécois en évoquant certains « souvenirs partagés », qui sont trouvés dans le récit historique de la communauté nationale. Ces souvenirs partagés, ainsi que leurs représentations symboliques, reflètent les sentiments de protestation, injustice et victimisation, qui sont vitaux pour les nationalistes flamands et québécois dans le maintien de leur expression parallèlement à un nationalisme de contestation ethnolinguistique en Flandres et au Québec.

Mots clés : Flandre, Flamand, Québec, Québécois, division culturelle du travail, ethnolinguistique, nations, nationalisme, nationalisme de contestation, mouvement nationaliste, souvenirs partagés, symbolisme.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

BHV	Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde
BQ	Bloc Québécois
CD&V	Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams
CSN	Confédération des syndicats nationaux
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGP	Gross Geographic Product
LDD	Libertair, Direct, Democratisch
RIN	Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale
RN	Ralliement National
N-VA	Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliantie
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Open VLD	Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten
PQ	Parti Québécois
SP.a	Socialistische Partij Anders
VB	Vlaams Belang
VVB	Vlaamse Volksbeweging

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Introduction

There is debate among social scientists regarding the exact point in history that marks the emergence of nationalism. However, there is virtually universal acceptance that nationalism is a modern phenomenon that came to the forefront as a tangible movement and ideology in the latter half of the eighteenth century.[1] Today, nationalism maintains an unassailable position in the world as an extremely influential socio-political force. But what does the term *nationalism* denote, and how can we identify it?

John Breuilly underlines the vagueness that exists when defining nationalism, explaining that the term can be used to refer to ideas, sentiments, or actions.[2] For other scholars, such as Elie Kedourie, nationalism has been viewed as a 'doctrine',[3] while Anthony Smith sees it as an ideological movement,[4] and according to Ernst Gellner, nationalism can be categorized as a political principle.[5] In light of nationalism's broad nature, an analysis of a 'nationalist movement' is arguably better suited to address the empirically observable activity of individuals who utilize nationalism as a political ideology and means of social organization, in an effort to obtain their specific goals and demands.[6]

Within a community, a nationalist movement gains adherents when it is able to build upon a sense of social solidarity and collective identity, which is based on objective criteria such as ethnicity and culture (objective in that it is the community itself that establishes the parameters defining 'ethnicity' and 'culture'). These ideals of social solidarity and collective identity are translated into a sense of national membership, and are the galvanizing force behind national movements.[7] Today, nationalist movements continue to have a profound influence in shaping the social and political landscapes of societies around the world. This is especially true for those societies having nationalist movements of stateless nations; and this fact is exemplified in the Belgian region of Flanders and in the Canadian province of Québec, where the respective Flemish (or *Vlaams* in Dutch) and Québécois nationalist movements have become integral parts of the socio-political culture.

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[1] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 1.
[2] John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 404.
[3] Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 1.
[4] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991), 51.
[5] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 1.
[6] Miroslav Hroch, "Real and Constructed: the nature of the nation," in *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, edited by John A. Hall (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 92.
[7] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalist Movements* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1976), 15.

The Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements were founded on similar principles of ethno-linguistic nationalism, and both have been historically focused on the objective of reversing socio-economic inequalities by establishing a political structure geared towards redistributing cultural and political power.[8] More specifically, the nationalist projects in Flanders and Québec have both successfully established political institutions within their respective sub-state political structures, which embody the ideal of an ethno-linguistic and territorially linked conception of the nation. Furthermore, both the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have a commonality in terms of the factors that acted as a catalyst for their development. Both movements can be viewed as a struggle for cultural and linguistic recognition, which had initially been sought-after as a means of overcoming obstacles to social mobility—specifically, a linguistically defined 'cultural division of labour'.[9] And although the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have unique historical narratives, they developed into a full-fledged socio-political force within their respective societies around the same time.[10] In fact, both the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements today are very similar in terms of their discourse regarding their cultural (notably linguistic) and political objectives. We refer to this specific discourse defining the characteristics of the cultural politics of the nationalist movements in sum as being the 'nationalist profile'.

Interestingly, however, the similarities between the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements are present despite key structural differences, including diverging ideological perspectives and economic principles, as well as a contrasting role and influence of the Catholic Church.[11] Furthermore, there are clear differences between the region of Flanders and the province of Québec, namely in terms of demographics, economic strength, geography, and political organization. For example, out of a population of eleven million, the Dutch-speaking Flemish make up the largest linguistic group in Belgium (59 percent), and out of the three Belgian regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital), the Dutch-speaking region of Flanders is the biggest in terms of geographic size and population (6.08 million), as well as

[8] Jan Erk, "Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du nationalisme québécois," *Recherches Sociographiques* 43, no. 3 (2002): 503.
[9] Ibid., 505.
[10] Eric Vanneufville, *Le coq et le lion : La Belgique à la croisée des chemins* (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1998), 86; Raphaël Canet, *Nationalismes et Société au Québec* (Outremount: Athéna éditions, 2003), 174.
[11] Jan Erk, "Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du nationalisme québécois," *Recherches Sociographiques* 43, no. 3 (2002): 500.

being the strongest economically.[12] Conversely, only around 22.1 percent of Canada's population of 34 million count themselves as Francophones. The majority (91.2 percent) reside in Québec, which is the largest province in terms of geographic size but is only one of ten provinces in Canada (there are also three Northern territories), with almost all of the other provinces being predominantly English-speaking (New Brunswick, Canada's only officially bilingual province, being a notable exception).[13] Moreover, despite being the province with the second largest population, Québec's economy cannot be counted among the strongest in Canada, as it has only the tenth largest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita among the Canadian provinces and territories, as well as having a heavy public debt burden.[14]

In terms of the differences in their ideological character, the Flemish nationalist movement can be placed to the right of the political spectrum in Belgium, and it has traditionally been closely linked to the Catholic Church; whereas the Québécois nationalist movement leans more to the left, and is a proponent of a secularism that developed in Québec during the *Révolution Tranquille* (Quiet Revolution) of the 1960s.[15] Therefore, we are left with the question as to why the current differences between the region of Flanders in Belgium and the province of Québec in Canada, as well as the structural contrasts of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, have not resulted in more of a divergence in the nationalist profiles of the two nationalist movements? This question is of particular interest from the Flemish perspective; in considering that the region of Flanders and Dutch-speak Flemings in general account for the demographic majority in Belgium, and that the region of Flanders has obtained significant political autonomy (notably over language and cultural matters), why have we not observed a transformation of the Flemish nationalist discourse?

As a means of attempting to understand why the nationalist discourse concerning the cultural and linguistic agendas, and the political strategies and objectives of Flemish and Québécois nationalist movement remain so strikingly similar today, it is necessary to analyze

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[12] Paul M. Lewis, "Languages of Belgium," *Ethnologue: languages of the world* (web version), 16th ed., (Dallas: SIL International, 2009): http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=BE.
[13] Government of Canada: Statistics Canada, "2006 Census: The Evolving Linguistic Portrait, 2006 Census: Highlights," http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-555/p1-eng.cfm; Government of Canada: Statistics Canada, "Population by knowledge of official language, by province and territory (2006 Census)," http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/demo15-eng.htm.
[14] Government of Canada: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, "Financial Security — Standard of Living," http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/.3ndic.1t.4r@-eng.jsp?iid=26.
[15] Jan Erk, "Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du nationalisme québécois," *Recherches Sociographiques* 43, no. 3 (2002): 513-514.

the paralleling genesis of both nationalist movements, and the subsequent conceptualization of their respective 'nations'. More specifically, the impetus of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movement was the mobilization of nationalist academics and 'elites' (political leaders, social advocates, artists, etc.) who sought to overcome the limitations on their socio-economic mobility, due to the presence of a cultural division of labour that was imposed along linguistic lines. This oppositional reaction was a catalyst for the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements; framing their nature as expressions of an 'ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest', embodying a sense of injustice, victimization, and struggle, which has, in turn, helped to define the characteristics of the collective conception of the Flemish and Québécois national identity—an ethno-linguistically defined national community that is territorially linked to a historic 'national homeland', and which is in perpetual opposition and struggle against the imposition and dominance of another nation.

According to Christophe Traisnel, a 'nationalism of protest' has the objective of imposing on a state a political and institutional recognition of a community's national identity. This objective is pursued through nationalist agitation aimed at spreading awareness of a community's collective national identity, which is in contradiction with the state's own national identity doctrine, and then inciting a mobilization around that national character.[16] This type of nationalism is consistent among nationalist movements of 'stateless' nations. However, in an attempt to establish a more specific definition of a nationalism of protest in the context of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, we have built on Traisnel's definition by isolating the importance of language to the nature of both nationalist movements, and to the collective identity of the Flemish and Québécois nations. Thus, we have specified the expression of an 'ethno-linguistic' nationalism of protest; identifying a linguistically based cultural division of labour as having been the catalyst for an oppositional reaction and nationalist agitation in Flanders and in Québec, which has subsequently shaped the character of both nationalist movements by framing the Flemish and Québécois national identities as being ethno-linguistic *nations* in a state of struggle.

[16] Christophe Traisnel, "Le nationalisme de contestation en Amérique du Nord," in *Le Québec à l'aube du nouveau millénaire: entre tradition et modernité*, edited by Marie-Christine Weidmann Kopp (Québec: Press de l'Université du Québec, 2008), 21-22.

A key underlying principle of collective identity formation is opposition, and the very nature of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements as expressions of protest went a long way in shaping the character of the Flemish and Québécois national identities.[17] Thus, nationalists' conceptualization of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nations were built on sentiments of opposition and protest, which act as boundaries in defining both national identities. Nationalist leaders and the *intelligentsia* of both Flanders and Québec have acted as a causal mechanism in shaping the character of the nationalist movements, most notability by utilizing the shared memories and symbols of historic myths as the building blocks in constructing and reinforcing the collective cultural identity of an ethno-linguistic nation, which has been suppressed under the domination and imposition of another nation. For Flemish nationalists that *other* nation is the French-speaking Walloons in Belgium, and for Québécois nationalists it is the Anglophones in Canada.

Thus, this dissertation postulates that the key explanatory variable as to why the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have maintained similar nationalist profiles, despite the development of socio-demographic and structural differences, is the perpetual conception of the nation as defined by the principles of a Flemish and Québécois ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which were initially conceived in reaction to a linguistically defined cultural division of labour. However, in order to analyze how the similar origins and conception of the national identity are the explanatory variables for the continuing paralleling profiles of both nationalist movements, it is necessary to focus on the important role played by shared memories and their symbolic representations. Shared memories and symbols have acted as antecedent variables in helping to shape the nature of the nationalist movements and the collective conception of the national identities; and subsequently, they have been employed as a vehicle to perpetuate the tenets and ideals of each nationalist movement and national identity. Nationalists can act as the causal mechanism in shaping the collective conscience of a group's identity and the nature of the nationalist movement, by instrumentalizing the interpretation and transmission of shared memoires. History does not generate a collective identity by itself, but rather requires the subjective construction in the present; and thus, nationalists endeavour to shape the groups collective memory from that

[17] Daniele Conversi, "Reassessing current theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as a boundary maintenance and creation," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 1, No. 1 (1995): 79.

which in the past continues to have pertinence and carries influence within the present situation.[18]

By employing a method of comparative analysis known as process tracing, which is a means of analyzing intervening variables that link putative causes to observed effects,[19] we can examine how the mirroring influence of a cultural division of labour has defined the development of the similar tenets of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, in terms of embodying an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, and how those ideals influenced the construction and perpetuation of the collective conception of the Flemish and Québécois nations. More specifically, we use process tracing to analyze how of key shared memories have been relied upon as the causal mechanism in perpetuating the tenets of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and the conception of a nation 'in peril', which subsequently explains the continued presence of paralleling nationalist profiles in Flanders and Québec.

However, it is important to note that a limitation of our analysis is that its focus is less on the explicit agency of specific Flemish and Québécois nationalist elites. Instead, the analysis of the instrumentalization of shared memories on the part of Flemish and Québécois nationalists (via secondary sources detailing the development and use of shared memories in Flanders and Québec) is implicitly taken from a 'presentist' perspective, which assumes the employment of the past for present purposes, and that the past is a particularly useful resource for expressing nationalists' interest. The images of the past and struggles over history are used as vehicles for establishing a group's power, or lack of power in the present.[20] The presentist perspective on memory emphasizes instrumentalism or meaning dimensions of memory. The former views the entrepreneurship of memory as a manipulation of the past for particular purposes, while the latter sees selective memory as an inevitable consequence of the fact that humans interpret the world—including the past—on the basis of experience and within cultural frameworks.[21] Therefore, the cultural division of labour and key shared memories are the focus of our analysis as explanatory factors for the continuation of paralleling nationalist

[18] Allan Megill, "History, memory, identity," *History of the Human Sciences* 11, No. 3 (1998): 56.
[19] Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, "Process Tracing in Case Study Research," MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods (Harvard University, October 17-19, 1997).
[20] Jeffrey L. Olick and Joyce Robbins, "Social Memory Studies: From "Collective Memory" to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998): 127-128.
[21] Ibid., 128.

profiles in Flanders and Québec; whereas the role of nationalists is implicitly viewed as the causal mechanism in establishing the nature of the nationalist movements, and in perpetuating the mirroring tenets of Flemish and Québécois nationalism over time.

The theoretical framework of J.S. Mill's method of agreement argues that cases sharing a common outcome will also share common hypothesized causal factors, despite varying in other significant ways.[22] Therefore, a comparative analysis of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements is an ideal case study for furthering an understanding as to why stateless national movements very often share a commonality in terms of the discourse defining their nationalist profiles. Our research also highlights the importance of analysing the seminal historical factors, and subsequently the use of shared memories, which have acted both as an impetus for the development of the nationalist movements, and also as explanatory variables regarding the nationalist movements' contemporary profile.

This dissertation is divided into three parts, each of which comprises two chapters. "Part I" presents both the theoretical framework and the methodology of our historical comparative analysis of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. The opening chapter outlines the three main scholarly approaches to the study of nations and nationalism, as well as a presentation of Miroslav Hroch's theory of the developmental process of national movements. The first chapter also provides a detailed explanation of a 'cultural division of labour' and definition of 'shared memories', before culminating with a presentation of the theoretical framework of our analysis. The second chapter then details the methodology of our research, explaining the structure of the historical comparative analysis, which is based on a method known as 'process tracing'.

"Part II" of the dissertation discusses the development of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements: Chapter 3 explores the paralleling development of both nationalist movements, providing a cross case historical comparative analysis, before ultimately reviewing their similar contemporary nationalist profiles. Subsequently, chapter 4 explains

[22] Edwin Amenta, "What We Know about the Development of Social Policy: Comparative and Historical Research in Comparative and Historical Perspective," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 341.

that, in contrast to the strikingly similar nationalist profiles, there are clear socio-demographic and structural differences between the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements.

In "Part III", the final part of this dissertation, we examine key shared memories (and the symbols reflecting them) that have been integral to the development and perpetuation of the nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec. This is achieved by analyzing how the nature of both nationalist movements is impacted by the evocation, interpretation, and transmission of key shared memories and their symbolic reflections. Chapter 5 will first explore the linkage between shared memories and symbols, a sense of territoriality, and Flemish and Québécois nationalists' conception of the national identity. Then in Chapter 6, we trace the historical process accounting for the development of key shared memories within the historical narratives of the Flemish and Québécois national communities, and subsequently how these shared memories, and their symbolic reflections, were evoked and shaped by nationalists in Flanders and Québec as a means of obtaining their objectives. Ultimately, we demonstrate that due to the historic presence of a linguistic based cultural division of labour, nationalists in Flanders and Québec established a similar sense of 'ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest' and similar conception of their respective national identities, which was established, and perpetuated, by relying on key shared memories as a tool of their nationalist agitation.

Finally, the dissertation concludes with an overview of our analysis on the two nationalist movements, underscoring the importance of analysing the historical factors that influence the genesis of a nationalist movement, and reiterating the role that shared memories and symbols can have in shaping the nature of nationalist movements today. This final chapter also suggests future avenues of research on nationalist movements that our model of analysis may be applicable to.

Part I – Theory and Methodology

Chapter 1
The Study of Nations and Nationalism

Before embarking on an analysis of a nationalist movement, it is imperative to have a better understanding of nations and nationalism, and their inter-relation. Nationalism is inseparably linked to the perception of belonging to a *nation*. Essentially, a nation can be defined as a community, located in a historically shared territory, and having the self-recognition of being defined by common social, economic, and legal rights and duties for all members.[23] Moreover, the sentiment of 'belonging' to the nation, stems from a community of people maintaining a semblance of social solidarity and a mutual recognition of a common identity. This social solidarity and collective identity are based on objective criteria, namely ethnicity and culture, which are translated into a sense of national membership.[24] These characteristics affirm the community's national identity, while also constructing a distinction from 'other' communities. Furthermore, there is a demarcation of the 'us' (those belonging to the nation) and the 'them' (the outsiders, or foreigners), which is the essence of nationalist discourse; and in turn, this nationalist discourse constantly shapes individuals' consciousness and meaning of the world within the context of their nation, as well as producing and reproducing people as 'nationals'.[25]

These ideals of belonging, distinctiveness, and membership are indirectly linked to the perceived origins of the nation. However, the inquiry into nationalism before the 1980s took the origin of the nation for granted, ignoring the importance of the present day production and reproduction of the idea of 'nationhood'.[26] Recent scholarship on nationalism has brought into focus an emphasis on explaining how the nation, or the modern conception of nationhood, came about, and subsequently how it translates into manifestations of nationalism. In fact, the study of nationalism today is centralized on one basic dilemma: to what extent are nations and nationalisms a modern phenomenon?[27] In other words, to what extent are nations and nationalism the products of modern conditions, such as capitalism, industrialization,

[23] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991), 14.
[24] Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 34-35.
[25] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995), 78-79.
[26] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 56.
[27] Ibid., 60.

urbanization, and secularism? And, how do modern nations relate to pre-modern ethnic communities?

This principal dilemma of contemporary studies on nations and nationalism has resulted in what is arguably the most fundamental cleavage in the theoretical debate on nationalism; a debate that is between 'primordialist' scholars, who subscribe to the idea that nations are incessant entities, and 'modernists', who believe that the conception of the nation is strictly a modern phenomenon.[28] Our analysis of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements is in-line with this contemporary trend of attempting to establish linkages between an understanding of the origins of the nation and the expressions of nationalism.

In addition, the theoretical framework for our endeavour borrows from the emerging middle ground of the traditional divide between 'primordialists' and 'modernists', in the form of an approach referred to as 'ethno-symbolism'. The ethno-symbolist approach stresses the symbolic legacy of pre-modern ethnic identities for today's nations, and it seeks to shows how ethnic cultures define the parameters in which 'elites' can attempt to forge the nation.[29] The principles of ethno-symbolism help to explain how nationalists in Flanders and Québec helped establish a collective historical memory and symbolic legacy of specific events in the historical narratives of their respective communities, as a means of constructing a similar conception of the nation, and a mirroring type of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest. Ultimately, it is this paralleling conceptualization of nationhood and the perpetuation of a sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest that accounts for the similar nationalist profiles of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements.

In the following sections we present the three main approaches to the study of nations and nationalism, as well as Miroslav Hroch's theory of the developmental process of national movements, and provide a definition of shared memories and a cultural division of labour; all of which are used to establish the theoretical framework for our analysis.

[28] Ibid.
[29] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 224.

1.1 Approaches to the Study of Nations and Nationalism

Although no other socio-political phenomenon has been as prominent in shaping the face of the modern world as nationalism, it was not held in high regard by social scientists until relatively recently. Formerly, nationalism was seen by liberal and Marxist thinkers as a 'passing phase', and it only became the subject of substantial and sustained academic inquiry starting in the 1920s and 1930s.[30] However, it was not until the 1960s that nationalism had a major breakthrough as a subject of academic investigation, with the important works put forth by scholars such as Elie Kedourie and Ernest Gellner, two academics that laid the foundation for the modernist school of thought on nationalism.[31] Then, in the 1980s, the study of nationalism would witness a renaissance of sorts, with theories and approaches becoming more sophisticated and rich, and a clearer division between the schools of thought on the subject beginning to take shape.[32]

Essentially, three main approaches to the study of nationalism have developed: *primordialism*/*perennialism*, *modernism*, and *ethno-symbolism*.[33] Although the study of nationalism is not strictly limited to these three categories, they are undoubtedly the focus of, and basis for, the bulk of the studies on nations, nationalism, and national movements. The following sections will briefly outline key elements of these three main approaches as they relate to our body of research, and with an emphasis being given to key principles of modernism and ethno-symbolism as the theoretical basis for our research model.

1.2 Primordialism and Perennialism

Primordialism is the oldest paradigm in the study of nations and nationalism. It is essentially the idea that being a member of a nation is a 'natural' part of human beings, and that nations have basically always existed. Primordialist explanations of nations and nationalism are based on the principles of the origins and strength of ethnic identities.[34] Starting from the time of the 'German Romantics' in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, primordialists have believed that the world consists of natural nations, or 'organic

[30] Ibid., 1.
[31] See: Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, [1960] 1994), and Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964).
[32] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 2.
[33] Ibid., 213.
[34] Ibid., 64.

nationalism', and that nations are the bedrock of history and the principal actors in the world's historical narrative. In other words, nations and their characters are organisms that can be easily ascertained by their cultural differences; and oftentimes, nationalists seek to restore lost national self-consciousness among the members of nations—a 'reawakening' of the organic nation.[35]

Umut Özkirimli explains that there are three categories of primordialism: the *sociobiological* approach, the *cultural primordialist* approach, and the *naturalist* approach.[36] The sociobiological approach applies findings in the field of socio-biology to the study of ethnic ties. It seeks the origins of ethnic and national ties in genetic mechanisms and instincts, treating the nation as an extension of kin selection (or mating with ethnic 'relatives') based on cultural criteria.[37] The cultural primordialist approach focuses on the perception and beliefs of the individuals; it is based on the idea that what generates the strong attachments people feel for 'given' sentiments of social existence and identity is the very belief in their 'sacredness'.[38] Finally, the naturalist approach is based on the idea that national identities are a 'natural' part of all human beings, just like speech or sight. In other words, a person has a nationality in the same way they have eyes and ears.[39]

There is also a contemporary incarnation of primordialism, known as *perennialism*, which was established by scholars also suggesting that nations have existed as historic entities and have developed over the centuries with their intrinsic character largely unchanged. The difference separating perennialists from primordialists is that the former concedes the antiquity of ethnic and national ties without insisting that they are 'natural'.[40] Another key characteristic of perennialists is the readily accepted modernity of nationalism as a political movement and ideology; however, perennialist scholars regard nations as either updated versions of immemorial ethnic communities, or as collective cultural identities that have existed in all epochs of human history.[41] Therefore, perennialism has closed the gap between

[35] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 146.
[36] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 70-71.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid., 72.
[39] Ibid., 66.
[40] Ibid., 68; Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 53.
[41] Ibid., 159.

primordialism and modernism, and opened the door for the development of 'ethno-symbolism', which will be explained further along.

1.3 Modernism

In the 1960s, modernism, which was influenced by the decolonization occurring at the time in Asia and Africa, developed in reaction to primordialism's seemingly outdated axiom of an inherent nature of nations. Instead, modernists began to regard nations and nationalism as historically formed modern constructs.[42] Modernists (sometimes referred to as *instrumentalists*) criticize primordialists' cultural attachments to the nation, such as language, religion, and kinship, as being alterable elements.

For example, critical of the importance primordialists place on the relationship between language and an individual's bond to the nation, Paul Brass points out that many people in the world do not think about their language or attach any emotional significance to it. Brass explains that many people speak more than one language or dialect in multilingual developing societies, and many illiterate people in these countries have little or no attachment to their 'mother tongue'.[43] Furthermore, Brass also questions the cultural attachments between religions and nations, stating that religions have been subject to immense changes over the centuries; and Brass explains that even place of birth and kinship can lose their emotional significance for many people. Basically, for modernists like Paul Brass, the ethnic cultural foundation of nations is created by 'elites' as a means of uniting communities and mobilizing them for social and political advantage.[44]

According to the modernist approach, the *modernity* that gave life to the concepts of nations and nationalism was the rapid socio-economic changes that began in the late eighteenth century, which came about after the debut of industrial revolution in England, and the 'Age of Enlightenment' that was ushered in by the American and French Revolutions. The result of this phenomenon of *modernity* was modern processes such as capitalism, industrialism, the emergence of the bureaucratic state, urbanization, and secularism; all of

[42] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 85.
[43] Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1991), 70-72.
[44] Ibid.

which, modernists contend, created the sociological necessity of *nationalism*, from which the *nation* was born.[45]

Among modernist scholars, the work of Ernest Gellner can be said to have an almost emblematic status. The modern study of nationalism arguably began with Gellner's contribution in attempting to analyze nationalism as primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.[46] Gellner explains the modernist perception of *nationalism* as a sociological necessity of the modern world, by highlighting the absence of nations and nationalism in the 'pre-modern' ages, and noting that the nationality of the ruler during these periods was not important to the ruled.[47] According to Gellner, nationalism could not operate in pre-modern 'agrarian societies' because the role of culture was to reinforce, underwrite, and render visible and authoritative the hierarchical status system of the social order of the time.[48]

For Gellner, nationalism arises from the relationship between power and culture that occurs within industrialized societies, in which nationalism becomes a product of industrialized social organization. Consequently, nations can be defined in terms of the coming of the 'age of nationalism'. Gellner states that nations have emerged "when general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities."[49] This idea of 'high culture' refers to a specially cultivated, standardized, and education based literate culture, which establishes a system of norms and communications. The exigencies of social organization that stem from industrialization call for a standardization of communication (a common language), as well as an educated and culturally homogenous society, in order to facilitate the convergence towards essential technical and occupational norms of industrialized jobs.[50]

Therefore, nationalism becomes the instrument of the society's social elites and *intelligentsia*, in terms of establishing the state structure and bureaucracy needed to develop the body of complex, formalized, mass participation in educational processes, which bring all

[45] Ibid; Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 29; E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 10.
[46] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 1.
[47] Ibid., 6; Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), 153.
[48] Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 20-21.
[49] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 132.
[50] Ibid., 47.

of a society's members into contact with 'high culture'. Subsequently, according to Gellner, people come to 'love' their culture, seeing it as an essential condition of their wellbeing and functioning, because it underpins and makes possible their economic existence.[51] Furthermore, successful participation in 'high culture' means successful involvement in contractual relationships among individuals who understand 'things' in the same way, and sharing a common conceptual currency. Gellner believes that this makes people aware of their nationality and acutely conscious of their differences from others, with whom they cannot communicate as readily. Thus, the limits of the nation are found where the break-lines occur between cultures; while at the same time, mobility weakens the differentiation between social layers typical of pre-modern societies, resulting in the modern society taking on the shape of being an "internally fluid, culturally continuous community," which is referred to as the *nation*.[52] Ultimately, Gellner's link between the nation-state and nationalism is centred on the functional relationship between the needs of a modern economy, with its interchangeable unites of labour, and the formation of a uniform culture. As a result, people are made aware of a common situation and identity, thus stimulating sentiments of loyalty and 'love' for their nation.

Ernst Gellner's modernist theory of nations and nationalism, although said to contain traces of historical materialism, is essentially based on a liberal view of society.[53] Tom Nairn, another influential modernist thinker, developed a materialist approach to explaining nationalism, stating that the basis for nationalism should be sought in the general process of historical development since the end of the eighteenth century. In other words, nationalism is "determined by certain features of the world political economy, in the era between the French and Industrial Revolutions and the present day."[54] For Nairn, the spread of nationalism is not simply a product of industrialization and the Age of Enlightenment, but rather the result of an 'uneven development' of societies since the dawn of modernization during the eighteenth century. As a result of this 'uneven development' and spread of modernization and capitalism, those regions and countries able to lead in modernization acted as the *metropolis*, dominating those regions and countries of the *periphery*, which, in turn, were compelled to find their own

[51] Graham Day and Andrew Thompson, *Theorizing Nationalism* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 47.
[52] Ibid., 48.
[53] Ibid., 47.
[54] Tom Nairn, *The Break-Up Of* Britain, 3rd ed., (Altona, Australia: Common Ground Publishing, 2003), 320.

means of advancement.[55] The elites of the regions and countries on the developmental periphery wanted the advantages of modernization, but they had to mobilize their societies in such a way as to reject direct intervention from the metropolis. Therefore, a 'historical short-cut' to modernization was required, or in other words, the "conscious formation of a militant inter-class community rendered strongly (if not mythically) aware of its own separate identity vis-à-vis the outside forces of domination."[56] This is the foundation of nationalism, according to Nairn, as the periphery had to mobilize utilizing its best resource—the people and peculiarities of the region (language, folklore, custom, etc.); and thus, nationalism relies on the differentiae of a society because it must, in that it is invariably 'populist'.[57]

Nairn's approach has been criticized as being only applicable in situations where regional economic disparities were conjoined and coterminous with a particular ethnic community.[58] The economic disparities and social deprivation resulting from 'uneven development' only becomes a vehicle of a nationalist political purpose if an ethnic community, or their elites, have been suppressed or marginalized.[59] Nevertheless, Nairn's approach can be useful in providing a basis in explaining the development of the nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec, which can be viewed as two sub-national entities that have historically been peripheral regions within states controlled by a *metropolis*. This is to say that modernization was unevenly developed in Belgium and in Canada, and as a result the Dutch-speakers in Flanders and French-speakers in Québec were socio-economically dominated and marginalized by the French-speaking Walloons and English-speaking Canadians respectively.

It can be said that the uneven socio-economic development of the Dutch-speaking community in Flanders and of the French-speaking community in Québec pushed Flemish and Québécois elites to forge a nationalist movement aimed at mobilizing the Flemish and Québécois society towards closing the developmental divide. As Nairn explains, "The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the

[55] Ibid., 326.
[56] Ibid., 327.
[57] Ibid., 328.
[58] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 54.
[59] Ibid.

invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood."[60] Therefore, the nationalist mobilization in Flanders and in Québec was based on an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, stimulated by the evocation of an ethno-linguistic sense of national identity and awareness of the historical injustices and indignity imposed by the 'other' national community from the *metropolis*.

1.4 Ethno-Symbolism

Ethno-symbolism emerged as a theoretical critique of modernism closely linked to perennialism, with the key difference being that the analysis of ethnicity is seen as the precursor to the study of nations and nationalism. For perennialists, the nation is a recurrent form of social organization, and nationalism is a perennial mode of cultural belonging; whereas ethno-symbolism is based on the notion of reaching back into the past and moving forward towards the present, while stressing the 'ethno-symbolic' nature of nations and nationalism.[61]

That being said, there is also a commonality between ethno-symbolism and modernism. For example, there is relative agreement among ethno-symbolists and modernists that nationalism, as an ideology and social movement in general, is a modern phenomenon.[62] Nevertheless, ethno-symbolists are critical of modernist's social *constructionism* and *instrumentalism*, which underpins the modernist theory of nations and nationalism.[63] Moreover, ethno-symbolism differentiates itself from modernism by not tying the formation and existence of the nation to a particular period of history, or to the process of modernization.

The ethno-symbolist approach to the study of nations and nationalism seeks to uncover the symbolic legacy of pre-modern ethnic identities for nations today. The means of achieving this objective is by clarifying the concepts of 'ethnicity' and 'nation', and by recognizing the importance of a long history of ethnicity for the formation of nations, in an effort to understand the relationship between politics, ethnicity, and nationalism.[64] Ethno-symbolism rejects the axiom that nations may be *ipso facto* invented, subscribing instead to the belief that

[60] Tom Nairn, *The Break-Up Of* Britain, 3rd ed., (Altona, Australia: Common Ground Publishing, 2003), 328.
[61] Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 4.
[62] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 170.
[63] Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9.
[64] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 98.

nations rely on pre-existing texture of ethnic myths, memories, symbols, and traditions.[65] For ethno-symbolists, the emergence of today's nations cannot be understood properly without taking their ethnic forebears into account. As John Hutchinson explains, ethno-symbolists believe that the rise of nations needs to be contextualized within the larger phenomenon of the *ethnicity* which shaped them.[66]

Anthony D. Smith, arguably the most influential ethno-symbolist scholar, states that ethno-symbolism places great importance on tracing the origins and formation of nations, as well as their possible future course, over long periods of time, or what Smith describes as the study of modern nations over the "*longue durée*" (long duration).[67] This long-term analysis focuses on understanding the role that pre-existing cultures and ethnicity have in the emergence of the modern conception of the nation, as well as the popular and widespread appeal of nationalism.

Nationalism is viewed by ethno-symbolists as an expression of aspirations by various social groups to create, defend, or maintain nations—their autonomy, unity, and identity—by drawing on the cultural resources of pre-existing ethnic communities (or *ethnies,* to use Smith's terminology) and categories.[68] For ethno-symbolists, what gives nationalism its power is the ethnic heritage of nations (shared memories, myths, traditions, and symbols). It is this popular 'living past' that has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by contemporary nationalist academics and elites.[69] Central to the ethno-symbolist study of nations and nationalism is the theory that 'shared memories' of a collective cultural identity define the make-up of the nation. Smith explains that,

"Collective cultural identities are based on the shared memories of experiences and activities of successive generations of a group distinguished by one or more shared cultural elements. Ethnic identity, in turn, may be seen as the product of shared memories of collective experiences and activities of successive generations of a group claiming a common origin and ancestry. Therefore, ethnicity may be defined as the sense of collective belonging to a named community of common myths of origin and shared memories, associated with an historic homeland."[70]

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[65] Daniele Conversi, "Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 1, no. 1 (1995): 73-74; Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 6.
[66] John Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism* (London: Fontana, 1994), 7.
[67] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 181.
[68] Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Anthony D. Smith, "LSE Centennial Lecture: The Resurgence of Nationalism? Myth and Memory in the Renewal of Nations," *The British Journal of Sociology* 47, No. 4 (1996): 583.

The theoretical framework of our analysis subscribes to this notion that the 'living past' of the nation can be shaped by nationalist academics and elites. In Flanders and Québec, nationalists academics and elites have relied on key shared memories and symbols (many evoking a pre-modern sense of ethno-cultural identity) as a means of constructing and perpetuating the modern conception of the nation, and oftentimes to contextualize the contemporary nationalist movement as an extension of the historical struggle against the imposition and indignity inflicted on the national community.

1.5 Shared Memories and Symbols

In constructing the identity of a nation, primordialists, perennialists, and modernists are in agreement with ethno-symbolists regarding the need for nationalists to be able to convey a particular type of story about the nation and its importance; an easily transmitted story that can resonate emotively with the people.[71] As Maurice Halbwachs explained, collective memory is not a given, but rather a socially constructed notion;[72] and thus, nationalist academics and elites rely on shared memories as the vehicle of transmission for the 'national story', while transmigrating across multiple historical contexts from generation to generation.

However, it is important to make the clarification that by 'shared memories' we are not simply referring to a mnemonic process in which individuals exchange a recollection of personally lived experiences and events (although this is a factor in creating shared memories). Instead, we can broadly define shared memories as being specific historic events and epochs that are evoked, interpreted, and then transmitted through social agency—namely on the part of nationalist academics and elites—for the use as a resource of expressing interests; for example, as a differentiator and reminder of the unique culture and fate of an ethnic community.[73]

Furthermore, shared memories can be attributed with having the following characteristics: they are usually of a historic event that goes beyond the experience of those who lived it; they have an association with a tradition (cultural, political, or religious), which is a unique version of the past that has been collectively canonized; when the event reaches far

[71] Duncan S.A. Bell, "Mythscapes: memory, mythology, and national identity," *British Journal of Sociology* 54, No. 1 (2003): 67.
[72] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, ed. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 22.
[73] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 191.

back in time, the shared memory of the event is not generally a direct historic account, but rather a 'tale' of the past; and thus, a shared memory is closer to being a 'belief' than historical knowledge; shared memories can be thought of as 'living myths', in which the community is able to 'relive' the essence of the event in question by channelling it to the present.[74] Moreover, the 'reliving' and commemoration of shared memories are not only an act of identification for a community, they are also acts of real identity.[75] Finally, shared memories are usually attached to specific places and defined territories, and this 'territorialization of memory' is an indispensable part of the shared memories and mythology of the community.[76] For an ethnic community, a particular geographical area becomes associated with the traditional place of origin, liberation, settlement, or the location of the community's 'golden ages'; and this relationship between people and land is the product over the *longue durée* of continual 'myth-making' and the recitation of shared memories.[77]

Along with shared memories, symbols (such as emblems, hymns, festivals, customs, linguistic codes, etc.) play an important role in defining a community's history and identity, and in securing the attachment of many people to a particular nation.[78] Symbols act as 'border guards' by distinguishing an ethnic community from *others*, with symbolic interaction acting as a means of communication by sending signals of identification to both members of a group, and to outsiders; and thus, symbols are crucial to the survival of ethnic identification.[79] The content of symbols is often established generations before they can act as cues to group members. As John Armstrong observes, "ethnic symbolic communication is communication over the *longue durée*, between the dead and the living."[80] Therefore, the meaning behind what symbols represent to an ethnic community is essentially the expression of shared memoires.

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[74] Àngel Castiñeira, "Nations imagines : identité personnelle, identité nationale et lieux de mémoire," in *Les Nationalismes majoritaires contemporains: identité, mémoire, pouvoir*, edited byAlain-G. Gagnon, André Lecours and Geneviève Nootens (Montréal: Les Éditions Québec Amérique, 2007), 97

[75] Ibid.

[76] Anthony D. Smith, "Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 72, No. 3, (1996): 453-454.

[77] Anthony D. Smith, "LSE Centennial Lecture: The Resurgence of Nationalism? Myth and Memory in the Renewal of Nations," *The British Journal of Sociology* 47, no. 4 (1996): 589.

[78] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 180.

[79] Ibid., 182.

[80] John Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 8.

Ethno-symbolists, such as Anthony D. Smith, often focus primarily on shared memories that evoke a community's idealized 'golden age' (or ages) of virtue, heroism, beauty, learning, holiness, power and wealth; an era distinguished as a time of collective dignity and external prestige of the nation.[81] However, for the purposes of this study we have classified shared memories into two categories: the first of which is shared memories of 'national glory'—liberation, the golden age (or ages), victories, heroes, saints and sages; and the second category of shared memories is those of 'national injury'—defeats, forced migration, injustices and oppression.[82] These shared memories of a community's national glory and/or injury are carried forward over time, and they can be thought of as markers of the positive or negative events in the historical narrative of a community, and which have the capacity to resonate and remain within the conscious of a large number of members of the community. The shared memories are kept alive and transmitted over the *longue durée* through symbols, and by the teaching of the community's history via the community's cultural characteristics, such as language, myths, folktales, literature, song, etc. These collective memories of events exemplifying national glory and injury to national dignity are elements that re-enforce a sense of *ethnie*, while also distinguishing the national identity from that of 'others'.

In the case of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, shared memories of national injury have been utilized as a resource in perpetuating a sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, and the notion of both respective nations being in a continuing state of struggle. As is often the case, Flemish and Québécois nationalist academics and elites have used shared memories of contestation and struggles over history as a vehicle for establishing their power, or conversely their lack of power.[83] Many of these shared memories are contextualized in an epoch where an imposed cultural division of labour existed in Flanders and in Québec. Therefore, it is important to have an understanding of what a cultural division

[81] Ibid., 583-584; Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 191.
[82] The concept of shared memories of national injury is loosely based on Charles Taylor's explanation that, in the wake of the 'wave of modernity', the elites of nations in the less modernized 'periphery' viewed their disadvantaged position as a challenge to their national dignity: see Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and Modernity," in *The State of the Nation: Ernest Geller and the Theory of Nationalism*, edited by John A. Hall (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 206.
[83] Jeffrey L. Olick and Joyce Robbins, "Social Memory Studies: From "Collective Memory" to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998): 127-128.

of labour is, and how it has deeply impacted the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements.

1.6 Cultural Division of Labour

At their foundation, the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements are manifestations of an 'ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest'. This protestation at the heart of the development of both national movements originated as a reaction to the inequalities and limits on upward social mobility imposed upon Dutch-speakers in Belgium and French-speakers in Canada. This limitation on social mobility was the result of an uneven development of modernization (the transformation from a traditional rural and agrarian society, to a secular, urban and industrial society). This is to say that, in general terms, Francophone Belgians and English-Canadians adapted to modernization before Dutch-speaking Belgians and French-speaking Canadians, which in turn resulted in a discrepancy of economic development, largely due to linguistic inequality and discrimination imposed upon Dutch-speakers in Flanders and Francophones in Québec.

This socio-economic inequality and discrimination established along linguistic lines can be identified as a 'cultural division of labour', which occurs when individuals are assigned to specific types of occupations, and other social roles, on the basis of observable cultural traits or markers. Michael Hechter explains that the cultural division of labour is a "system of stratification where objective cultural distinctions are superimposed upon class lines."[84] As a result of this phenomenon, ethnic boundaries coincide with lines of structural differentiation, and collective action based on ethnic boundaries ensues; or in other words, the ethnic solidarity that results from a cultural division of labour often leads to a nationalist movement. Furthermore, this structural discrimination can exist regardless of the level of structural differentiation in the society as a whole.[85]

The cultural division of labour in Belgium and Canada resulted in the Dutch-speaking Flemish community and the French-speaking Québécois community being over-represented in the working class and under-represented in the middle and upper classes, as well as having an

[84] Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Developments, 1536-1966* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 30.
[85] François Nielsen, "The Flemish Movement in Belgium after WWII: A Dynamic Analysis," *American Sociological Review* 45 (1980): 77.

under-representation in positions of economic importance and political decision making.[86] From the origin of the Belgian state in 1830, until the middle of the twentieth century, the language of administration, commerce, and higher education in Flanders was in French, and Belgium's Francophone bourgeoisies controlled the stores, clubs, and theatres in Flemish cities. Therefore, up until the 'Flemish Movement' gained the political recourse to address the socio-economic situation of Flemings, the Dutch-speaking people of Belgium were resigned to being culturally underdeveloped and economically poor, with the social mobility of Flemings limited to agricultural and industrial labour.[87]

In Québec, the origins of a cultural division of labour can be traced back to the decades following the British conquest of North America in 1760, when English-speakers held the key colonial economic positions in what was at the time Lower Canada. This Anglophone dominance of economic functions in Québec would continue after Canada's Confederation in 1867. The industrialization of Québec in the twentieth century only served to exacerbate the hierarchy of the cultural division of labour, as managerial positions in Québec's large Anglophone owned enterprises were reserved almost exclusively for other Anglophones. Consequently, French-Canadians were resigned to blue-collar positions within the English-Canadian managed industrial enterprises.[88]

According to John Armstrong, the point of departure for the genesis of a nation can be ethnic exclusion.[89] Essentially, this is what occurred in Flanders and in Québec, where nationalists viewed the linguistic inequalities and cultural division of labour as the principal demarcation between their disadvantaged *nation* (the Flemish and the Québécois), and the dominant *nation* (the Francophones of Belgium and the Anglophones of Canada). The more there is a presence of a conflict or contradiction between two opposing groups of elites—national elites in opposition to the 'alien' elites of the discriminatory community—the greater the national elites' efforts in mobilizing the masses around a national consciousness.[90] Thus,

[86] Jan Erk, "Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du nationalisme québécois," *Recherches Sociographiques* 43, no. 3 (2002): 504.
[87] Ibid., 501; Jacques Nagels, "La Situation Économique de la Flandre et le Mouvement Flamand," *Brussels Economic Review – Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles* 45, no. 4 (2002), 104.
[88] Jean-Claude Rolinat, *Nationalisme québécois et Canada français* (Paris: Éditions Dualpha, 2000), 72-73.
[89] John Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 5; Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 191.
[90] Hetukar Jha, "Stages of Nationalism: Some Hypothetical Considerations," in *National and Ethnic Movements*, edited by Jacques Dofny and Akinsola Akiwowo (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications Inc., 1980), 197.

the socio-economic inequality caused by the imposition of a linguistically based cultural division of labour acted as the catalyst for Flemish and Québécois nationalist academics and elites to identify their linguistic communities as forming a territorially defined nation. These nationalists then mobilized their respective communities within a nationalist movement, in an effort to reverse the socio-economic inequalities and lift the limitations on their social mobility by creating their proper nation-state structure within Flanders and Québec, which in both instances was founded on the principles of their respective ethno-linguistic national identities.[91]

However, before the development of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements can be adequately reviewed, it is necessary to define a framework for the analysis of the developmental process of a national movement. Fortunately, Miroslav Hroch can be credited with creating an approach that specifically targets the study of a national movement's development.

1.7 Developmental Process of National Movements

Miroslav Hroch's theory of the developmental process of a national movement is based on the analysis of 'non-dominant' ethnic groups, usually occupying a compact territory, which are dominated by an 'exogenous' ruling class. These non-dominant ethnic groups, which lack their own states, an indigenous ruling elite, and often a continuous cultural tradition in their own literary language, eventually go through an *identity awakening*, during which time group members become aware of their own 'ethnicity' and start to conceive of themselves as a potential nation.[92] As certain members of the group compare their situation to that of the established nations, there is the sentiment of certain deficits. These future nationalists begin efforts to overcome those deficits, seeking to obtain support of their compatriots. Hroch defines these organized endeavours aimed at achieving all the attributes of a full-fledged nation as being a 'national movement'.[93]

[91] Jan Erk, "Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du nationalisme québécois," *Recherches Sociographiques* 43, no. 3 (2002): 504.
[92] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010), 114-115.
[93] Ibid., 115; Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation Building Process in Europe," *New Left Review* 198 (1993): 6.

According to Hroch, a national movement's evolution occurs along three phases. In the beginning phase, or 'Phase A', the bulk of the nationalist activity is devoted to the scholarly inquiry into, and the propagation of, an awareness of the linguistic, cultural, social, economic and historical attributes of the non-dominant ethnic group.[94] This initial stage of the nationalist movement is followed by 'Phase B', during which a new range of nationalist activists emerge seeking to win over as many members of their ethnic community as possible to the project of creating a modern nation. In this secondary phase, nationalists set out to achieve their goals by way of patriotic or nationalist agitation, which is essentially an effort to spread the idea of the national identity.[95] Finally, 'Phase C' occurs once a large majority of the members of the non-dominant ethnic group link their social and political well-being to a 'national identity' of the ethnic group, with the 'national consciousness' then becoming the concern of the majority of the population; and thus, a mass movement emerges.[96]

Hroch underlines that one of the most important criteria for any typology of national movements is the relationship between the transitions to Phase B, and then to Phase C, and that the 'periodization' between phases allows for meaningful comparisons between national movements.[97] We argue that the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements transitioned from 'Phase A' of their development—the scholarly inquiry and propagation of an awareness of their respective linguistic, cultural, social, economic, and historical attributes—to 'Phase B'—a period of nationalist agitation aimed at spreading the idea of the national identity—at very different times. However, the development of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements into socio-political mass movements, rooted in a widely held ethno-linguistic sense of the nation, would occur around relatively the same time, during the latter half of the twentieth century. Thus, Hroch's theoretical model proves a useful tool in outlining the developmental phases of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements.

[94] Miroslav Hroch, "Real and Constructed: the nature of the nation," in *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, edited by John A. Hall (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 95.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010), 116.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

Our analysis focuses on the development of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, and the role that shared memories and their symbolic representations have played in establishing and perpetuating a similar ethno-lingustic and territorially linked conception of national identity. This idea of the national identity is characterized by a sense of opposition and struggle as defined by the principles of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which originated as a reaction to the linguistically defined cultural division of labour that was present in Flanders and Québec. The continuation of this ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest in Flanders and Québec, and subsequently the conception of the Flemish and Québécois nations, are central to the vitality of both nationalist movements.

Essentially, the theoretical framework of our research is based on three key principles regarding a nationalist movement's development: the theory of an uneven development and the effects of a subsequent 'cultural division of labour'; the tenets of 'reactive ethnicity perspective', in terms of explaining the establishment of group solidarity and a sense of *nation*; and the role of shared memories and symbols in establishing and sustaining the nature of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements.

As previously mentioned, we postulate that the genesis of both the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements can be explained by the development of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which was essentially established in reaction to a cultural division of labour defined along linguistic lines that had been historically present in Flanders and in Québec. As a means of overcoming the limitations on their social mobility, Flemish and Québécois nationalist academics and 'elites' relied on a nationalist agitation based on a discourse of a national identity that was contextualized by the struggle, oppression, and victimization of the nation. Moreover, this conception of the nation has been largely shaped by the evocation of shared memories of a national struggle to overcome the injustices inflicted on the Flemish and Québécois peoples.

The frontiers that developed in the eyes of the nationalists in Flanders (between the Flemish and Walloons) and in Québec (between the Québécois and English Canada) was based along ethno-linguistic lines, which we explain as being exacerbated, in both instances, by the effects of an uneven socio-economic development that came in the wake of *modernity*. Within Belgium and Canada, the effects of this 'uneven development' began in the mid-

nineteenth century and lasted until the mid-twentieth century, leaving the Dutch-speaking Flemish community and the French-Canadian community as the socio-economic 'periphery' in relation to the dominant 'metropolis' (English-speaking Canada and French-speaking Wallonia respectively).

Stemming from this uneven development, a 'cultural division of labour' was established, with the Dutch-speaking people of Belgium and the Francophones of Canada having their social mobility limited, as well as being over-represented in the working and agricultural classes, and under-represented politically and within the upper social classes.[98] In reaction to the cultural division of labour, Flemish and Québécois nationalist academics and elites promoted the development of a nationalist movement as a means of overcoming the imposed limitations on their socio-economic mobility. Both of these nationalist movements have been equally fixated on the injustices and indignity suffered by their nations at the hands of the dominant Anglophone Canadians and Francophone Walloons respectively; and thus, the discourse employed by both nationalist movements has embodied the principles of 'contentious politics'. As Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow explain, contentious politics are interactions between actors that are centred on matters of mutual claims of interests.[99] This has been the case in Flanders and in Québec, where both nationalist movements have sought to wrestle political power from the federal government of the Belgian and Canadian state respectively, which has historically been intent on keeping it.

This engagement in contentious politics, which is often the case for 'stateless' nationalist movements, is a driving force behind the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements' expression of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest; with political identities being based on the notion of a frontier separating the *nation* from the *others*, and with the contemporary conception of the nation being defined and perpetuated by key shared memories of the injustices inflicted upon the nation by the others. This phenomenon is in-line with the 'reactive ethnicity perspective', which theorizes that when there is the presence of a 'cultural division of labour', the solidarity of ethnic identities is often perceived in the context of a collective oppression. Moreover, the ethnic ties among economically disadvantaged

[98] Jan Erk, "Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du nationalisme québécois," *Recherches Sociographiques* 43, no. 3 (2002): 504.
[99] Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, *Politique(s) du Conflit: De la grève à la révolution* (Paris, Sciences Po. Les Presses, 2008), 20.

individuals—specifically that of language in the case of the Flemish and Québécois—plays an important role in facilitating conditions for the group formation essential to political mobilization.[100]

In our effort to understand why the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements share a similar nationalist profile, despite having socio-demographic and structural differences, we carry this theoretical framework one step further in explaining that even after the obstacles to social mobility for Dutch-speaking Flemish and French-speaking Québécois had been significantly overcome, thereby arguably eliminating the need to reinforce group solidarity along ethnic and occupational lines (which had previously been the case with the presents of a cultural division of labour), the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have continued to rely on an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest as a gallivanting force in shaping the conception of their national identities. Furthermore, both nationalist movements have relied upon the evocation of shared memories as a means of perpetuating a sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, and subsequent conception of the nation; and it is this phenomenon that accounts for the continuation of similar nationalist profiles in Flanders and Québec, despite diverging structural and socio-demographic influences.

Our research focuses on the developmental process of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movement, which reveals paralleling factors of origin while having clear differences in structural evolution. We also focus on the influence of key shared memories and symbols in perpetuating a similar sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and conception of the nation. To achieve this objective we utilize a method of historical comparative analysis referred to as 'process tracing'. The following chapter outlines the methodological approach of our analysis.

[100] Eric Leifer, "Competing Models of Political Mobilization: The Role of Ethnic Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 87, no. 1 (1981): 28.

Chapter 2
Methodology

Essentially, the objective of this dissertation is the isolation of independent variables that have a direct causal effect on the dependent variable. As previously mentioned, the dependent variable in question is the nationalist profiles of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, which are strikingly similar despite the presence of structural and socio-demographic differences. As a means of explaining this phenomenon, we have identified two related independent variables: the first being the perpetuated principles of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which originate from a mobilization against a linguistically defined cultural division of labour in Flanders and Québec; and secondly, the continued conceptualization of the Flemish and Québécois national identity as an ethno-linguistic *ethnie*, embodying a sense of survival in the face of historical injustices and upholding the ideal of a constant struggle against the enduring threat of renewed imposition and oppression at the hands of 'others'. This conception of the national identity has been framed by the tenets of the ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest established by Flemish and Québécois nationalists; and because these two independent variables are interdependent, our research views them together as accounting for the key causal variable as to why both nationalist movements continue to share a similar nationalist profile. Furthermore, we examine the instrumentalization and employment of key shared memories and symbolic linkages to the past on the part of nationalists, which can be defined as the causal mechanism for the perpetuation of the ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and the conception of the nation within the nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec.

A summary of our hypothesis is that the causal variable as to why the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have maintained similar nationalist profiles, despite contrasting socio-demographic realities and structural differences, is the perpetual conception of the nation as defined by the principles of the Flemish and Québécois ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest—the origin of which stems from a reaction to a linguistically defined cultural division of labour. Thus, as a means of testing our hypothesis, we use a multi-leveled historical comparative analysis approach, which relies on a method of process tracing to chart the causal chain from the genesis of the nationalist movements and national identities, to their perpetuation through the use of key shared memories.

2.1 Historical Comparative Analysis

The historical comparative analysis approach has been a fixture in the social sciences for a long time, going as far back as the works of Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Karl Marx. In fact, there has been a dramatic re-emergence of the comparative historical approach in recent decades.[101] As James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer explain, the historical comparative analysis approach is geared towards the explicit analysis of historical sequences and it takes seriously the unfolding of processes over time.[102] It is a model of analysis that aims to produce an explanation of important outcomes within delimited historical contexts, usually focusing on a small number of cases. Furthermore, this type of approach is concerned with causal analysis, the exploration of temporal processes, and uses systematic and contextualized comparisons.[103] Therefore, because we are concerned with an analysis of two nationalist movements within the context of their respective temporal development, a historical comparative analysis approach is ideal for our endeavour.

As our analysis is essentially the explanation of an outcome (or dependent variable) by using related causal independent variables, our approach can be said to be deterministic in nature. In following James Mahoney's definition of determinism, our approach assumes the existence of independent variables that exhibit a causal relationship with the outcome of the specific cases in question.[104] Moreover, our approach also follows the principles of J.S. Mill's method of agreement, which establishes that cases sharing a common outcome also share common hypothesized causal factors, despite varying in other significant ways.[105]

In the context of a comparative historical analysis, a deterministic explanation relies on conditions that are either necessary or sufficient causes, or both, in an effort to explain the

[101] James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, "Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3.
[102] Ibid., 12.
[103] Ibid., 14.
[104] James Mahoney, "Strategies of Causal Assessment In Comparative Historical Analysis," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 340.
[105] Edwin Amenta, "What We Know about the Development of Social Policy: Comparative and Historical Research in Comparative and Historical Perspective," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 341.

occurrence of an outcome, at least within the specified cases.[106] According to Mill's method of agreement, the outcome of interest will be present in all cases; and thus, it is logically impossible for any hypothesized cause not shared by the cases to be individually necessary for the outcome's occurrence.[107] More precisely, with *necessary cause* the absence of cause *x* is always associated with the absence of outcome *y*; however, the presence of cause *x* does not imply that outcome *y* will occur. With *sufficient cause* the presence of cause *x* is always associated with the occurrence of outcome *y*; however, another cause (*z*) may alternatively cause outcome *y*, and therefore the presence of *y* does not imply the presence of *x*. Only when a variable has a necessary and sufficient cause will the outcome always be present when the cause is present, and always absent when the cause is absent.[108] Mill's method of agreement dictates that a single deviation from a hypothesised pattern of necessary or sufficient causation is enough to eliminate a given factor as a potential cause.[109] Therefore, because our historical comparative analysis only involves two cases, and the hypothesized causal variable and the outcome are present in both cases, we can argue that our causal variable is both necessary and sufficient.[110]

However, our comparative analysis is not based solely on a linear historical explanation of the causal effect of our hypothesized explanatory variable. It also involves an examination of the 'causal mechanism' that links the explanatory variable to the dependent variable.[111] We identify the causal mechanism as being the instrumantalization and continued use of key shared memories and symbols on the part of Flemish and Québécois nationalist academics and elites (political leaders, social activists, etc.). It is through the employment of these shared memories and their symbolic representations that Flemish and Québécois

[106] James Mahoney, "Strategies of Causal Assessment In Comparative Historical Analysis," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 340-341.
[107] Edwin Amenta, "What We Know about the Development of Social Policy: Comparative and Historical Research in Comparative and Historical Perspective," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 342.
[108] James Mahoney, "Strategies of Causal Assessment In Comparative Historical Analysis," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 341.
[109] Edwin Amenta, "What We Know about the Development of Social Policy: Comparative and Historical Research in Comparative and Historical Perspective," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 342.
[110] James Mahoney, "Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-N Analysis," *Sociological Methods & Research* 28, no. 4 (2000), 392-393.
[111] Ibid., 412.

nationalists are able to maintain the collective conceptualization of their respective ethno-linguistic national identities, in terms of being in a constant state of peril and struggle, which is defined by the tenets of the ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest developed in Flanders and Québec. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the key shared memories and symbols that have a direct causal effect on the dependant variable—the nationalist profile of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. Consequently, we employ a historical comparative analysis technique of causal inference known as 'process tracing', permitting us to analyze shared memories and symbols as the causal mechanism.

2.2 Process Tracing

The key element of a historical comparative analysis is establishing the causal association between the explanatory variable and the outcome variable. However, for our purposes, identifying the causal mechanism that explains how and why the explanatory variable is determinant for the outcome variable is of equal importance.[112] Therefore, our historical comparative analysis relies on a method referred to as 'process tracing'. The advantage of using process tracing is that it offers the capacity to marshal many observations to support deductive claims regarding linkages in a causal chain.[113] In general terms, a method of process tracing is aimed at generating and analyzing data on the causal mechanisms and other intervening variables that link putative causes to observed effects.[114] This is ideal for our endeavour in that we attempt to define an antecedent variable that can be traced to the development of the explanatory variable, which, in turn, has a causal effect on our outcome variable through the agency of a causal mechanism.

Process tracing is also often used when analysing a small number of cases to avoid mistaking a spurious correlation for a causal association. A spurious correlation arises when the explanatory and outcome variables appear to be causally related, but, in fact, the presence of an antecedent variable explains away the presumed causal relationship between the

[112] James Mahoney, "Strategies of Causal Assessment In Comparative Historical Analysis," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 363.
[113] Jack A. Goldston, "Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolution," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 49.
[114] Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, "Process Tracing in Case Study Research," MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods (Harvard University, October 17-19, 1997).

hypothesized explanatory and outcome variables.[115] As a means of ensuring that there is not a spurious correlation in our analysis, we establish the presence of a 'causal chain' linking an antecedent variable to the explanatory variable, which subsequently has a causal relationship with the outcome variable. More specifically, the antecedent variable present in our research is the historical presence of a linguistically based cultural division of labour in Flanders and Québec, which impeded the socio-economic mobility of Dutch-speaking Flemings and French-speaking Québécois. The oppositional reaction to this cultural division of labour on the part of nationalist academics and elites acted as the seminal force behind the genesis of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest in Flanders and in Québec, which subsequently helped define the conception of the Flemish and Québécois nations.

Therefore, through process tracing we seek to establish a causal association between the antecedent variable and the dependent variable through the agency of the explanatory variable; thus creating a 'causal chain', which is linked together by the effect of a 'causal mechanism'.[116] As previously mentioned, our theory proposes that the causal mechanism is the perpetuation of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and related conception of the collective national identity through the use of key shared memories and symbols on the part of Flemish and Québécois nationalists.

In our analysis, we use an approach of process tracing referred to as 'process verification', which involves testing whether the observed processes among variables in the cases in question match those predicted by the previously designated theory.[117] More precisely, our approach of process verification seeks to confirm the theorised causal chain, linking the socio-economic effects of a linguistically based cultural division of labour, to the origins of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest that defines the conception of the national identity, which subsequently has had a perpetual causal effect on the national profile through the agency of shared memories and symbols. As a means of confirming our theorized causal chain, our approach involves a cross-case historical analysis of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements on a number of different levels.

[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid., 364.
[117] Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, "Process Tracing in Case Study Research," MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods (Harvard University, October 17-19, 1997).

2.3 Structure of Approach

There are three main phases to our approach: an analysis of the development of both nationalist movements, an examination of the contrasting structural and socio-demographic factors, and an analysis of key shared memories and symbols. The objective of the first phase is to establish the presents and effect of the theorized causal variables, while the second phase outlines the alternative influencing factors that would suggest a different outcome, and the third phase demonstrates the effect of the causal mechanism.

To begin with, we examine the development of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements though a cross case historical comparative analysis, which culminates with an outline of the nationalist profiles of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. The historical analysis of both nationalist movements is done in the context of Miroslav Hroch's theory on the developmental process of a national movement. From this analysis we seek to isolate the similar variables that have affected the development of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements; this is to say, a linguistically based cultural division of labour, an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, and a similar conception of the national identity. More importantly, our comparative analysis explains how in both Flanders and Québec, the oppositional reaction to the effects of a cultural division of labour acted as an antecedent variable in creating an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, and subsequently the conception of national identity. Finally, we highlight the lasting effect of these common variables by outlining the paralleling nationalist profiles in Flanders and Québec.

In the second phase of our approach, we present the structural differences between the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, including diverging economic and ideological principles, differing organizational structures, and a contrasting influence of the Catholic Church. Furthermore, we explore the differing socio-demographic, economic, and political situations of Flanders and Québec. The objective of this phase of analysis is to highlight the various alternative influential factors that would intuitively lead to the assumption that the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have very different nationalist profiles.

The third and final phase of our approach examines how shared memoires have acted as the casual mechanism, in terms of perpetuating the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements' conception of an ethno-linguistic nation in peril, which has been defined by the tenets of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest. Ultimately, we content that it is this causal

effect which explains why the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements continue to exhibit similar nationalist profiles. However, based on the parameters of this research project, which delimit the length of this dissertation, we focus our analysis on only specific key shared memories (and their symbolic linkages) found within the historical narrative of each community. Furthermore, is important to note that our historical comparative analysis is faced with certain limitations. For example, although our analysis relies on the large body of scholarly inquiry, in both English and French, focused on the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, our research could have been enhanced by incorporating the wide array of research on Flemish nationalism and the Flemish nationalist movement that is exclusively available in Dutch.

Another arguable weakness of our analysis is limiting the focus of the research to only two cases. We recognize that it would be more advantageous to broaden the scope of the analysis, and include more cases to compare and contrast. Moreover, our research falls into the traditional dilemma of being fixated on cases from the 'Western world'; a constant criticism of studies related to nationalism is their ethno-centric and 'Western' concentration. A richer comparison would undoubtedly include cases of nationalism and nationalist movements in Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East. However, it should be noted that this dissertation is structured in accordance with pre-established parameters of length, and therefore a more wide-ranged study encompassing other cases for analysis and comparison would not be feasible under the circumstances.

Accepting these analytical limitations, it should be reiterated that the principal objective of our approach is the case specific explanation of why the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements share very similar profiles concerning their nationalist discourse and objectives, despite the presence of clear socio-demographic and structural differences; and thus, we are not concerned with establishing a causal variable that can be applied universally. At the same time, we establish a model of analysis based on identifying a casual chain, which defines the present nature of a nationalist movement by analysing both the factors influencing its origin, and the causal mechanism maintaining its nature. Therefore, our approach could provide a template for future applications in explaining the nature and development of other nationalist movements.

Part II
Development of the Flemish and Québécois Nationalist Movements

In chapter 3, we provide a cross case historical comparative analysis of the development of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. This analysis highlights the fact that both nationalist movements are rooted in an 'ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest', which was originally promoted by Flemish and Québécois nationalists as a means of redressing socio-economic inequalities that resulted from the presence of a 'cultural division of labour' in Flanders and in Québec.[118] Ultimately, it is our contention that as a direct result of the commonality in their expression of nationalism and in the conceptualization of their national identities, both the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements presently maintain similar nationalist profiles.

However, as Chapter 4 will point out, the development of both nationalist movements has been influenced by very distinctive elements; for example, the Flemish nationalist movement has been framed within a liberal Christian-democratic political ideology, while the nationalist movement in Québec has traditionally been based on leftist and secular principles.[119] Moreover, the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements are contextualized by differing organizational structures, which are present within states having very different socio-demographic and political realities.

[118] Jan Erk, "Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du nationalisme québécois," *Recherches Sociographiques* 43, no. 3 (2002): 500.
[119] Ibid.

Chapter 3
Cross Case Historical Analysis of the Flemish and Québécois Nationalist Movements

The following chapter presents a cross case historical analysis, exploring the genesis and developmental phases of both nationalist movements. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight the common effect of the linguistically based cultural division of labour that was historically present in Flanders and in Quebec, as a means of explaining the origins of the paralleling expressions of Flemish and Québécois nationalism, which subsequently have led to the similar nationalist profiles of both nationalist movements.

3.1 Impact of the First World War and the Flemish Front Movement

The origins of Flemish nationalism, as a movement of literary inquiry into the Flemish identity and culture (or what Miroslav Hroch refers to as 'Phase A' of the developmental process of national movements), can be traced back to the years immediately following Belgium's independence in 1830. It was during this time that Flemish literature written in Dutch was marginalized by the Francophone elite in Belgium, leading to an increasing awareness of a separate Flemish identity among Dutch-speakers.[120]

The most influential book of this era, "The Lion of Flanders," was written by Hendrik Conscience in 1838, and it sought to foster Flemish pride and self respect within the context of a Belgian national identity.[121] However, it would be the First World War that would usher in an evolution of the *Vlaamse Beweging* (Flemish Movement), as it transitioned from simply being devoted to the cultivation and protection of the Dutch language and Flemish culture in Belgium, to a nationalist agitation and propagation of a Flemish national identity.

This evolution of the Flemish Movement would be initiated by the development of the *Frontbeweging* (Flemish Front Movement) during the First World War, helping to transform the Flemish Movement into a socio-political movement of nationalist agitation, and driving Flemish nationalism towards becoming a popular mass movement within Flemish society. In fact, the 'Great War' would have a profound impact on the collective conscious of the Flemish community, influencing the Flemish nationalist movement right up until the present day.

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[120] Louis Vos, "Reconstruction of the Past in Belgium and Flanders," in *Secessions, History and the Social Sciences*, edited by Bruno Coppieters and Michel Huysseune (Brussels: Brussels University Press, 2002), 183.
[121] Theo Hermans, Louis Cos and Lode Wils (editors), *The Flemish Movement: A documentary History 1780-1990* (London: The Athlone Press, 1992), 86.

There was a profound resentment from Flemish soldiers during the First World War over the fact that the Belgian army was in practice a French institution, which acted as the catalyst for the development of a nationalist agitation aimed at building an awareness of a Flemish identity. The Francophone nature of the Belgian army of the day existed despite a law passed in 1913, which mandated that the army use both French and Dutch. Nevertheless, the vast majority of Belgian officers during the First World War were Francophones who gave their orders exclusively in French, and who were often openly discriminatory towards Dutch-speaking troops. Conversely, there was an over-representation of the Flemings in the Belgian regular army in the first years of the First World War, which only grew as the war progressed; going from 60 percent at the beginning of the conflict, to 72 percent in the latter half of the war. Moreover, 80 percent of the frontline troops were Flemish, and most of those were poorly educated Dutch-speaking labourers and farm workers, whose inability to understand French orders had fatal consequences in battle.[122] The conscripted Flemish soldiers were given instruction in French as part of their initial training; however, because so many of them were uneducated country teenagers, this practice was often a futile effort.[123]

As a means of battling against the isolation of being within an essentially French-speaking Belgian army, the Dutch-speaking soldiers, along with Flemish priests, teachers, and students (who were serving in the army as stretcher-bearers or orderlies), organized a vibrant social and cultural life among themselves. These groups were intellectually oriented, discussing Flemish literature and with the goal of establishing Flemish solidarity. However, senior Belgian officers were fearful that this solidarity among Flemish soldiers could result in a vulnerability to German influence, and thus took disciplinary action by banning any semblance of political organization within the army and the publishing of pamphlets, which often recounted the discriminatory action of the Francophone officers.[124]

By 1917, despite the attempted suppression, most of the individual Flemish societies that formed on the front came together under the official name of *De Frontbeweging* (the Front Movement). Originally, the Front Movement was dedicated to the recognition of

[122] Lode Wils, *Histoire des nations belges*, (Brussels: Éditions Labor, 2005), 221; Bernard A. Cook, *Belgium: A History* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2002), 105.
[123] Karen Shelby, "Conflicted Nationalism and World War I in Belgium: Memory and Museum Design," City University of New York (2008): 48, http://search.proquest.com/docview/304671659?accountid=13800.
[124] Bernard A. Cook, *Belgium: A History* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2002), 105.

Flemish vitality and culture, but it eventually radicalized to the point that some members began to call for Flemish independence from Belgium. The Front Movement would transcend the trenches of the First World War, greatly impacting Flemish society, and subsequently influencing the greater Flemish Movement during the German occupation. This Flemish nationalist agitation coming from the frontline soldiers eventually developed into an important political movement, dramatically shaping Flemish nationalism.[125]

As a direct result of the stories of discrimination coming from the front, several letters were written by *flamingant*[126] activists to King Albert I, demanding the legal rights of the Flemish be recognized when the war was over. In 1916, after the Belgian government publicly refused to make the University of Ghent a Dutch-speaking institution after the war, the leaders of the Front Movement approved a motion allowing the occupying German administration to establish the university for them. At the end of 1916, the Flemish 'frontists' created their own political party, the *Frontpartij* (Front Party), followed by the creation of a Council of Flanders in 1917, which was geared towards working with the occupying German administration in Belgium to establish the administrative separation of Flanders from Wallonia.[127]

The German administration of occupied Belgium during the First World War implemented a 'divide and rule' policy of rapprochement with the Flemish community, known as *Flamenpolitik*. This policy would have a profound influence in shaping the Flemish Movement during the First World War (as it would again years later during the Second World War). In 1917, the German military governor of Belgium, Moritz Von Bissing, convened a commission to organize the division of the country. In a decree, Von Bissing separated Belgium into two administrative areas: Flanders and Wallonia. This measure would have a lasting impact on both Flemish and Walloon nationalists, and acted as the germination for later claims to create a federal Belgian state.[128] The influence of the German policy of *Flamenpolitik* on the Flemish nationalist movement (during both world wars) cannot be overemphasised; and although the policy was an overall failure in terms of dividing the general Belgian public's loyalties during the First World War (Flemings included), it did show

[125] Ibid.
[126] *Flamingant* is the term used in Belgium to describe all activists and nationalists of the Flemish Movement. Conversely, *wallingant* is the term used to describe Walloon nationalists.
[127] Lode Wils, *Histoire des nations belges*, (Brussels: Éditions Labor, 2005), 221-222.
[128] Ibid., 226.

Flemish nationalists, especially those involved with the Front Movement, that the idea of their own governance was obtainable, and it also reinforced the idea of a Flemish identity apart from a Belgian one.[129]

In the immediate aftermath of victory in the First World War, there was a resurgence of Belgian patriotism within much of the Flemish community, including a high level of popularity for King Albert and pride in the Belgian colonial empire. But the nationalist agitation of the Front Movement would continue to encourage the development of Flemish nationalism. For many Flemings, patriotism and loyalty towards the nation would shift from Belgium to Flanders; and in the 1930s, the idea of a Flemish nation would become an indubitable fact.[130]

The treatment of Dutch-speaking soldiers by French-speaking officers in the Belgian army during the First World War, and the fact that most of the frontline troops were Flemings, exemplified the effect of a linguistic cultural division of labour that was present in Belgium at the time. The First World War would exacerbate Flemish nationalists' frustration with a Belgian state that was effectively controlled by a Francophone bourgeoisie, thus serving as a catalyst for the establishment of a Flemish ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest. In fact, the creation of shared memories embodying Flemish frustrations during the First World War would take shape very early on, and a prime example of this is the story of the brothers Van Raemdonck. Historical evidence indicates that Frans Van Raemdonck died in a heated battle during the First World War while cradling a dying Walloon soldier, Aimé Fiévez. However, in disseminating the shared memories of Frans Van Raemdonck's death, Flemish Frontists substituted Fiévez for Frans Van Raemdonck's brother, Edward. But history tells us that, although Edward had died in the same pitched battle as his brother Frans, he did not do so in Frans's arms.[131] Nevertheless, the shared memories of the Van Raemdonck brothers would become entrenched in the collective memory of Flemings, taking the form of stories and poems, many of which are still influential within the Flemish nationalist movement today.

[129] Ibid., 224-225.
[130] Ibid., 233.
[131] William Hirst and Ioana Apetroaia Fineberg, "Psychological perspectives on collective memory and national identity: The Belgian case," *Memory Studies* 5, no. 86 (2011): 89.

3.2 La Révolution Tranquille: French-Canadian Nationalism to Québécois Nationalism

In Québec, the First World War, as well as the Second World War, would also be a flash point for tension, as Francophones in Québec staunchly opposed being conscripted to fight in what many viewed as being wars of British imperialist design.[132] However, the conflict over the question of the conscription in Québec during the First and Second World Wars would primarily stimulate reflections by the Francophone *intelligentsia* on French-Canadian nationalism. It would not be until the nationalist agitation during the *Révolution Tranquille* (Quiet Revolution) of the 1960s that a widespread sense of a *Québécois* national identity began to take hold among Francophones in Québec. This sentiment of *Québécois* nationalism would replace what had previously been a pan-Canadian ideal of French-Canadian nationalism.

In the period immediately following the end of the Second World War, efforts at modernizing Québec society were held back by the socio-economic policies of politicians and the Catholic Church's position on education. During this time, Québec was governed by the *Union nationale* government of Maurice Duplessis, which was focused on establishing the economic autonomy of the province by relying on American and Canadian Anglophone private investment, while leaving the Catholic Church to essentially remain in control over the social development of Québec society.[133] The policies of the Duplessis government pushed for the provincial autonomy of Québec in the name of what had been traditional French-Canadian nationalism, and Duplessis relied on the power and hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church to establish the social values of Québec society.[134]

This dominant role of the Catholic Church in Québec had been established following the British 'Conquest' of New France in 1760, and the implementation of the Québec Act of 1774, which allowed the Church to impose tithes, as well as build and staff educational and welfare institutions.[135] Furthermore, economic power in Québec was effectively in Anglophone hands, with Francophone elites being more heavily concentrated in the liberal professions and the clergy. Anglophone control over Québec's economy and commercial

[132] Jean-Claude Rolinat, *Nationalisme Québécois & Canada* Français (Paris: éditions Dualpha, 2000), 60-61.
[133] Louis Balthazar, *Bilan du Nationalisme au Québec* (Montréal: l'Hexagone, 1986), 82.
[134] Susan Mann, *The Dream of a Nation: a social and intellectual history of Quebec* (Montréal: McGill University Press, 2002), 270.
[135] Kenneth McRoberts, "Internal colonialism: The case of Québec," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2, no. 3 (1979): 301.

activity began soon after the Conquest and continued into the 1800s, when industrialization was introduced to Québec by Anglophones financed by British capital. Then during the first half of the twentieth century, a shift to the United States as the dominant source of capital and the primary trade partner of Québec only further weakened the position of Francophones within the Quebec economy.[136] Due primarily to the lack of resources available to Francophones in Québec, there was a clear segmentation of occupations.[137] Increasingly, Francophones were restricted to blue-collar jobs in Québec and found themselves working in enterprises owned by English-Canadians and Americans, in which the managerial jobs were filled by Québec's Anglophone population. Census data from 1961 showed that even with comparable levels of education, Francophones in Québec occupied less significant positions in the economy than did Anglophones.[138] Thus, the imposition of a cultural division of labour in Québec can be traced back to the late seventeenth century, only to be exacerbated by an uneven development of industrialization, and continuing through to the first half of the twentieth century.

However, the status quo in Québec society would be challenged by the emergence of a 'neo-nationalist' *intelligentsia* in Québec, which called for social mobilization against the *laissez-faire* economic policies of the Duplessis government, and against the social domination of Québec society by the Catholic clergy. This neo-nationalist movement pushed for a policy of 'secular statistism', in which the Québec 'state' was to become the motor behind economic development and social change, with the principal objective being the empowerment and amelioration of Francophones in Québec.[139]

It would be Québec's Liberal Party that initially gave this emerging Québécois nationalism a political voice, after the party won the 1960 provincial elections and enacted the social and economic reforms that essentially sparked the 'Quiet Revolution'. The objective of these reforms was a progressive economic emancipation of French-speaking Québécois, and an affirmation of the Québécois national identity. Moreover, Québécois nationalism would

[136] Ibid., 302.
[137] Ibid. 303-304.
[138] Ibid., 305.
[139] Louis Balthazar, *Bilan du Nationalisme au Québec* (Montréal: l'Hexagone, 1986), 95-96.

replace Catholicism's role within Québec society as the galvanizing force that was able to rally and mobilize Francophones.[140]

Amidst this period of the Quiet Revolution in Québec during the 1960s, a number of nationalist and 'independentist' organizations were established, for example the *Ralliement National* (RN) and the *Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale* (RIN). The RIN was notably a movement of nationalist psychology, using propaganda and disseminating information during manifestations and within publications as a means of creating nationalist agitation, in an effort to diffuse the ideal of a Québécois nation and the independence of Québec.[141] This nationalist agitation during the Quiet Revolution resulted in Francophones in Québec increasingly identifying themselves as *Québécois*, transitioning away from the idea of being 'French-Canadian', and subsequently viewing Québec as the 'state' irrevocably linked to the Québécois nation.[142] Therefore, in following Miroslav Hroch's approach to the study of national movements, the 'awakening' of the Québécois national identity can be described as the transition to 'Phase B' of the Québécois nationalist movement's development.

Despite the discrepancy in the timeline of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements' transition from 'Phase A' to 'Phase B' of development (Phase B being the nationalist agitation leading to an 'identity awakening' of the contemporary conception of the nation), the nationalist agitation that developed within both societies embodied an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, and was similarly aimed at overcoming the socio-economic limitations of an imposed cultural division of labour. This shared characteristic attributing to the 'identity awakening' of the Flemish and Québécois nations is a key variable as to why the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements maintain similar nationalist profiles to this day. The ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and conception of the national identity, which originated as an oppositional response to a cultural division of labour, would be perpetuated overtime in Flanders and Québec, as both nationalist movements evolved socio-politically in capturing mass appeal.

[140] Ibid., 131; Jean-Claude Rolinat, *Nationalisme québécois et Canada français* (Paris: Éditions Dualpha, 2000), 97.
[141] Jean-Claude Rolinat, *Nationalisme québécois et Canada français* (Paris: Éditions Dualpha, 2000), 72.
[142] Ibid., 132.

3.3 Rise of the Contemporary Flemish Nationalist Movement and Belgian Federalism

In the years following the Second World War, the Flemish Movement became relatively dormant. This was primarily due to the stigma of Nazi collaboration, which was caused by the close association of some *Flamingant* groups with the Nazis during the occupation of Belgium. However, the Flemish Movement would become revitalized in the 1950s, when a renewed interest in Flemish social and economic issues came to the forefront, and as the Flemish economy was catching up to the Walloon economy, which was suffering from slowing industry. Flanders would see growth in economic development and improved living standards during this period. There was also an expansion of higher education, and more and more Flemish workers remained in Flanders rather than migrating to Wallonia, with the call coming from Flemish nationalists for Flemings to "Work in our own Region".[143]

The 1950s would also see the Flemish Movement galvanize politically. In 1952, the Flemish nationalist organization and pressure group *Vlaamse Volksbeweging* (VVB) was established, and over the course of the 1950s and beyond, the VVB would shape the Flemish Movement's calls for Belgian federalism, educational reform, and Flemish cultural autonomy.[144] Coinciding with the formation of the VVB, an electoral alliance of Flemish nationalists entered elections under the name of *Christelijke Vlaamse Volksunie* (Christian Flemish People's Union) in 1954. The party's name soon changed to the *Volksunie* (People's Union), with the party's platform being centred on the federalization of the Belgian state.[145] Thereafter, the *Volksunie* became a part of the Belgian electoral landscape, and although the party would win only a single seat in the 1954 legislative elections, it would rapidly gain in support throughout the 1960s. This period would signal the final stage of development of the Flemish national movement (what Hroch refers to as 'Phase C'), as the social and political well-being of the Flemish nation became the concern of the majority of the population in Flanders.

By the 1960s, the Flemish economy had surpassed the stagnating Walloon economy; and as a result, *wallingant* (the term used in Belgium to describe Walloon nationalists) leaders

[143] Theo Hermans, Louis Cos and Lode Wils (editors), *The Flemish Movement: A documentary History 1780-1990* (London: The Athlone Press, 1992), 332.
[144] Lode Wils, *Histoire des nations belges*, (Brussels: Éditions Labor, 2005), 287.
[145] Jan Erk, "From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself," *West European Politics* 28, no. 3 (2005), 496.

sought to protect the Walloon social-democratic economic model, while *Flamingants* were more preoccupied with assuring the cultural independence and the linguistic territoriality of Flanders, including Brussels and its periphery, which were becoming more and more French-speaking.[146] In 1962, a law was passed defining the linguistic borders in Belgium between the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking communities. However, the law granted special facilities to linguistic minorities in a few border regions, including parts of Greater Brussels, which subsequently created resentment among Flemish proponents of the territorial integrity of Dutch unilingualism in Flanders.[147] There was the sentiment among *Flamingants* that allowing for French language facilities in Flemish territory would perpetuate the intrusion of French in Flanders.[148]

The tensions between Dutch and French speakers in Belgium, along with Flemish nationalist agitation, hit a high-water mark during the conflict over the linguistic future of what had been the bilingual Catholic University of Leuven, located in Flemish Brabant. Flemish nationalists demanded a transfer of French faculties at the University of Leuven to their own institution in Wallonia, while the French students and professors were determined to stay put.[149] In 1965, the Walloon general secretary of the Catholic University of Leuven suggested publicly that Leuven was one of the points of the 'academic triangle' of a future bilingual 'Grand Brussels'. The result was mass demonstrations by Flemish students, with the rally cry of "*Walen Buiten*!" (Walloons Get-out!). The students were supported by Flemish professors and *Flamingant* politicians, and the protests would become more and more violent over the course of the late 1960s.[150] In the end, the student unrest over the Catholic University of Leuven brought down the Belgian government at the time in February 1968, and eventually a French-speaking university called *l'Université Catholique de Louvain* was moved to Louvain-la-Neuve, twenty kilometres southeast of Brussels, where French is the official language. In the wake of the crisis over the University of Leuven, political parties in Belgium

[146] Eric Vanneufville, *Le Coq et le Lion* (Paris : Éditions France-Emipre, 1998), 86.
[147] Bernard A. Cook, *Belgium: A History* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2002), 140.
[148] Ibid.
[149] Lode Wils, *Histoire des nations belges*, (Brussels: Éditions Labor, 2005), 308.
[150] Eric Vanneufville, *Le Coq et le Lion* (Paris: Éditions France-Emipre, 1998), 93; Theo Hermans, Louis Cos and Lode Wils (editors), *The Flemish Movement: A documentary History 1780-1990* (London: The Athlone Press, 1992), 389.

split along linguistic and national lines, and the 1968 election would signal the emergence of the Flemish nationalist *Volksunie* as a viable political party.[151]

By the late 1960s, Flemish nationalism had developed into the dominant socio-political and ideological force within Flemish society. The Flemish Movement's demand for full cultural autonomy could no longer be ignored. Eventually, there was what would be the first of many revisions to the Belgian Constitution in 1970, resulting in the establishment of three cultural communities: the Dutch Cultural Community, the French Cultural Community, and the German Cultural Community. The constitutional revision of 1970 also laid the foundation for the establishment of three administrative 'regions', which was in direct response to Flemish nationalists' demands for cultural autonomy, and in reaction to the calls for economic autonomy by both Walloon nationalists and the French-speaking inhabitants of Brussels.[152]

Since the 1970 changes to the Belgian Constitution, there have been four additional state reforms increasing the federative nature of Belgium. In 1980, the three cultural communities became simply referred to as 'communities', and the Flemish Community, the French Community, and the German Community were each granted a legislative council and government.[153] These communities continued to decide on cultural matters, but also dealt with matters relating to the 'individual' (namely health and social services). Moreover, the 1980 state reform also granted a legislative council and government to the Flemish and Walloon Regions. Immediately following the 1980 phase of constitutional reform, the Flemings had their regional legislative council and government transfer its competencies to the community legislative council and government, thus establishing an integral state structure in Flanders that had competence over cultural, language, and educational affairs, as well as responsibility for regional economic matters. Flemish nationalist governments subsequently used this sub-state structure as a means of obtaining their long desired cultural autonomy, as well as a large measure of political autonomy. Conversely, the French-speaking population did not choose to merge the institutions of the French Community and the Walloon Region.[154]

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[151] Lode Wils, *Histoire des nations belges*, (Brussels: Éditions Labor, 2005), 313-314.
[152] Ibid., 315.
[153] Belgian Federal Government: official information and services, "The First and Second State Reforms," http://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/country/history/belgium_from_1830/formation_federal_state/first_and_second_reform_of_state/.
[154] Ibid.

In 1988-89, the Belgian Constitution was again amended to give additional responsibilities to the regions and communities. The most sweeping change was the devolution of nearly all responsibilities for educational matters to the communities. The regions and communities were also provided additional revenue, and the Brussels Region was given its own legislative assembly and executive.[155] Then in the summer of 1993, the previous state reforms would be consolidated, transitioning Belgium into a fully-fledged federal state. This fourth round of changes to the Belgian state also reformed the bicameral parliamentary system and provided for the direct election of the members of the community and regional legislative councils. The bilingual Brabant province was split into separate Flemish Brabant and Walloon Brabant provinces; however, the electoral and judicial arrondissement of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) was not split, which, until very recently, continued to be a source of political tension. Finally in 2001, the Lambermont and Lombard Accords were passed in Belgium. The Lambermont Accord transferred more powers and taxation rights to the linguistic communities and to the regions, while the Lombard Accord granted guaranteed representation for the Flemish inhabitants of Brussels in the Parliament of the Brussels-Capital Region.[156]

The nationalist agitation of the Flemish Movement, and the subsequent push for the devolution of power to Flanders, led to a substantially autonomous Flemish sub-state structure being established within a Belgian Federation. In fact, after the 1993 state reform, the nationalist government in Flanders at the time affirmed that, "The deepening of Flemish autonomy is a natural process."[157] The Flemish Movement had essentially obtained political control over the region of Flanders and the solidarity of the Flemish nation. However, despite the numerous constitutional revisions, there remains a lot of political tension between French speakers and Dutch speakers in Belgium, and the voice of those *Flamingants* who insist that a fully independent Flanders is still necessary has only grown louder.

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[155] Belgian Federal Government: official information and services, "The Third and Fourth State Reforms," http://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/country/history/belgium_from_1830/formation_federal_state/third_and_fourth_reform_of_state/.

[156] Belgian Federal Government: official information and services, "The Fifth State Reform," http://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/country/history/belgium_from_1830/formation_federal_state/fifth_reform_of_state/.

[157] Lode Wils, *Histoire des nations belges*, (Brussels: Éditions Labor, 2005), 323.

3.4 Political Development of the Flemish Movement

In 1977, radical far-right factions within the *Volksunie* political party were incensed over the concessions given to Francophones in Brussels and in the Flemish Brabant, which were made as part of the Egmont agreement on the federalization of Belgium. These *Flamingant* hardliners in the *Volksunie* united with other far-right nationalist groups to form the far-right party *Vlaams Blok* (Flemish Block).[158] By 1978, the *Vlaams Blok* was the most notable militant right-wing party of the Flemish Movement, embracing a Christian conservative Flemish nationalism, emphasizing an anti-immigration platform, and calling for the independence of Flanders. The *Vlaams Blok* quickly began to gain ground in the Flemish and Belgian parliamentary elections, with election campaigns consisting mainly of an anti-immigration and law-and-order platform, combined with the desire for full Flemish autonomy and eventual independence.[159] However, all of the major Flemish political parties were reluctant to enter into coalitions with the *Vlaams Blok*, due to the party's far right-wing tendencies; and following a 1992 agreement between all of the other Flemish political parties, known as the *cordon sanitaire* (sanitary cordon), the *Vlaams Blok* was effectively blocked from entering into any level of government.[160]

In 2000, what had historically been the principal Flemish nationalist party, *Volksunie*, dissolved as a result of escalating internal conflicts, splitting into two new parties: Spirit, and N-VA or *Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliantie* (New Flemish Alliance). Both parties initially tried their luck in a cartel with another larger Flemish political party; N-VA allying with the Christian democrats of CD&V, and Spirit with the Flemish socialists of SP.a. But by 2004, the *Vlaams Blok* had arguably become the single most popular Flemish party in Belgium, having the support of about one in four of the Flemish electorate, as well as being one of the most successful radical right-wing populist parties in all of Europe. However, in April 2004, the Belgian Court of Cassation ruled that some of the party's affiliated organizations had breached a 1981 anti-racism law, and that it sanctioned discrimination. The ruling was made definitive on November 9th, 2004, and the *Vlaams Blok* shortly after reorganized itself as the *Vlaams Belang* (Flemish Interest), which took the lead as the most popular Flemish nationalist party in

[158] Jan Erk, "From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself," *West European Politics* 28, no. 3 (2005), 496.
[159] Ibid., 494-495.
[160] Ibid., 496.

Belgium, and quickly began securing the support of almost one in four of the Flemish electorate.[161]

The *Vlaams Belang* (VB) has since sought to change its image from a radical right-wing party to a more conservative party, and has tried to distance itself from some of its former more extreme programs. Nevertheless, most other parties have extended the *cordon sanitaire* to apply to the *Vlaams Belang*, effectively preventing the party from any executive power; however, the VB contested the 2006 municipal elections on the theme of "Secure, Flemish, Liveable", and obtained a massive increase of votes, seeing its council members almost double from 439 to nearly 800.

This viable far-right political element within the Flemish nationalist movement is very much a differentiating characteristic from the Québécois nationalist movement, indicative of the ideological cleavage between the rightist-Christian conservative nature of the Flemish Movement and the leftist secular nature of the nationalist movement in Québec. In the Belgian general election of June 2010, the right-wing Flemish separatist N-VA became the biggest party in Flanders, and even in Belgium as a whole, receiving 17.4 percent of the vote for the Belgian House of Representatives (3.96 percent higher than the second place Walloon socialist political party, the *Parti Socialiste*), and capturing 19.61 percent of the vote for the Senate.[162] The enormous growth of N-VA is generally explained as being caused by an influx of 'moderate' Flemish voters, who do not necessarily support the party's eventual aim of Flemish independence, but do want consistent and far-reaching reforms with greater autonomy for Flanders, something they no longer trust the traditional parties to be able to achieve.

The N-VA has arguably emerged as the main political force behind the Flemish nationalist movement, with the *Vlaams Blok* still appealing to more hard-line radical nationalists. However, despite the fact the Flanders has obtained considerable political autonomy and controls all matters concerning culture, education, and language in the region, the N-VA still maintains an adherence to an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest by continually making referenced to the injustices of the past.[163] This has notably been the case

[161] Ibid., 497.
[162] Belgian Federal Government: Federal Public Services Home Affairs, "Elections 2010," http://elections2010.belgium.be/en/index.html.
[163] "Cultural preconceived notions in Belgium," News: Features & Analysis, N-VA (official website - English), http://international.n-va.be/en/news/features-analysis/cultural-preconceived-notions-belgium.

for the current leader of the N-VA, Bart de Wever, who constantly evokes shared memories of the historic injustices inflicted on the Flemish nation in the context of justifying present day Flemish nationalist objectives. For example, at a conference in Inverness, Scotland put on by the Scottish Nationalist Party in October 2011, de Wever included the following statement in his speech:

"It [Belgium] was a centralized francophone nation, ruled by a francophone elite that dominated the majority of poor, illiterate and non-French speaking Flemings through censitary suffrage. This electoral system excluded most Flemings from the democratic process and sentenced them to a life in the social, economic and cultural margins of the state."

"But the struggle for universal suffrage would become a critical juncture for this new nation-state, the point where the paths of the Flemings and the French speaking Belgians would start to part. Universal suffrage introduced the Flemish masse into the democracy and sparked the struggle for equal rights, for the abolishment of linguistic barriers and for social justice. The French speaking elite reluctantly accepted the Flemish demands for reform and tried to temper the effects in every way. Which caused Flemish public opinion to radicalize."

"And so a pattern emerged that remains vibrant until this day. The French speaking minority fears becoming democratically out weighted by the Flemish majority. So they try to discourage every attempt to reform."[164]

3.5 The Parti Québécois and the Sovereignty Movement

In 1967, the congress of the Liberal Party of Québec rejected a proclamation calling for a sovereign Québec in a new Canadian union. The rejection of this proclamation led to the departure of a number of Québec nationalists from the Québec Liberal Party, including René Lévesque, who would go on to form their own party that same year, *le Mouvement Souveraineté-Association* (the Sovereignty-Association Movement).[165] Then in October 1968, following negotiations with the RN and the RIN, the fusion of the sovereigntist organizations occurred, establishing the *Parti Québécois* (PQ). The PQ proposed a less radical form of *sovereignty* for Québec, rather than the independence 'at any cost' that had previously been touted.[166] In fact, the PQ called for a 'sovereignty-association' with the rest of Canada based on the desire to see Québec become a state and member of the United Nations, as well as the

[164] Bart de Wever, "Nation Building in Flanders," SNP Fringe meeting (Inverness, Scotland, October 21, 2011): 3, http://international.n-va.be/files/nva_int/generated/dossier/Nation%20Building%20in%20Flanders.pdf.
[165] Jean-Claude Rolinat, *Nationalisme québécois et Canada français* (Paris: Éditions Dualpha, 2000), 72.
[166] André Bernard, "L'histoire de la revendication souverainiste québécoise," *Féderalisme Regionalisme* 1 (1999-2000): http://popups.ulg.ac.be/federalisme/document.php?id=277.

desire to assure the economic and social standing of Francophones Québécois, and preserve and protect French as the predominant language in Québec.[167]

Essentially, the Québécois nationalist movement had entered its final stage of development ('Phase C') with the creation of the PQ; and in the 1970 Québec provincial election, the PQ obtained 24 percent of the vote, resulting in the election of six deputies to the *Assemblée nationale* (National Assembly), Québec's provincial legislature. Then in 1976, the PQ won the provincial election by having seventy-one deputies being elected and the party gaining 41 percent of the vote.[168] After obtaining political power in Québec, the PQ passed an important law in 1977 called the Charter of the French Language (also commonly known as Bill 101), which defined French as the only official language of Québec, and established fundamental language rights and a language policy.

Although nationalism in Québec was not solely defined by the idea of *sovereignty* during this time, the victory of the PQ was indicative of the fact that the sovereigntist movement had taken the lead in terms of being the predominant focus of the Québécois nationalist movement. It was also evident that Québec nationalism had become fully entrenched as a widespread socio-political force within Québec society, centralized around the PQ.

At its seventh national convention from June 1st to 3rd, 1979, the members of the PQ adopted a strategy for a referendum on the sovereignty of Québec. They then began an aggressive effort to promote the idea of 'sovereignty-association' by providing details of how the economic relations with the rest of Canada would include free trade between Canada and Quebec, common tariffs against imports, and a common currency. In addition, joint political institutions would be established to administer these economic arrangements. Sovereignty-Association was proposed to the population of Quebec in the 1980 'Québec referendum', resulting in the proposal being rejected by 60 percent of the Quebec electorate; however, the period following the referendum would only serve to solidify the Québec sovereignty movement as the principal force of the Québécois nationalist movement.

In the aftermath of the 1980 Québec Referendum, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau began discussions of constitutional renewal. Québec wanted to see changes to the

[167] Ibid.
[168] Ibid., 98-99.

structure of federal power in relation to the provinces, including an 'opt out' clause for federal programs with equivalent funding being given to the provinces, as well as Québec's right to veto any constitutional amendments specifically affecting the province. However, in November 1981, an agreement was reached between Prime Minister Trudeau and the leaders of all of Canada's provinces except Québec on the text concerning the 'patriation' of Canada's Constitution, which would make it strictly under Canadian jurisdiction, rather than part of British law as it had been in the form of the 1867 British North America Act. On April 17, 1982, Queen Elisabeth II signed the Canada Constitution Act into law without Québec as a signatory to the document.

The 1982 Constitution Act was followed by two failed attempts to get Québec's consent to the Constitution. The first attempt was in 1987, in the form of the Meech Lake Accord, which proposed amendments to the 1982 Constitution aimed at obtaining Québec's endorsement of it and increasing support in Québec for remaining within Canada. The Meech Lake Accord was put forth by Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and the ten provincial premiers at the time, including the Premier of Québec Robert Bourassa. However, the accord was unable to be ratified before the predetermined deadline in 1990, and its rejection re-energized support for Québec sovereignty. In fact, in the fallout from the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, several Québec Members of Parliament from the federal Progressive Conservative and Liberal parties followed the federal Environment Minister, Lucien Bouchard, in the forming of a new federal party, the *Bloc Québécois* (BQ), whose main platform was the promotion of the Québec sovereignty movement in Canada's Parliament. In the 1993 Canadian federal election, the BQ won fifty-four out of the seventy-five seats in Québec, which resulted in the BQ becoming the official opposition in the Canadian Parliament.[169]

The second attempt at resolving the constitutional rift between Canada and Québec would come in 1992, with the Charlottetown Accord. This time the constitutional amendments would be submitted to a Canada-wide public referendum on October 26 of that year; however, the accord was resoundingly defeated in Québec and in the rest of Canada.[170] In the aftermath of the Charlottetown Accord—the second failed attempt at obtaining Québec's formal consent

[169] John Dickson and Brian Young, *A Short History of Quebec*, 4th ed. (Montréal: McGill University Press, 2008), 357.
[170] Kenneth McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997), 216.

to the 1982 Canadian Constitution—the Québec sovereignty movement regained its role as the dominant force behind Québec's nationalist movement. During the 1994 Québec provincial election, there was a renewed commitment by the *Parti Québécois* to hold a second referendum on Québec's sovereignty. This referendum would eventually come to fruition in October of 1995, and the results of this second sovereignty referendum would be a lot closer than the first, with 49.4 percent voting for sovereignty, while 50.58 percent voted against it.

Despite the fact that the 1995 referendum on Québec sovereignty was defeated, it was done so by less than one percent, with the majority of Francophones (60 percent) having voted in favour of sovereignty; and thus, Québec's sovereignty came to be regarded as an obtainable possibility.[171] As a consequence, Québec nationalists have maintained their motivation to continue the debate over the very idea of sovereignty, and the issue continues to dominate the Québec nationalist discourse.[172] The issue of sovereignty also remains the focal point of the *Parti Québécois*, and the Québec sovereignty movement is still relatively synonymous with the Québec nationalist movement.

3.6 Contemporary Profile of the Flemish and Québécois Nationalist Movements

The contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have both sought to impose a political and institutional recognition of their national identity on the Belgian and Canadian states respectively, regardless of the fact that such a measure of identity recognition goes against said states' own ideal of national identity.[173] Subsequently, both nationalist movements have engaged in a form of contentious identity politics with the perceived opposing nations (French-Speaking Walloons and English-Speaking Canadians); and thus, both nationalist movements are largely defined by the continuous conflictual interactions with these other *nations*.[174]

The nationalist discourse of both nationalist movements has been shaped by the advocacy of political mobilization to remove the historic limitations on the social mobility of

[171] Ibid., 230.
[172] Ibid., 233-234.
[173] Christophe Traisnel, "Le nationalisme de contestation en Amérique du Nord," in *Le Québec à l'aube du nouveau millénaire: entre tradition et modernité*, edited by Marie-Christine Weidmann Kopp (Québec: Press de l'Université du Québec, 2008), 21-22.
[174] Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, *Politique(s) du Conflit: De la grève à la révolution* (Paris, Sciences Po. Les Presses, 2008), 142.

Dutch-speaking Flemings in Belgium and French-speaking Québécois in Canada, as well as the preservation and protection of the Flemish and Québécois linguistic-culture. In present terms, however, this call to political mobilization is dominated by political actors claiming that the separation of Flanders and Québec from their current federal state structures (Belgium and Canada respectively) is the only means of ensuring the vitality of the language and culture of the Flemish and Québécois peoples. Furthermore, Flemish and Québec separatists envision the current federal systems in Belgium and Canada as being replaced by a 'partnership' or 'association' between independent states.

Because nationalists in Flanders and in Québec have an ethno-linguistic conception of their respective nations, language is at the heart of Flemish and Québébcois nationalism. As a result, the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements are focused on national territoriality and national community, which are both greatly defined by language. The nationalist rhetoric in Flanders and Québec is also contextualized in language and shaped by history, or more specifically the shared memories and symbols of past injustices suffered by the Flemish and Québécois nations; most notably the limitation on socio-economic mobility, which was caused by the imposition of a linguistically defined 'cultural division of labour' at the hands of the Francophones of Belgium and the Anglophones of Canada.

Another key focal point of the nationalist discourse of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements is the linguistic situation in Brussels and Montréal, which are viewed as being the epicentres of the linguistic conflict in Flanders and Québec respectively. Brussels, a city that became a predominantly Francophone enclave within Flanders over the course of the twentieth century, is a constant reminder to Flemish nationalists of the historic *frenchification* of Flemings in Belgium, whereas the large English-speaking population in Montréal is viewed by many Québécois nationalist as reminiscent of the historic Anglophone socio-economic domination of Québec and the resulting cultural division of labour. Flemish nationalists point to the fact that only 28.3 percent of Brussels' population of 1.02 million can speak Dutch, despite Brussels being an enclave within the region of Flanders, while 95.55 percent are able to communicate in French.[175] Thus, Flemish nationalists sound the alarm over the requirement to provide French language facilities for Francophones living in the Flemish municipalities on

[175] Rudi Janssens, "L'usage des langues à Bruxelles et la place du néerlandais. Quelques constatations récentes," *Brussels Studies*, no. 13 (2008), 4, http://www.briobrussel.be/assets/andere%20publicaties/fr_51_brus13fr.pdf.

the periphery of Brussels. There is fear among Flemish nationalists that the growing numbers of French speakers in the Flemish municipalities around Brussels will slowly expand the Francophone influence deeper into Flemish territory, a phenomenon of known as *verfransing* (Frenchification), which Flemish nationalists also refer to as being like an expanding *olievlek* (oil-stain).[176]

Similarly, the linguistic situation in Montréal is one of the flashpoints of the Québec sovereigntist movement. Historically, the unilingualism of downtown Montréal in the 1950s and 1960s was a catalyst for Québec society's 'Quiet Revolution'. Presently, the sovereignty movement points to the threat of a growing *Anglicization* of Montréal (especially in regards to Allophones and new immigrants) as an imposition of the Canadian federal government's policy of bilingualism, a policy effectively viewed by sovereigntists as a means of attacking the French language in Québec.[177]

The separatists in Flanders and the sovereigntists in Québec have emerged as the galvanizing force behind the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, despite the fact that Flanders and Québec presently enjoy a high degree of devolution of power within their respective federal states, including extensive control over education, language, and cultural affairs. Since the 1960s, both nationalist movements have worked towards establishing an alternative nation-state structure separate from the federal government, and this feat has resulted in a combination of popular support for territorial decentralization and the institutional capacity to translate that support into meaningful political pressure. In terms of the political strategy to obtain independence, both the largest Flemish separatist political party, *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie,* and the principal Québec sovereigntist political party*, le Parti Québécois,* currently call for a gradual increase in the devolution of power away from the respective federal governments in Belgium and Canada, until the democratic obtainment of independence for Flanders and Québec becomes an inevitability.[178]

The Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have profoundly influenced the social and political landscape of their respective societies. In fact, nationalism has become a

[176] Eric Vanneufville, *Le coq et le lion : La Belgique à la croisée des chemins* (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1998), 128.
[177] Louis Balthazar, "L'évolution du nationalisme québécois," in *Le Québec en jeu: Comprendre les grand défis*, edited by Gérard Daigle and Guy Rocher (Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1992), 15.
[178] "Does the N-VA want Belgium to end?" About the N-VA: FAQ, N-VA (official website - English), http://international.n-va.be/en/about/faq; "Plan pour un Québec souverain," Le Parti Québécois (official website), http://pq.org/souverainete/plan.

dominant characteristic of the socio-political culture in both Flanders and Québec. Both nationalist movements have been defined by an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and ethno-linguistic conception of their nations, which originated as an oppositional reaction to a linguistically based cultural division of labour. This has resulted in both contemporary nationalist movements having a similar nationalist profile (nationalist discourse, cultural-linguistic agenda, and political strategy and objectives), despite the fact that the Flemish nationalist movement is rooted in more right-leaning Christian democratic principles, while the Québécois nationalist movement is ideologically secular and social-democratic in nature. As a means of explaining this phenomenon, we point to key shared memories and symbols that act as a causal mechanism in perpetuating the ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and conception of the national identity in Flanders and Québec; however, before analysing these shared memories and symbols, the following chapter highlights the clear diverging characteristics that intuitively should act as differentiating influences on the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements.

Chapter 4
Structural and Socio-Demographic Differences

The similar nationalist profile of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements seems almost counter-intuitive when considering the vastly different influential elements that have been present in each nationalist movement's historical development. The following sections will review these differences, including the diverging ideological principles of both national movements, as well as the contrasting socio-demographic, economic, and political realities of Flanders' place within Belgium as compared to Québec's position within Canada.

4.1 Structural Differences between the Flemish and Québécois Nationalist Movements

Political actors and parties have become the primary focal point for both the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. However, there are a number of differences between Flanders and Québec in terms of the political divisions and organization of the nationalist political parties. The contemporary nationalist movement in Québec has been politically centralized around the *Parti Québecois* and the issue of sovereignty since the 1970s.[179] And despite the recent emergence in Québec of a more left-leaning social democratic sovereigntist party, *Québec Solidaire,* the PQ presently maintains its predominant role as the political vehicle for the objectives of the Québec sovereigntist movement.[180] Nevertheless, all provincial political parties in Québec have members proclaiming to be some degree of 'nationalist', whether that label be as a 'sovereigntists', 'federalist-nationalists' (which are primarily members of the *Parti Libéral du Québec*), or 'autonomists' (used to describe some members of *Coalition Avenir Québec*). However, although both federalist-nationalist and autonomists (or soft-nationalists) seek constitutional recognition of Québec's cultural distinction within Canada, they differ from sovereigntists in that they do not seek full independence for Québec.

In Flanders, the nationalist movement is politically much more fragmented than in Québec with double the number of viable Flemish nationalist political parties. This is due to

[179] Hudson Meadwell, "The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec," *World Politics* 45, no. 2 (1993): 238.
[180] In the 2008 Québec provincial election, *Québec Solidaire* obtained one seat in Québec's provincial legislative body, *l'Assemblé nationale* (the National Assembly); however, the party failed to increase its share of the vote as compared to the previous election. *Québec Solidaire's* left-leaning and sovereigntist constituency still appears to be limited to urban Montreal and continues to face strong opposition in gaining ground on the *Parti Québécois* amongst sovereigntist voters in the rest of Québec: Éric Bélanger, "The 2008 Provincial Election in Quebec," *Canadian Political Science Review* 3, no. 1 (2009): 98.

the fact that several Flemish political parties can be said to be sympathetic with the Flemish Movement; however, these Flemish political parties are divided by being either 'separatist' or 'confederalist'. The two political parties focused on Flemish nationalism, *Vlaams Belang* and N-VA, are separatist, with both parties seeking outright independence for Flanders, while the *Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams* (Christian Democratic and Flemish, or CD&V), *Libertair, Direct, Democratisch* (Libertarian, Direct, Democratic, or LDD), and *Open Vlaamse Liberalen en* Democraten (Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats, or Open VLD) all prefer a confederal option for a more autonomous Flanders within Belgium.[181]

Despite the larger number of nationalist political parties in Flanders, Flemish political parties will very often come together to establish coalitions (or 'cartels' as they are called in Belgium) at both the federal and regional levels—a phenomenon that does not occur in Québec. Moreover, all of the Flemish political parties have a presence at both the regional and federal levels of government. In Québec, however, the nationalist movement is primarily concentrated at the provincial level of government, namely in the form of the *Parti Québécois*, while the *Bloc Québécois* (BQ), which functions separately from the PQ (although the two parties are associated), has the objective of representing the interests of Québec and the sovereigntist movement at the federal level of government within the Canadian Parliament.

But the most dramatic structural difference between the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movement is the presence of a clear ideological cleavage; in Flanders, the Flemish Movement is rooted in Catholic conservatism and economic liberalism, while in Québec the nationalist movement is secular and predominantly social-democratic.[182] This ideological difference has resulted in the principal Flemish nationalist political parties—the far-right *Vlaams Belang*, the conservative N-VA, and the Christian-democratic CD&V—on the opposite side of the political spectrum from the Québécois nationalist movement's main political parties, most notably the centre-left *Parti Québécois*. These ideological differences can be traced to a contrasting relationship with the Catholic Church and the development of opposing economic principles.

[181] There are also a number of moderate Flemish nationalist politicians within the Flemish socialist party, *Socialistische Partij Anders* (SP.a).
[182] Jan Erk, "Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du nationalisme québécois," *Recherches Sociographiques* 43, no. 3 (2002): 511-512.

4.2 Influence of the Catholic Church and Far Right on the Flemish Nationalist Movement

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, while facing the simultaneous threat of liberalism, socialism, and a modernizing Jacobin state, the Catholic Church in Belgium decided to enter into mass politics after the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1894, in an attempt to galvanize the support of the newly enfranchised Dutch-speaking masses. The Church capitalized on class, religion, and language divisions in order to combat the anti-clerical alliance of predominantly French-speaking liberals and socialists at the time, successfully tapping into Flemish discontentment.[183]

The shift towards mass politics forced the Catholic Church to take drastic measures in order to hold back a growing tide of anticlericalism; the church was motivated by the fear that a socialist movement might give the secularism proposed by liberals in Belgium the vital mass support it needed. Therefore, the Catholic clergy decided to take an active role in Belgian politics, and in due course Flemish nationalism was incorporated into the Catholic labour movement in order to win over the Flemish lower classes.[184] This decision by the Belgian clergy during the late nineteenth century resulted in the Flemish nationalist project being securely linked to the Catholic Church. Furthermore, by championing the cause of a Catholic Flanders during a time of industrialization and the expansion of political suffrage, the church would come to greatly influence the Flemish nationalist movement's conservative character.

Ultimately, the Catholic Church was, and to some extent remains, a major constitutive force in the Flemish Movement, having a powerful material and ideological influence within the education system and labour organization in Flanders.[185] In fact, the Flemish labour movement is associated with the Christian democratic principles of the Flemish nationalist movement, and several Christian trade unions are united under the General Association of Christian Unions (*Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond*), in addition to the Christian Labour Union (*Algemeen Christelijk Werkersverbond*) and the Union of Christian Employers (*Verbond van Christelijke Werkgevers en Kaders*).[186] Moreover, the Flemish Press is also

[183] Jan Erk, "Sub-state nationalism and the left–right divide: critical junctures in the formation of nationalist labour movements in Belgium," *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no. 4 (2005): 553-554.
[184] Ibid., 561.
[185] Bob Jessop and Stijn Oosterlynck**,** "Cultural political economy: On making the cultural turn without falling into soft economic sociology," *Geoform* 39 (2008): 1161.
[186] Jan Erk, "Sub-state nationalism and the left–right divide: critical junctures in the formation of nationalist labour movements in Belgium," *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no. 4 (2005): 566.

dominated by ideologically Christian Democratic publications, as five of the seven main daily newspapers in Flanders have editorials taking a Christian democratic political stance.[187] The influence of the Catholic Church on the Flemish nationalist movement is profound, and partly explains the ideological divisions in Belgium between the predominantly socialist Wallonia and the predominantly Christian democratic Flanders, with the Flemish nationalist movement having internalized the Catholic/secular cleavage of Belgian politics.[188]

Due to the influence of this historic role of the Catholic Church in shaping the Flemish Movement, Flemish nationalism is considerably more socially conservative than the nationalism expressed by the Québec sovereignty movement. This is reflected by the presence of the influential far-right within the Flemish nationalist movement. The political embodiment of this far-right element of Flemish nationalism began with the *Vlaams Blok* in 1978, which rebranded itself the *Vlaams Belang* in 2004. The *Vlaams Belang* has softened the xenophobic rhetoric and the calls for economic 'solidarity' in the form of an anti-trade union and conservative collectivist economic platform, which were central to the *Vlaams Blok*. Nevertheless, the *Vlaams Belang* has carried forward most of the far-right political ideals of Flemish nationalism that were embraced by its predecessor.[189] The far-right has managed to pull the political centre of the Flemish nationalist movement to the right, as the conservative and centre-right Flemish nationalist political parties have felt compelled to incorporate aspects of the far-right agenda; an agenda that includes strong anti-immigration, anti-Francophone, and 'anti-Belgian' positions.[190]

4.3 The Secularism of the Québécois Nationalist Movement

From the mid-nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, the Catholic Church defined the character of French-Canadian nationalism and was the dominant social and political force in Québec society. One of the main reasons for this phenomenon was the fact that the church had total control over the education system in Québec, as well as having a

[187] Jan Erk, "Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du nationalisme québécois," *Recherches Sociographiques* 43, no. 3 (2002): 512.
[188] Jan Erk, "Sub-state nationalism and the left–right divide: critical junctures in the formation of nationalist labour movements in Belgium," *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no. 4 (2005): 554; Eric Vanneufville, *Le Coq et le Lion* (Paris: Éditions France-Emipre, 1998), 61.
[189] Jan Erk, "From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself," *West European Politics* 28, no. 3 (2005): 495.
[190] Ibid., 499.

direct influence over the government.[191] In fact, during the era of the *Union Nationale* government of Maurice Duplessis, from 1944 to 1960, the Catholic Church was relied upon to shoulder the financial burden of education, hospital care, and social assistance; and thus, permitting the Duplessis government in Québec to 'opt out' of programs requiring financing from the Canadian federal government, which was done in the name of autonomy for the only province having a French-Canadian and Catholic majority.[192] But as a result of increased wealth, social mobility, urbanization, and a secularization of labour, the church in post-war Québec was unable to maintain its institutional status in terms of fulfilling the social dependencies of the French-Canadian society.[193]

These societal changes resulted in the emergence of a neo-nationalist political class beginning in the 1950s, which saw the influence of the Catholic Church as an obstacle to social and economic progress, and to the modernization of Québec. Instead, neo-nationalists turned their attention to Québec's provincial political institutions, or the 'state', as the motor that would propel Québec forward. As a result, the ecclesiastical influence in Québec was put into question by unions, cultural organizations, colleges, universities, etc., and eventually the Catholic Church was replaced by the Québec state structure as the cohesive social force in Québec society. The Québec governmental institutions gradually assumed control over matters concerning education, culture, social assistance, and the redistribution of wealth.[194] The emergence of a new political class would eventually break the church's hold over Québec society during the 'Quiet Revolution' of the 1960s, and in the process establish Québec nationalism as a secular movement.[195]

The secular nature of the contemporary nationalist movement in Québec is in stark contrast to the influential role of the Catholic Church in the development of the contemporary Flemish nationalist movement. This has resulted in the politics of Flemish nationalism being far more conservative and 'rightist' than the left-leaning ideology of the present Québec sovereignty movement. This ideological difference is compounded by opposing economic

[191] Husdon Meadwell, "The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec," *World Politics* 45, no. 2 (1993): 205; Gilles Gougeon, *A History of Quebec Nationalism* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1994): 81.
[192] Susan Mann, *The Dream of a Nation: a social and intellectual history of Quebec* (Montréal: McGill University Press, 2002), 271, 275.
[193] Ibid., 277.
[194] Ibid., 95.
[195] Louis Balthazar, *Bilan du Nationalisme au Québec* (Montréal: l'Hexagone, 1986), 96-97.

policies, with the Flemish Movement subscribing to economic liberalism, while the Québécois nationalist movement has developed a primarily 'statist' economic approach. Nevertheless, both types of economic policies originate from an effort to overcome the cultural division of labour that had historically been present in Flanders and Québec.[196]

4.4 The Flemish Movement's Economic Liberalism

In the mid-1950s, as the Flemish economy began to catch up to that of Wallonia, the Flemish nationalist movement pushed for a reversal of the disadvantaged socio-economic situation of Dutch-speaking Flemings in Belgium. The economic development of Flanders would be due in large part to an expansion of Flemish higher education and a movement to have Flemish workers stay in Flanders with the slogan, "Werk in eigen streek" (Work in your region), rather than providing labour for Walloon industry.[197]

In the midst of an influx of foreign investment into Flanders, due primarily to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which created a free-trade zone between Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg), and to the 1959 Belgian legislation favouring foreign investment,[198] the Flemish Movement became focused on the socio-economic situation in Flanders. In fact, Flanders would benefit from twice as much foreign investment as did Wallonia during this time, largely due to the relatively low level of salaries and maritime accessibility.[199]

The economic expansion in Flanders continued during the 1960s and 1970s, encouraged by a liberal economic approach stemming from the Flemish Movement, and subsequently shaping the economic policies of the Flemish regional government. More specifically, a Fordist economic model was adopted in Flanders, and there was a focus on the development of small and medium enterprises. This economic liberalism would be in contrast

[196] Jan Erk, "Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du nationalisme québécois," *Recherches Sociographiques* 43, no. 3 (2002): 507.
[197] Theo Hermans, Louis Cos and Lode Wils (editors), *The Flemish Movement: A documentary History 1780-1990* (London: The Athlone Press, 1992), 332.
[198] The 1959 legislation favoured Belgian and foreign investment into a province by offering economic incentives, such as a low rate of interest, state guarantees on loans, and state-led improvements to infrastructure; however, to qualify for these subsidies a province needed to meet certain criteria, such as structural unemployment, a lower than average per capita revenue, and regional investment below the national average. These criteria were purposely selected to benefit the four Flemish provinces: Jacques Nagels, "La Situation Économique de la Flandre et le Mouvement Flamand," *Brussels Economic Review – Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles* 45, no. 4 (2002): 111.
[199] Ibid., 113.

to the socialist economic policies that were present in Wallonia at the time. Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, the economic growth of Flanders continued, while the economy of Wallonia slowed down; and by the 2000s, the Flemish economy would grow to account for 60 percent of Belgium's GDP.[200]

4.5 Social Democratic and Statist Nature of the Québécois Nationalist Movement

In contrast to the Flemish liberal approach, nationalists in Québec adopted an economic model aimed at creating a Keynesian 'welfare state'.[201] During the 'Quiet Revolution' of the 1960s in Québec, the Québécois nationalist movement ushered in a 'statist' economic philosophy, which was based on the idea that Québec as a political entity, or in other words the Québec 'state', should be used to the socio-economic benefit of Québec society, and especially in terms of improving the socio-economic situation of Franchophones. This feat was to be achieved by using the capacities of Québec's provincial government and institutions as a vehicle to redistribute wealth, to create a regime of social insurance, and to reorganize Québec's education system.[202]

The economic engine behind Québec's statist economic model emerged in 1963, when the governing Liberal party of the time 'nationalized' Hydro-Québec, the provincial electricity provider. Hydro-Québec would serve as the symbol of the capacity of Québécois to control large scale technological and publicly financed projects.[203] The financial capital for Québec's public projects would come from *la Caisse de depot et placement du Québec*, which was the public financial institution created in 1965 to manage Québec's pension plan, and as a means of investment of the funds coming into the public coffers from several public agencies, such as *la Société d'assurance automobile* (Québec's public auto-insurance provider).[204]

The social democratic economic nature of the Québécois nationalist movement has been marked by the labour movement and the strong and influential socialist-nationalist unions in Québec, most notably the *Confédération des syndicats nationaux* (CSN), which

[200] Ibid., 115.
[201] Gilles Dostaler and Frédéric Hanin, "Keynes et le keynésianisme au Canada et au Québec," *Sociologie et sociétés* 27, no. 2 (2005): 36.
[202] Louis Balthazar, *Bilan du Nationalisme au Québec* (Montréal: l'Hexagone, 1986), 92.
[203] John A. Dickson and Brian Young, *Brève Historique Socio-Économique du Québec,* (Sillery, QC: Les Éditions du Septentrion, 2003), 351.
[204] Ibid., 352.

regrouped several of Québec's labour unions. Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, the CSN subscribed to a Marxist ideology of class struggle, and viewed workers as the integral part of the Québécois nation.[205]

Politically, however, the *Parti Québécois* was influenced during the 1980s and 1990s by the rise of economic neo-conservatism and the push for a North American free-trade zone. The 'Québec Model' of statist economic development was put into question. Fiscal constraint and privatization were embraced as means of reducing Québec's provincial debt; this notably was the case over the course of Lucien Bouchard's tenure as premier from 1995 until 2001, during which time the Québec government subscribed to an economic strategy of 'deficit zero', a measure aimed at addressing Québec's substantial public debt.[206] Nevertheless, the nationalist movement in Québec is generally still rooted in left-leaning economic principles, such as favouring government intervention into the economy and the development of the welfare state. The secular-statist nature of the Québécois nationalist movement, which developed during the 'Quiet Revolution' of the 1960s, remains a pillar of the contemporary sovereignty movement in Québec, and in contrast to the liberal economic principles of the Flemish nationalist movement.

4.6 Socio-Demographic and Political Differences between Flanders and Québec

Both the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements define the territorial integrity of their *nations* as encompassing sub-state units (the region of Flanders and the province of Québec), both of which are part of federal states—Belgium and Canada respectively. However, there are significant socio-demographic and political differences between Belgium and Canada, as well as between Flanders and Québec. While it is true that Belgium and Canada are both constitutional monarchies, are both governed by parliamentary democracies, and are both multilingual, decentralized federations, their specific composition differs a great deal.

Belgium is politically divided into five sub-national entities. The main political division is between the federal parliament located in Brussels and three regions: Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region. The Belgian federal government is responsible for

[205] Ibid., 162-163.
[206] Ibid., 389.

all affairs considered to be 'common heritage'; this includes justice, defence, federal police, social security, public debt and other aspects of public finances, nuclear energy, and state-owned companies such as the Post Office and Belgian Railways. It is also responsible for the obligations of Belgium and its federalized institutions within the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and controls substantial parts of public health and foreign affairs.

The regions of Flanders and Wallonia are divided into five provinces (the Brussels-Capital Region does not have provinces), and all three regions are also comprised of municipalities. Regions supervise the provinces and municipalities, and have authority in their territory over activity relating to the economy, employment, agriculture, water policy, housing, public works, energy, transport, the environment, town and country planning, nature conservation, credit, and foreign trade.

Belgium also has three official languages—Dutch, French, and German—and all matters concerning language are governed by the administration of *communities*, including culture, education, health policy, and assistance to individuals (protection of youth, social welfare, aid to families, immigrant assistance services, etc.). Each community exercises its competence only within linguistically determined geographical boundaries. The linguistic boundary of the German Community is located within the provinces of Liège and Luxembourg, both of which are located in the region of Wallonia, with the rest of Wallonia being administered by the French Community. The Dutch Community administers linguistic matters in Flanders and shares the administration of the Brussels-Capital Region (which is officially bilingual) with the French Community.

On the other hand, Canada's federal system of government comprises of two distinct jurisdictions of political authority: the federal government and ten provincial governments. Canada also has three Northern territorial governments; however, these are subject to the jurisdiction of the federal government. The division of powers between the federal and provincial governments is outlined in Sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act of 1867, Canada's original constitution.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act of 1982 and the Official Languages act of 1988 entrench French and English as the official languages of Canada. Sections 16 to 19 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantee the

equal status of both languages in Parliament, in all federal government institutions, and in federal courts, while Section 20 guarantees the right of the Canadian public be able to communicate in English and French with any central federal government office or with regional offices where there is "a significant demand for communication with and services from that office."[207] However, 'a significant demand' was not defined in the Charter of Rights, an issue that was remedied by the Official Languages Act of 1988. Apart from the federal level of government, English-French bilingualism has been made constitutionally applicable to only one of Canada's ten provinces, New Brunswick. Québec's official language is French, and the other eight provinces have English as their official language (although Manitoba and Ontario have passed legislation to provide provincial government services in both English and French).

Although Belgium and Canada are both constitutional monarchies, with the monarch in each country acting as a symbolic head of state and having no real political power, the sovereignty movement in Québec views the Monarchy (which Canada shares with the United Kingdom) as a recurring presence and reminder of Anglo-Canadian cultural oppression and 'colonization'. In contrast, the contemporary Flemish Movement has traditionally supported Belgium's Monarch; for example, there was far more support from Dutch-speaking Flemings and within the Flemish Movement for reinstating Belgium's Monarch after World War Two, than there was within the French-speaking Walloon community. Today, both Flemings and Walloons accept Belgium's King Albert II as a mediator in resolving Belgium's recent political crises.

There is also a contrast in the political and economic influence of Flanders and Québec within their respective federal systems, due primarily to the demographic differences between the two sub-states. The predominately Dutch-speaking population of the region of Flanders is 6.05 million, which is 56 percent of Belgium's total population of 11 million. In terms of the linguistic communities in Belgium, 59 percent are Dutch speakers and only 38 percent have French as their first language.[208] Thus, Dutch-speaking Flemings have a clear demographic advantage in Belgium.

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[207] Department of Justice, "Official Languages of Canada: Section 20 (a)," *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/charter/page-2.html#anchorbo-ga:l_I-gb:s_16.

[208] Paul M. Lewis, "Languages of Belgium," *Ethnologue: languages of the world* (web version), 16th ed., (Dallas: SIL International, 2009), http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=BE; L'État belge: Données démolinguistiques,

Québec, however, is only one of ten Canadian provinces, and it has a population of around 8 million (80 percent of which are Francophones), which is around 23 percent of Canada's total population of 34.5 million; and only 22.1 percent of that total population are Francophones, with 91.2 percent of them being located in Québec.[209] As a result of the minority situation of Québec and Francophones within Canada, sovereigntists claim that Québec's independence is the only way to guarantee the Québécois nation's political control over its culture and to ensure that the French language is protected in Québec.

Along with the Flemish demographic majority, the region of Flanders has far and away the most robust economy in Belgium, accounting for 60 percent of Belgium's total gross domestic product, and has an unemployment rate that is considerably lower than in the Wallonia or the Brussels-Capital regions.[210] Moreover, data from 2007 shows that the gross geographical product (GGP) per capita in Flanders was almost 32,000 euros, whereas the GGP for Wallonia was 23,000 euros.[211] As a result of the Flemish economy's superior strength, the region of Flanders provides a much larger sum of money to the federal government in the form of direct and indirect transfers. The National Solidarity Intervention program is the mechanism designed to reduce fiscal disparities between the federated entities in Belgium through direct transfers. Under the program, those regions in which the average per capita yield of personal income tax falls below the national average are entitled to an unconditional transfer from the federal government. Therefore, the amount paid to each region reflects the gap in the yield of personal income tax in the region in relation to the national average, weighted by an indexing factor and a factor pertaining to the amounts received by beneficiaries when the system was introduced.[212] Due to their inferior fiscal capacity, the Brussels and Wallonia regions are recipients of the National Solidarity transfers at the expense of the region of Flanders, which does not receive funding under this program as its fiscal capacity lies above the national average. Furthermore, due to the larger intake of tax revenue in Flanders, Flemings make

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Trésor de la langue française au Québec: Département de Langues, linguistique et transduction – l'Université Laval, http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/europe/belgiqueetat_demo.htm.

[209] Statistics Canada, "2006 Census: The Evolving Linguistic Portrait, 2006 Census: Highlights," http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-555/p1-eng.cfm; Statistics Canada, "Population by knowledge of official language, by province and territory (2006 Census)," http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/demo15-eng.htm.

[210] Jacques Nagels, "La Situation Économique de la Flandre et le Mouvement Flamand," *Brussels Economic Review – Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles* 45, no. 4 (2002), 115.

[211] William Hirst and Ioana Apetroaia Fineberg, "Psychological perspectives on collective memory and national identity: The Belgian case," *Memory Studies* 5, no. 86 (2011): 88.

[212] Ibid., 123.

indirect transfers by way of higher contributions into social security and towards the federal budget.[213]

Québec, on the other hand, is largely a benefactor of the federal transfer system in Canada. The Canadian Equalization Program is based on a formula that calculates the difference between the per capita revenue yield that a particular province would obtain using average tax rates, and the national average per capita revenue yield at average tax rates. The objective of the program is to ensure that all provinces have access to per capita revenues equal to the potential average of all ten provinces. In 2011-2012, Québec will receive $7.815-billion in equalization payments, which is the largest sum among the six so-called 'have-not' provinces that benefit from the equalization program.[214]

Despite the fact that Québec is the largest recipient of federal transfers in Canada, and Flanders, conversely, is the provider of inter-regional transfers in Belgium, Québec nationalists, including sovereigntists, mirror Flemish nationalists in advocating for an end to federal transfers. However, in Flanders it is based on a resentment of having to prop up Wallonia's 'failed economy', whereas in Québec there is a desire to terminate the culture of Québec's dependence and obligation to the Canadian federal government under the Equalization Program.[215]

Due to Flanders' demographic weight in Belgium, the Flemish nationalist political parties have considerably more sway over Belgium's federal Parliament than does Québec's federal sovereigntist party, the *Bloc Québécois*, in Canada's federal Parliament. The Chamber of Representatives in Belgium has 150 elected members from 11 electoral districts. The districts are divided along linguistic lines, and there are five Flemish districts making-up 79 seats. In the 2010 federal election, this formula resulted in the Flemish nationalist-separatist party NV-A winning the most seats in the Chamber of Representatives at 27, one more than the Walloon *Parti Socialiste*, which won 26; CD&V, a Flemish Christian-democratic party sympathetic to the Flemish Movement, won the third-most seats with 17.[216] Flanders also has

[213] Ibid.
[214] Department of Finance Canada, "Equalization Program," http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/eqp-eng.asp.
[215] Marcelin Joanis, "Péréquation: Les Plaques Tectoniques du Déséquilibre Fiscal Horizontal sont en Mouvement," *Policy Options*, May (2010): 44.
[216] IBZ: Service Publique Fédérale Intérieur - Resultats Officiels, "Elections 2010," http://elections2010.belgium.be/fr/index.html.

the most political sway in the Belgian Senate, which consists of 71 members from four categories of appointment: directly elected senators, community senators, co-opted senators, and senators by right. There are 25 Flemish and 15 Francophone senators directly elected from Belgium's three regional constituencies. Of the Community senators, 10 are elected by the Flemish Parliament, 10 by the Parliament of the French Community, and one by the Parliament of the German-speaking Community.

In the Canadian federal Parliament, the province of Québec has 75 seats out of the 308 seats in the House of Commons, which are distributed among Canada's 10 provinces and territories according to population. This means that, although Québec has considerable representation, it is outnumbered by the other Canadian provinces and territories, which are predominantly Anglophone. Moreover, there are multiple federal political parties that run candidates in Québec, and only one of which, the *Bloc Québécois*, represents the sovereigntist movement. After the 2011 Canadian federal election, the *Bloc Québécois* was reduced to four elected Members of Parliament, which is below the required number of twelve for a party to be officially recognized in the Canadian House of Commons.[217]

Senators in Canada are not elected but rather appointed to the Senate by the Governor General based on the instruction from Canada's Prime Minister. The 105 seats in the Senate are divided equally amongst four geographic regions: 24 for Ontario, 24 for Québec, 24 for the Maritime Provinces (10 for Nova Scotia, 10 for New Brunswick, and 4 for Prince Edward Island), 24 for the Western provinces (6 each for Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta), Newfoundland-and-Labrador is represented by six senators, and there is one senator for each of Canada's three Northern territories (the Northwest Territories, the Yukon, and Nunavut). Therefore, although the province of Québec has significant representation and political weight within Canada's federal government, it does not have the same political sway that the region of Flanders has in Belgium's federal government. Consequently, the Québec sovereigntist movement has pointed to Québec's minority status within Canada's federal system, which has a majority of representation from 'English-Canada', as an underlying reason for Québec's need to obtain statehood and full self-government.

[217] Elections Canada, "Official Voting Results/Résultats officiels du scrutin – Forty-First General Election 2011/Quarante et unième Élection Général 2011," http://www.elections.ca/scripts/ovr2011/default.html.

However, despite the Flemish demographic superiority and subsequent political weight and majority position in Belgium's federal government, there is a continued push by Flemish nationalist political parties for either increased decentralization or the outright independence of Flanders. The discourse of the Flemish nationalist movement mirrors that of the Québec sovereigntists, in that it is focused on the perceived threat and imposition of the Francophones in Flemish territory (Québec sovereigntists are similarly focused on threat and imposition coming from Anglophone Canadians), and specifically in the periphery of Brussels. Moreover, just as is the case for sovereigntists in Québec, *Flamingants* continue to frame their political discourse regarding Flemish political and social matters in the context of victimization and injustice, and relying on the evocation of the 'shared memories' of the past.[218]

In fact, the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements focus very much on the linguistic situation in Brussels (especially in the periphery) and in Montréal respectively, which are viewed by *Flamingants* and Québec sovereigntists as the primary linguistic battlegrounds for their respective nationalist struggles. This is regardless of the fact that Brussels is an officially bilingual region unto itself in Belgium, with only seven percent counted as using Dutch at home, with 66.5 percent using French (with nine percent counted as being bilingual);[219] whereas the official language of Montréal, the largest city in the province of Québec, is French, with metropolitan Montréal having 66.5 percent Francophones, 13.2 percent Anglophones, and 22 percent Allophones (having neither English or French as a first language). Furthermore, the vast majority of people in Montréal (86 percent) have a functional knowledge of French. In Brussels, however, despite being officially bilingual, more than 95 percent of people are able to speak French, but more people can speak English (34.4 percent) than can speak Dutch (28.23 percent).[220] The Flemish nationalist movement, including Flemish separatists, have resigned themselves to the fact that Brussels is a Francophone city within Flemish territory, and the focus of *Flamingants* has turned to an end to the provision of French linguistic facilities in the Flemish municipalities on the periphery of Belgium, most notably in Halle-Vilvoorde. There is the sentiment among Flemish nationalists that

[218] Pol Vandromme, *Belgique: La Descente Au Tombeau*, (Paris : Éditions du Rocher, 2008), 84.
[219] Rudi Janssens, "L'usage des langues à Bruxelles et la place du néerlandais. Quelques constatations récentes," *Brussels Studies*, no. 13 (2008): 5, http://www.briobrussel.be/assets/andere%20publicaties/fr_51_brus13fr.pdf.
[220] Ibid., 4.

Francophones choosing to live in Flemish territory should respect Flemish institutions, legislation, and the official language of Flanders—Dutch.

Conversely, in Montréal, despite the presence of a large Anglophone population, Francophones are still the majority. Linguistic legislation is in place in the form of Bill 101, which is largely aimed at ensuring Montréal remains a predominantly Francophone city, a battle Dutch-speaking Flemings lost long ago. Montréal remains an integral part of the province of Québec, and not a separate federal entity like Brussels is in Belgium. In fact, the Francophones of Brussels prefer to see themselves as having a separate identity apart from Walloons and Flemings alike. Nevertheless, Flemish and Québécois nationalists view Brussels and Montréal respectively as a symbolic linkage to the historic struggle against the injustices and the imposition of a 'cultural division of labour' defined along linguistic lines.

In summary, despite the clear structural and socio-demographic differences between the region of Flanders in Belgium and the province of Québec in Canada, as well as the structural and ideological differences between the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, contemporary *flamigants* and *sovereigntists* have maintained very similar nationalist profiles. In other words, in spite of several potential contrasting influences on the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, both *flamigants* and *sovereigntists* have continued to share a nationalist discourse contextualized by the objective of cultural-linguistic preservation, as well as the attainment of self-determination and the political independence of the 'nation'.

It is the premise of this dissertation that the explanation for this phenomenon can be found at the origin of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, in terms of their paralleling genesis as an oppositional reaction to the imposition of a cultural division of labour. The product of this oppositional reaction was an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest in Flanders and Québec, along with the development of a national identity that was defined by the tenets of this ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest. However, this phenomenon has not been maintained out of its own fruition. Nationalists in both Flanders and Québec have relied on shared memories and symbols as means of reinforcing and perpetuating the tenets of the ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and collective conception of the national identity.

Part III
Influence of 'Shared Memories' and Symbols

The Flemish and Québécois ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, as well as both nationalist movements' conception of the national identity, has been predicated on the characteristics of injustice and struggle, which stem from the origin of both nationalist movements as vehicles of opposition against the imposition of a linguistically based cultural division of labour and as a means of overcoming the resulting limitations on the socio-economic mobility of Dutch-speaking Flemings and French-Speaking Québécois. However, as the situation of the Flemish and Québécois societies has evolved and diverged, both nationalist movements have continued to be rooted in the same tenets that were established at their origins. These tenets have been reinforced and perpetuated by a continual link to the past in the form of shared memories and symbols, which are evoked and interpreted within a present context. This has subsequently resulted in the similar profiles of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, expressing a discourse that continues to reflect a sense of injustice and struggle.

The following chapter will explain how shared memories and symbols have been vital for nationalists in conceptualizing the Flemish and Québécois national identities within the context of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which is the very foundation of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. This will be done by analyzing specific events within the historical narrative of both groups that have provided the key shared memories and symbolic links for nationalists in Flanders and Québec to define their respective national identities and to perpetuate the sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest within both communities. Ultimately, it is the similarity in the nature of the shared memories of injustices, indignity, and struggle perpetuated by Flemish and Québécois nationalists that accounts for the continued presence of the similar nationalist profiles of both nationalist movements.

Chapter 5
Identity Formation

In essence, nations can only exist in the context of nationalism; cultural communities and their members are defined as 'nations' and 'nationals' by the discourse of nationalism.[221] The discourse of both Flemish and Québécois nationalists was established in the context of a movement of protest against imposed limitations on their socio-economic mobility, which had been historically caused by a cultural division of labour defined along linguistic lines. Thus, the nationalist rhetoric of the contemporary nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec has been contextualized in an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest.

Influenced by the established principles of this ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements define their respective national identities on the notion of a frontier separating the 'nation' from 'others'. This phenomenon is defined by the 'reactive ethnicity perspective', which explains that ethnic ties (most notably language in the case of the Flemish and the Québécois) among economically disadvantaged individuals plays an independent role in facilitating conditions for the group formation that is essential to political mobilization.[222] In Flanders and in Québec, the presence of a cultural division of labour helped shape the solidarity of ethnic identities in the context of a collective awareness of struggle and oppression. The cultivation and promotion of this solidarity of ethnic identity was largely influenced by nationalists evoking shared memories and symbols that were reflective of the tenets of the ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest that developed in Flanders and in Québec. These shared memories and symbols establish a link between the collective memory of the present and those historic events exemplifying a sense of struggle, discrimination, and victimization of the ethno-linguistic nation.

5.1 Process of Identity Formation

Nationalists are instrumental in shaping the concept of the national identity, and this is done as a means of "mobilizing, unifying, and legitimizing the objectives of sub-elites in their quest for power; and they achieve this feat by utilizing nationalism and the specious historicist

[221] Ibid., 8; Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 227.
[222] Eric Leifer, "Competing Models of Political Mobilization: The Role of Ethnic Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 87, no. 1 (1981): 28.

idea of an organic nation."[223] A group's 'identity formation' is achieved through an elaborate process of nationalist 'myth making', which is based on the evocation and reinterpretation of the shared memories of historical events, and subsequently the assigning of symbolical value to those shared memories.[224] The nation building campaign of Flemish and Québécois nationalists utilized an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest as a means of galvanizing the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking communities in Flanders and Québec respectively, with the goal of overcoming the obstacles to social mobility imposed by the presence of a linguistically discriminatory cultural division of labour. Nationalists in Flanders and in Québec relied on the metonymic equation of language with culture, thus making the former the decisive element in defining Flemish and Québécois national identity.

In Flanders and in Québec, national identity is associated with the use of a common language, while also being rooted in the shared memories and symbolism of the Flemish and Québécois 'ethnic' community. In both communities, the nationalist conceptualization of the nation has been contextualized within the development of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, relying on shared memories as a means of reinforcing the ethno-linguistic demarcation of the nation.

5.2 Vlaams (Flemish) Identity Formation

The Flemish nationalist movement was essentially born out of a struggle in Belgium between the established Francophone bourgeoisie and a rising Dutch-speaking Flemish bourgeoisie, with the latter desiring to replace the former. Flemish nationalists were largely from an ascending Flemish middle class that aspired to take the reins as the ruling class in Flanders, and consequently decided to seize cultural power.[225] The Flemish Movement did not begin as an 'ethnic' nationalist movement because initially there was no sense of Flemish ethnic identity. It is important to note that prior to the creation of the Belgian state in 1830, Flanders had never previously existed politically, administratively, economically, or even

[223] Anthony D. Smith, "Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 72, No. 3 (1996): 448.
[224] Alexander Dhoest, "Reconstructing Flanders. The representation of the nation in Flemish period drama," *Communications* 28, (2003): 261.
[225] Pol Vandromme, *Belgique: La Descente Au Tombeau*, (Paris : Éditions du Rocher, 2008), 88.

culturally as it does in its present form.[226] However, the Flemish community has gone through a process of 'ethnic revival', in which language has acted as the core symbol of, and driving force behind, the social, economic, and political 'emancipation' of Dutch-speaking Flemings in Belgium.[227]

It was the creation of a predominantly Francophone Belgian state structure in the mid-nineteenth century that gave rise to the initial stage of development of the Flemish nationalist movement. Flemish nationalist activism began with an academic and literary inquiry into the Flemish identity, most notably in the form of Flemish author Hendrik Conscience's 1838 novel, "The Lion of Flanders," coupled with a struggle for linguistic equality in Flanders and at the national level.[228] However, this initial phase of the Flemish Movement was done in the context of a bi-national Flemish identity, and did not seek to establish a distinction between a Flemish and Belgian identity, but rather include a Flemish dimension to that latter.[229]

The gradual construction of a distinct Flemish identity was largely the result of the refusal by French-speaking elites in Belgium to remove the obstacles facing the socio-economic mobility of Flemings by making the Belgian state bilingual. This opposition led the Flemish nationalist elites to proceed with political initiatives and a nationalist agitation that articulated Flanders and Flemings as a distinct entity within Belgium.[230] The change in the conception of the Flemish identity can be identified with Miroslav Hroch's model of the developmental process of a national movement as the transition from 'Phase A' to 'Phase B' of development; in other words, the initial nationalist activity devoted to scholarly inquiry into, and subsequent propagation of, an awareness of the identifiable attributes of the non-dominant ethnic group (culture, language, history, etc.), gradually transitioning to a nationalist agitation that was aimed at spreading the idea of the distinct national identity in the context of creating a modern nation.

The First World War would act as a catalyst for the Flemish Movement to embrace and spread the idea of a distinct Flemish national identity. The discrimination and injustices

[226] André Lecours, "Political Institutions, Elites, and Territorial Identity Formation in Belgium, *National Identities* 3, no. 1 (2001): 56.
[227] Ludo Beheydt, "The Linguistic Situation in the New Belgium," in *Languages in Contact and Conflict: Contrasting Experiences in the Netherlands and Belgium*, edited by Sue Wright (Bristol, PA: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1995), 55-56.
[228] André Lecours, "Political Institutions, Elites, and Territorial Identity Formation in Belgium, *National Identities* 3, no. 1 (2001): 56.
[229] Ibid., 57.
[230] Ibid.

suffered by Flemish-speaking soldiers in what was essentially a French-speaking Belgian Army, led to Flemish nationalists rallying behind the banner of the *Frontpartij* (Front Party). The *Frontpartij* acted as the vehicle for nationalist agitation in spreading the idea of an ethno-linguistic Flemish national identity, outside a sense of Belgian identity and in contrast to a Francophone Walloon identity.

By the 1930s, the ethno-linguistic identity of a Flemish nation resided as an indubitable fact within the collective conscious of the Dutch-speaking community in Flanders.[231] The language laws of the 1930s, most importantly the 1932 law on the use of language in administrative matters, established the principle of territorial unilingualism, which became irrevocably linked to the ideal of the Flemish nation.[232] Flemish nationalists have relied on linguistic nationalism to render to the Flemish people an identity, which the process of *Frenchification* had historically denied Dutch-speaking Flemings in Belgium.[233] Through the eyes of Flemish nationalists, the combat of Flanders was a cultural-linguistic struggle, as many nationalists considered that it is the language that makes the people. The Dutch language itself has been viewed as the "the flower of the Flemish civilization," the vehicle to transmit the Flemish culture.[234]

The historical heritage of the linguistically based cultural division of labour still greatly influences the attitudes of contemporary Flemish nationalists.[235] Nationalists view history as a source of continuity, and this continuity is then used to construct images of natural evolution or destiny. History and tradition are also associated with notions of naturalness and artificialness. For *Flamingants*, the more natural habitat of the Flemish people is within the Dutch cultural sphere because the Flemings share their main primordial feature—their language—with the Dutch. Belgium, therefore, is an 'unnatural' and artificial habitat for the Flemish people according to *Flamingants*, because it forces two peoples with totally different identities together into one state structure.[236] Essentially, the Flemish identity has been

[231] Lode Wils, *Histoire des nations belges*, (Brussels: Éditions Labor, 2005), 233.
[232] André Lecours, "Political Institutions, Elites, and Territorial Identity Formation in Belgium, *National Identities* 3, no. 1 (2001): 58.
[233] Eric Vanneufville, *Le coq et le lion : La Belgique à la croisée des chemins* (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1998), 75.
[234] Pol Vandromme, *Belgique: La Descente Au Tombeau*, (Paris : Éditions du Rocher, 2008), 87.
[235] Ludo Beheydt, "The Linguistic Situation in the New Belgium," in *Languages in Contact and Conflict: Contrasting Experiences in the Netherlands and Belgium*, edited by Sue Wright (Bristol, PA: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1995), 56.
[236] Jan Blommaert, "Languages and nationalism: comparing Flanders and Tanzania," *Nations and Nationalism* 2, no. 2 (1996): 244.

founded on a sentiment of injustice and cultural struggle, or more specifically linguistic struggle. It is the evocation of shared memories and the symbolism of these sentiments of injustice and linguistic combat that have defined the identity of the Flemish nation and the Flemish nationalist movement itself.

5.3 Québécois Identity Formation

The entrenchment of a 'Québécois' national identity within the collective conscious of Francophones in Québec began during the *Revolution Tranquille* of the 1960s, and stems from a territorialization, secularization, and modernization of Québec. However, in contrast to the process of Flemish identity formation, the conceptualization of the Québécois national identity was a process of 'identity transition' for Québec's Francophones, moving away from the perception of being part of a larger 'French-Canadian' nation, and instead developing the perception of a territorially linked 'Québécois' nation. This identity transition was undertaken by neo-nationalists during the 1960s and 1970s, as a means of overcoming the socio-economic disadvantages of Francophones in Québec.[237]

Initially, the French-Canadian ideal of ethnic nationalism was based on traditional Catholic and rural values, and seen as a means of cultural, linguistic, and religious survival under British (and later English-Canadian) domination. However, beginning in the 1950s, nationalist academics in Québec, who made up the so-called 'Montréal School', sought to establish a brand of nationalism better suited to a Québec society that had become more urban, industrial, and modern.[238] Then in the 1960s, nationalists in Québec looked to take control of their socio-economic situation; no longer wanting to see themselves as a disadvantaged minority in Canada, they instead began to view themselves as the majority within Québec. As a means of achieving an amelioration of their socio-economic condition, nationalists in Québec subscribed to a new secular, modernized, and territorially defined conception of a *Québécois* nation.[239]

The transition from a 'French-Canadian' nationalism to a 'Québécois' nationalism can be viewed in the context of Miroslav Hroch's model as the transition from 'Phase A' to 'Phase

[237] Louis Balthazar, *Bilan du Nationalisme au Québec* (Montréal: l'Hexagone, 1986), 135.
[238] Leigh Oakes and Jane Warren, *Language, Citizenship and Identity in Quebec* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 27.
[239] Ibid.

B' of development for the Québécois nationalist movement. This is to say that nationalists in Québec shifted away from a simple concentration on the scholarly inquiry and propagation of their historic, cultural-linguistic, and religious attributes as the non-dominant ethnic group in Canada, and transitioned to a mode of nationalist agitation aimed at spreading the idea of a Québécois national identity, which was crucial for the nation-building project of contemporary Québécois nationalists.

The principal objective of Québécois nationalists during the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s was to reverse the effects of what had been a cultural division of labour for Francophones in Québec, and ultimately become '*Maîtres chez nous*' (Masters of our house).[240] As a means of achieving this feat, Québécois nationalists set out to establish a 'nation state' structure, which would permit Québec's Francophones to have control over culture, education, and social and economic affairs.[241] Thus, Québécois nationalists set out to spread the idea of a 'Québécois' national identity that was inseparably linked to the Québec 'state' identity; as Hroch explains, this is often the case for nationalist movements as they enter 'Phase B' of development.[242]

Politically, however, Québécois nationalists have attempted to construct a 'civic' sense of Québécois nationalism, based squarely on a 'territorialisation' of Québec, and on a society in which French is the common language of public life. As the *Parti Québécois* rose to power in 1976, ushering in the sovereigntist party as the galvanizing political force behind the Québécois nationalist movement, then party leader René Lévesque began to distance the PQ from an ethnic interpretation of Québec culture, a fact made evident by the 'white paper' policy document of 1978, entitled *La politique québécoise du dévloppement culturel* (Québec Policy of Cultural Development). The document was used as a means promoting the concept of a '*culture de convergence*' (culture of convergence), a policy that did not explicitly

[240] "*Maîtres chez nous*," was the slogan of Québec's Liberal Party during the 1962 provincial election. The slogan was developed by René Lévesque, who was the *de facto* leader of the 'hard-line nationalist' wing of the Liberal Party at this time. Lévesque would go on to help establish the Québec sovereigntist party, the *Parti Québécois*, and subsequently become the party's first leader: Gilles Gougeon, *A History of Quebec Nationalism* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., 1994), 91.
[241] Louis Balthazar, *Bilan du Nationalisme au Québec* (Montréal: l'Hexagone, 1986), 133.
[242] Miroslav Hroch, "Real and Constructed: the nature of the nation," in *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, edited by John A. Hall (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 96.

recognize a central place for the 'French-Canadian' ethnicity as had been the case in the past.[243]

However, outside of the political rhetoric, many nationalists limit the term 'Québécois' to Francophones in Québec who can trace their origins to the *anciens Canadiens français* (original French-Canadians). Moreover, for many nationalists there exists the continued sense of a Québécois ethnicity associated with the ideal of *Québécois de souche* (old stock Québécois) or *Québécois pure laine* (true Québécois). Despite the intentions of political leaders, the Québécois national identity remains largely characterized within Québécois society by a clear distinction between members of the 'Québécois' nation on one hand (French-Canadian Francophones in Québec), and those of the 'other' cultural communities on the other.[244] Regardless of the efforts by nationalist 'elites' in Québec to develop and define the Québécois national identity based on a 'civic' nationalism, the general conception among the community of individuals sharing an arbitrarily defined *Canadiens français* heritage in Québec continue to conceive their membership to the Québécois nation in ethnic terms.[245]

Even with the presence of a continuing debate within the Québécois nationalist movement over a 'civic' or 'ethnic' conception of what defines the Québécois nation, there is little argument among Québécois nationalists that there exists a community of Francophone Québécois defined by a common culture and historical ancestry (that of the *anciens Canadien français*). Therefore, these nationalists subscribing to a 'civic' conception of the Québécois nation argue that this group can be defined as encompassing a 'cultural community' within a greater cosmopolitan and pluralistic Québécois identity, rather than simply being thought of as having an 'ethnic' national identity.[246] However, as Anthony D. Smith points out, the very attributes of an ethnic community are "named human populations with shared ancestry, myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity."[247] Therefore, regardless of the debate over whether the criteria for membership of the Québécois identity is 'civic' or 'ethnic', Québécois nationalism does consist of a conception of a Québécois *ethnie* based on the shared memories and symbols of the specific

[243] Ibid., 28.
[244] Ibid., 29.
[245] Louis Balthazar, *Bilan du Nationalisme au Québec* (Montréal: l'Hexagone, 1986), 138.
[246] Leigh Oakes and Jane Warren, *Language, Citizenship and Identity in Quebec* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 60.
[247] Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World* (Cambridge: University Press, 1981), 32.

Québécois ethno-linguistic group. But as John Hutchinson explains, these shifting cycles of cultural (or ethnic) and political nationalisms do occur within a national movement, one taking over when the other is temporarily exhausted, and one filling out what the other has failed to achieve or has neglected.[248] These paralleling 'civic' and 'ethnic' conceptions of the Québécois national identity within the Québécois nationalist movement are far less present in the Flemish nationalist movement, which more openly embraces the ethnic principles of Flemish nationalism. Arguably, this is due to the influence and viability of the far-right political elements of the Flemish nationalist movement, which are almost non-existent in Québec. Nevertheless, contemporary nationalists in Québec have relied on language and territory as a means of circumventing the exclusivity of *ethnie* within the nationalist movement.[249]

In Québec, nationalism has replaced religion as the point of solidarity for Francophones, and it has been specifically language that has taken precedence over religion as the principal defining factor of the Québécois identity. By the early 1970s, the French language had clearly replaced the Catholic religion as the primary symbol of Québec society, and the Québec 'state' (as the modernized governmental apparatus became known) was viewed broadly as being primarily responsible for ensuring the predominance of French in Québec.[250] No longer did the French speakers of Québec want to be considered as a minority in their ancestral home. Moreover, language has been the foundation for nationalist demands for recognition of a 'distinct status' for the province of Québec and the Québécois nation within Canada. Ultimately, the process of identity formation embarked upon by contemporary nationalists in Québec has universalized the term *Québécois* to represent a symbol of self-affirmation, self-determination, and national-liberation within the collective conscious of those Francophones in Québec having *anciens Canadiens français* (original French-Canadian) origins.[251]

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[248] John Hutchinson, *The dynamics of cultural nationalism: the Gaelic revival and the creation of the Irish nation state* (London: Allen and Unwin, I987), 8-9; Anthony D. Smith, "Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 72, No. 3 (1996): 448.
[249] Leigh Oakes and Jane Warren, *Language, Citizenship and Identity in Quebec* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 83.
[250] Dale Thomson, "Language, Identity, and the Nationalist Impulse: Quebec, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 538 (1995): 75.
[251] Leigh Oakes and Jane Warren, *Language, Citizenship and Identity in Quebec* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 27.

Québécois nationalists have established an ethno-linguistic sense of national identity, which is territorially linked to Québec, and they have had the capacity to politically emphasize the linguistic element of this identity. At the same time, by relying on the shared memories and symbols embodying a sense of struggle and reflecting the historic injustice and indignity suffered by the French-Canadian community in Québec, the Québécois nationalist movement has been able to maintain its nature as an expression of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which subsequently links the a sense of struggle and historic injustice to the conception of the Québécois national identity, while also promoting the idea that the perceived frontier between Francophone Québécois and Anglophone Canadians goes beyond simply language.

Chapter 6
Development, Evocation, and Interpretation of 'Shared Memories' and Symbols

At the origins of the contemporary nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec, key shared memories and symbols reflecting a sense of struggle, injustice, and oppression were relied upon as a means of effectuating a nationalist agitation aimed at creating a collective perception of the Flemish and Québécois nations and establishing a nationalist movement with mass appeal. Subsequently, these same shared memories and symbols have continued to be a vital resource for Flemish and Québécois nationalist in perpetuating an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest in Flanders and Québec, which has been aimed at re-enforcing the conception of the Flemish and Québécois nations. Ultimately, it has been the perpetuation of this nationalist conception of the national identity, as defined by the tenets of a Flemish and Québécois ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which accounts for the paralleling nationalist profiles in Flanders and Québec.

6.1 Use of Shared Memories and Symbols within the Flemish Nationalist Movement

By the period following the end of the Second World War, the Flemish ethno-linguistic national identity had become fully entrenched in the collective conscious of Flemings in Belgium; and following an initial decline of Flemish nationalism due to the connotation of being linked to Nazi collaboration, Flemish nationalists would eventually become fully politicized and turn their attention to the defence of Flemish social and economic interests.[252] By the 1970s, Flemish nationalists achieved cultural autonomy for Flanders and had fully reversed the effects of the uneven development of modernization and the cultural division of labour, as Flanders became not only the richest region in Belgium but also one of the most prosperous regions in all of Europe. However, despite the gains and achievements of the Flemish Movement, contemporary Flemish nationalists have continued to evoke the shared memories and symbolism of the historic injustices and indignity suffered by the Flemish nation. This has been done as a means of perpetuating a sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which remains the galvanizing force behind the Flemish nationalist movement.

[252] Ludo Beheydt, "The Linguistic Situation in the New Belgium," in *Languages in Contact and Conflict: Contrasting Experiences in the Netherlands and Belgium*, edited by Sue Wright (Bristol, PA: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1995), 56.

6.1.1 The Battle of the Golden Spurs and the Lion of Flanders

On July 11th, 1302, the knights of King Philip IV of France suffered a shocking defeat at the hands of a militia from Flanders. A Flemish army of around 10,000 infantrymen had besieged the citadel of Courtrai, and the French set out to crush this resistance to King Philip's subjection and lift the siege. With their backs to a river and shielded on their front by a formidable morass of streams and flooded ditches, the rebellious Flemish (predominantly guildsmen) committed themselves to either complete victory or defeat. After preliminary infantry skirmishes the French prematurely launched a catastrophic cavalry charge across unfavourable terrain. The Flemish withstood the initial surge of the French forces and counterattacked in a massacre that left at least half of the 2,500 or more French knights slaughtered. Hundreds of golden spurs were collected off the slain French knights and saved to memorialize the victory; thus the name, 'Battle of the Golden Spurs.'[253]

The shared memories of the 1302 Battle of the Golden Spurs, or *Guldensporenslag* in Dutch, have been fundamental to the Flemish national identity formation. The battle has been perpetuated and romanticized in myth by Flemish nationalists, who have continually evoked it as being one of the earliest examples of Flemish resistance; and this despite the fact that the region of Flanders as we know it today was not a political entity at the time of the battle, and both opposing forces were actually ethnically mixed.[254]

The Battle of the Golden Spurs initially entered into the collective memory of the Flemings through the influence of author Henri Conscience's 1838 novel, "*De Leeuw van Vlaanderen*" ("The Lion of Flanders"). Conscience's novel was inspired by the 'Romantic Movement' and his own active part in the Belgian Revolution of 1830, which influenced Conscience to attempt to foster a sense of Flemish pride and self respect, but within the context of a Belgian national identity. In fact, Conscience was himself was part of the French-speaking bourgeoisie of the time.[255] The book's title was in reference to Robert of Bethune (also known as Robert III of Flanders), who, in Conscience's story, is the saviour of the

[253] Paul Solon, "The Battle of the Golden Spurs: Courtrai, 11 July 1302," *The Journal of Military History* 67, no. 2 (2003): 549-550.
[254] Alexander Dhoest, "Reconstructing Flanders. The representation of the nation in Flemish period drama," *Communications* 28, (2003): 261.
[255] Theo Hermans, Louis Cos and Lode Wils (editors), *The Flemish Movement: A documentary History 1780-1990* (London: The Athlone Press, 1992), 86; Kris Rutten, André Mottart and Ronald Soetaert, "The rhetorical construction of the nation in education: the case of Flanders," *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 42, no. 6 (2010): 785.

Flemish army at the Battle of the Golden Spurs; however, historians have called into question Robert of Bethune's presence at the battle, and many have pointed out that he probably did not even speak Dutch, but rather French. Nevertheless, the Flemish nationalist movement has influenced the manner in which Conscience's novel is interpreted, with the imagined scenario of brave Flemings against the stubborn French playing a highly regarded role for the Flemish psyche. Consequently, "The Lion of Flanders" has been a useful resource of the nation-building curriculum in Flemish classrooms.[256]

For Flemish nationalists, the Battle of the Golden Spurs remains a seminal shared memory of the Flemish national identity; the Flemish national day, the national flag, and the national anthem are all based on the famous battle, during which the 'brave Flemings' are said to have defeated the 'cowardly French'.[257] On June 6th, 1972, Evrard Raskin, a member of the *Volksunie* party, the principal Flemish nationalist party at the time, submitted a proposal to the precursor to the present Flemish Parliament, the *Raad voor de Nederlandse Cultuurgemeenschap* (the Cultural Council for the Dutch-Speaking Cultural Community), concerning the Flemish 'national symbols': the flag, the anthem, and the Flemish national day. In his proposal, the flag was to depict a black lion on a yellow background, which was the medieval emblem of the County of Flanders, the flag of the Flemish Movement, and a symbolic link to Henri Conscience's novel, "The Lion of Flanders."[258] Raskin also proposed that the anthem should be the popular song, "*De Vlaamse Leeuw*" ("The Flemish Lion"), and that the Flemish national day should be on the anniversary of the Battle of the Golden Spurs, July 11th. According to Raskin, the three symbols were not new because the Flemish people were already using them, and his proposition just attempted to "confer an official status to something that already existed."[259]

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[256] Kris Rutten, André Mottart and Ronald Soetaert, "The rhetorical construction of the nation in education: the case of Flanders," *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 42, no. 6 (2010): 786.
[257] Ibid., 784.
[258] The Flemish Socialist Party argued at the time that the flag depicting a Black Lion on a yellow background was the flag of the Flemish Movement, which was adopted by the Volksunie Party, and that the correct heraldic description of the Flemish County's flag was a 'clawing black lion on golden field, red tongued and clawed'. Thus, the latter flag was ultimately adopted as the Flemish National Flag in 1973; see Javier Gimeno Martínez, "Actualizing the past: political devolution and symbols of the European regions. The case of Belgian federalization (1970-1998)," *Rethinking History* 12, no. 2 (2008): 237; also see Appendix B.
[259] Javier Gimeno Martínez, "Actualizing the past: political devolution and symbols of the European regions. The case of Belgian federalization (1970-1998)," *Rethinking History* 12, no. 2 (2008): 236-237.

The Battle of the Golden Spurs is hailed as a Flemish victory, and thus it can be viewed as a shared memory of Flemish 'national glory', harking back to a 'golden age'. However, contemporary Flemish nationalists also view the battle as an example of Flemish resistance, and contextualize it as being analogous to the more recent struggles against injustices inflicted on the Flemish nation by Francophones in Belgium. In fact, in the Flemish national anthem, "*De Vlaamse Leeuw*," which was written by Hippoliet Van Peene in July 1847, and based on the Flemish victory at the Battle of the Golden Spurs, the song's reference to the 'enemy' was originally intended to refer to the invading forces from France during the battle in 1302; however, Flemish nationalists have altered the symbolism of the anthem and directed its meaning at Francophone Walloons in Belgium. On July 6th, 1973, a decree by the Cultural Council for the Dutch-speaking Cultural Community proclaimed the first two stanzas to be the official national anthem of Flanders:

"They will never tame him, the proud Flemish Lion,
Even if they threaten his freedom with fetters and with shouts.
They will never tame him, as long as one Fleming lives.
As long as the Lion can claw, as long as he has teeth."

Chorus: "They will never tame him, as long as one Fleming lives.
As long as the Lion can claw, as long as he has teeth.
As long as the Lion can claw, as long as he has teeth."

"Time devours cities, no thrones will ever last,
Armies may go under, but a people never dies.
The enemy comes marching in; surrounded by mortal danger.
We laugh at his anger: the Flemish Lion is here!"
(Chorus).[260]

[260] Only the first two stanzas above are actually sung on official occasions; however, the full version of "*De Vlaamse Leeuw*" (the Flemish National anthem) finishes with following stanzas:
"For a thousand years now has he fought, for freedom, land and God,
And yet his strength is as youthful as ever.
Should anyone think him powerless, and taunt him with a kick,
Both menacing and fearsome will he rise. (*Chorus)*
Pity the mindless who, deceptive and full of treason,
Comes to pet the Flemish Lion and hit him faithlessly.
Not a single movement he does not see:
And if he feels offended, he will raise his manes and roar. (*Chorus)*
The sign of revenge has been given, he is tired of their bait;
With fire in the eye, in anger he jumps towards the enemy.
He tears, destroys, crushes, covers in blood and mud
And in victory grins over his enemy's trembling corpse. (*Chorus)".*

Despite the historical evidence to the contrary, Flemish nationalists have reinterpreted the Battle of the Golden Spurs via the *mythicization* of the battle by Conscience's novel, "The Lion of Flanders," in order to create a shared memory of Flemish resistance and victory in the face of an imposing French (or Francophone) menace; and thus, ultimately fitting the battle into the ethno-linguistic paradigm of the Flemish Movement. This shared memory of the Battle of the Golden Spurs, and the symbolic links to it, have become integral to the Flemish identity formation. Part of what it means to be Flemish is defined by the French (or Francophones) being understood as the historical enemy of Flanders. Moreover, the continued evocation of the shared memories of the Battle of the Golden Spurs and "The Lion of Flanders" helps perpetuate the Flemish nationalist movement's sense struggle and resistance, which are tenets of the Flemish ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest.

6.1.2 First World War and the IJzertoren (Tower of Yser)

The shared memories and symbolism of the injustices suffered by Dutch-speaking Belgian soldiers during the First World War have been fundamental in the formation of the Flemish national identity. Flemings made up the large majority of frontline soldiers in the Belgian Army during the First World War, but only accounted for 53 percent of junior officers (a number that would grow smaller over the course of the war), and only 20 percent of the senior officers. There were also proportionally more Walloons serving elsewhere in the army other than in the infantry; for example, in the armament factories in France and England, or in the technical units of the army, such as the artillery.[261] By 1918, 70 percent of the Belgian casualties had been Flemings, most killed by German troops on the frontlines at the banks of the Yser river (*IJzer rivier* in Dutch). Moreover, many of the casualties were due to Dutch-speaking Flemish soldiers not understanding the orders of their French-speaking officers.

There was also sense of isolation among Flemish soldiers, in what was effectively a French-speaking Belgian army, and Dutch-speaking soldiers began to feel the victims of discrimination. Therefore, in an act of Flemish solidarity, groups began to form in which Dutch-speaking soldiers would trade stories and discuss Flemish literature, for example Conscience's "The Lion of Flanders."[262] Flemish intellectuals and students began to partake in

[261] Lode Wils, *Histoire des nations belges*, (Brussels: Éditions Labor, 2005), 221.
[262] Bernard A. Cook, *Belgium: A History* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2002), 105.

activism, especially after 1916, when the Belgian government publicly refused the proposition to make the University of Gent a Dutch institution. This activism would eventually lead to the 'Front Movement'.[263]

The symbolism of a Flemish sense of injustice during the First World War began to take root early on. The Front Movement compelled Flemish soldiers to make a distinction between their perception of nationhood and that of the Walloons, prompting the desire for a separate and nationalistic recognition for fallen Flemish soldiers. One of the groups of the Front Movement, known as *Heldenhulde* (Homage to Heroes), created distinct tombstones with a 'Flemish cross' (or *Heldenhulde* tombstone) with the inscription AVV-VVK, which stood for *Alles voor Vlaanderen, Vlaanderen voor Kristus* (Everything for Flanders, Flanders for Christ), based on a poem by Cyril Verschaeve. The tombstones were made possible by donations from soldiers, municipal councils, and the citizens of Flanders; the Belgian government did not provide any financial assistance for them. [264]

As the First World War raged on, the Front Movement became a stronger and more controversial aspect of Belgian politics. The Belgian military's opposition to the Flemish nationalist movement grew and the hostility towards the Front Movement was directed at the most available, visible, and concrete symbol of Flemish opposition to Belgian rule—the *Heldenhulde* tombstones. In 1917 and 1918, measures were taken by the Belgian military against what was perceived to be a Flemish insurrection against a unified Belgium, resulting in participants of the Front Movement being incarcerated in camps.[265] Then in late 1917, a series of acts of sabotage against the Flemish crosses were committed, and rumours circulated that the Flemish crosses would be replaced by a uniform, Belgian government imposed model. By January 1918, in reaction to these events, having a family member buried beneath a *Heldenhulde* became an important public political act. Many of the families that had been neutral in choosing a tombstone became more inclined to opt for a Flemish cross. Then on the nights of February 8th and 9th, 1918, thirty-six of the *Heldenhulde* tombstones were defaced in the cemetery at Oeren-Alveringem, with the AVV/VVK inscription having been filled in with concrete. Years later, on May 27th, 1925, on the order of the Belgian Minister of Defense

[263] Ibid.
[264] Karen Shelby, "Conflicted Nationalism and World War I in Belgium: Memory and Museum Design," City University of New York (2008): 62-63, http://search.proquest.com/docview/304671659?accountid=13800.
[265] Ibid., 149.

Albert Hellebaut, more than five hundred *Heldenhulde* tombstones were crushed and then used in the construction of a road in Adinkerke.[266] These acts of vandalism and the disregard for the *Heldenhulde* tombstones only served to re-enforced their significance, and helped establish the Flemish cross as a symbolic link to the 'shared memories' of the injustices and discrimination inflicted on Flemish soldiers by French-speaking Belgians during the First World War.

By November 11, 1918, over one thousand Flemish crosses had been erected, as church cemeteries became filled with them. After the armistice brought the First World War to an end, more Flemish crosses were erected, creating a clear delineation within the cemeteries between the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking soldiers. Then in 1927, it was decided that the *Heldenhulde* tombstones would be extended to all Flemish veterans of World War One, and over the course of the next ten years new commemorative *Heldenhulde* tombstones would be placed on the graves of other Flemish soldiers who died during the war, but who did not initially receive such acknowledgment.[267]

Following the First World War, as early as 1919, annual pilgrimages to the site of the Flemish battles began. A governing body, the 'Yser Pilgrimage Committee', was organized to manage pilgrimages to *IJzer* (Yser), in Flanders. The committee then purchased a parcel of land along the Yser River to establish a permanent memorial. Since so many of the Flemish men had been interred in local village cemeteries, members of the Front Movement decided to define a site that would serve to collectively recognize all the 'martyred' men of Flanders. On the afternoon of August 31, 1924, during the fifth *IJzerbedevaart* (Yser pilgrimage) at the city of Diksmuide, a city which was completely destroyed during the Battle of the Yser, it was decided to bring together the threatened *Heldenhulde* tombstones under the mantle of a gigantic cross, the *IJzertoren* (the Tower of Yser).[268]

On August 25, 1930, the *IJzertoren* memorial was inaugurated in Diskmuide, Flanders, which was chosen for its central location to the battlefields and its proximity to the Yser River. For Flemish nationalists, the *IJzertoren* represents one of the most important symbolic links to the shared memory of the injustices inflicted upon the Flemish nation at the hands of

[266] Ibid., 65-66.
[267] Ibid., 69.
[268] Ibid., 69-70.

Francophone Walloons during the First World War. At the time of the inauguration, a song called "O Cross of the *IJzer*" was sung, which reflected the principles of the Front Movement and the palpable level of nationalism directed towards this imposing symbol of Flemish Catholic martyrdom, patriotism, and pride.[269] The original *IJzertoren* was fifty metres high, looming dramatically over the Yser plain with its cruciform top bearing the AVV/VVK inscription. Another dedication quoted the priest and poet Cyriel Verschaeve: "Here lie their remains, like seed in the sand. Hope for thy harvest, Oh Flanders land."[270] The memorial's message posthumously isolated the Flemings among the Belgian dead and redefined their deaths as sacrifices for Flanders, with that sacrifice's 'harvest' effectively spelling out a separate Flanders from Belgium. In short, the *IJzertoren* was as bluntly an anti-Belgian memorial as could be devised by the fiercely separatist Flemish nationalist culture of that time.[271]

German forces would again occupied Belgium again during the Second World War, and the Nazis would once again implement a policy of *Flamenpolitik*, taking advantage of the language and cultural division of Belgium, and enacting laws to protect and encourage the Dutch language in Flanders. This policy allowed the Nazis to effectively couch the invasion of Belgium within the rhetoric of liberating the Flemish nation from the oppression of a French-speaking Belgian state; and although the pre-war leaders of the Flemish Movement were opposed to the German advances, some of the young Flemish activists were more susceptible to the promises of the Nazi occupiers to form an autonomous Flanders.[272]

During these years of Nazi occupation, many Francophone Belgians came to regard the *IJzertoren* as a representation of the collaboration of the few Flemish nationalists who were activists in cooperation with the German occupiers. However, for Flemings the *IJzertoren* served in memory of those members of the Flemish community who died as a result of the war, and it honoured those who had been deported and alienated from their towns and communities. The monument at Yser was severely damaged during the Second World War, but the pilgrimages to the *IJzertoren* continued and even became increasingly elaborate and

[269] Ibid., 92.
[270] Sophie De Schaepdrijver, "Death Is Elsewhere: The Shifting Locus of Tragedy in Belgian Great War Literature," *Yale French Studies*, no. 102 (2002): 110.
[271] Ibid.
[272] Sophie de Schaepdrijver, "Occupation, PropaGenta, and the Idea of Belgium," in European Culture in the Great War, ed. A. Roshwald and R. Stites (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 281-282.

nationalistic.[273] Soon after the war, the *IJzertoren* became the responsibility of the Belgian government. Six months later, on the morning of March 14, 1946, explosives damaged the tower and a hole was created on the south side, approximately ten metres wide. Serious damage was also done to the circular staircase and elevator inside the building. A second, decisive attack took place on the next night, March 15, 1946, and the original monument was destroyed. It has been suspected that the act was perpetrated by Francophone radicals within the Belgian military who were opposed to the Flemish Movement.[274]

Several Flemish cultural groups and Flemish separatist groups publicly protested the Yser Tower's destruction. In fact, the board of one of the groups, *Het Vlaamse Kruis* (The Flemish Cross), expressed its anger by emphasizing that the tower was a sacred object and labelling the destruction as a blasphemous act of 'desecration', which violated the graves of the heroes who rested there as a symbol of Flemish greatness. The word 'desecration' was chosen to make the *IJzertoren* analogous to the Christian context of its inception, which linked the tower to the martyrdom of Flemish soldiers.[275] Margaret Olin explains that the intentional destruction of a monument gives a group the ability to redirect the cultural memory, and thus appropriate what has been built. Olin argues that the potential for destruction or defacement may be the most meaningful aspect of a monument's existence as an object.[276] The first impression of a monument's power pertains to its size, design, and location, but ultimately a monument is defined less by what it looks like than by what it represents or how people utilize it. The monument expresses the power and the sense of the society that gives it meaning. Designed to be permanent, a monument's symbolism is changed as it re-defines the past in terms of the present and future.[277]

In 1948, the *Comité voor Herstel van het IJzerkruis* (The Committee for the Repair of the Yser Cross) decided that since the main tenets of the Front Movement (self-government for Flanders, no more war, and peace among all people no matter their conviction) had been important attributes of the original *IJzertoren*, a very visible acknowledgment of these

[273] Karen Shelby, "Conflicted Nationalism and World War I in Belgium: Memory and Museum Design," City University of New York (2008): 98, http://search.proquest.com/docview/304671659?accountid=13800.
[274] Ibid., 106.
[275] Ibid., 106-107.
[276] Roger Nelson and Margaret Olin, eds., *Monuments and Memory, Made and Unmade* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 3-4.
[277] Ibid.

principles was to be expressed in a newly built monument. It was also decided that a gate dedicated to peace would be constructed by incorporating the fragments of the destroyed tower, transforming an act of violence (the destruction of the original *IJzertoren*) into a symbol of benevolence. The gate would also mark the entrance to the site of the "martyrs' graves" within the crypt of the original tower.[278] On May 22nd, 1949, the first stone from the original destroyed tower was placed as the foundations of the *Paxpoort* (Peace Gate) at the monument. Then in February 1952, the Yser Pilgrimage Committee decided that the new *IJzertoren* would be rebuilt in the shape of the previous monument, but only bigger (85 metres). Construction on the second *IJzertoren* began in July of 1952, and finally, on August 22nd, 1965, during the thirty-eighth *IJzerbedevaart* (Yser Pilgrimage), the new *IJzertoren* was dedicated to the 'martyrs' who died for Flanders. However, during the dedicatory speeches, the Christian and pacifist aspects of the site were overshadowed by the expressions of Flemish nationalism.[279]

The First World War resulted in the solidification of the Flemish identity; the Front Movement disseminated the stories of the discrimination and injustices suffered by Dutch-speaking soldiers in a Francophone Belgian Army. At the time, this phenomenon was compounded by the shared memories of other examples of indignity imposed on Flemings since the creation of the Belgian state in 1830. For example, the Belgian Constitution had been only written in French, and for Flemish nationalists it was an unforgivable affront to the Flemish people that the fundamental Belgian charter was not translated into the language of the majority community in Belgium.[280] There was also the fact that the Belgian judiciary had been a French institution, and Flemings could not receive a trial in Dutch until 1898.[281] Finally, there was the refusal to establish Dutch-speaking universities, most notably the Belgian government's refusal of a proposition from members of the Front Movement during the First World War to make the University of Gent a Dutch institution once the war was over.

Thus, beyond the direct symbolic linkage to the suffering, sacrifice, and martyrdom of Flemish soldiers during the First World War, the *IJzertoren* also became the symbolic

[278] Karen Shelby, "Conflicted Nationalism and World War I in Belgium: Memory and Museum Design," City University of New York (2008): 124, http://search.proquest.com/docview/304671659?accountid=13800.
[279] Ibid., 132; see also Appendix A.
[280] Pol Vandromme, *Belgique: La Descente Au Tombeau*, (Paris : Éditions du Rocher, 2008), 83.
[281] The *Gelijkheidswet* (Equality law), was passed by the Belgian government in 1898, and recognized Dutch as being equal to French in judicial matters.

embodiment of the Flemish national identity, which was rooted in the shared memories of the linguistic discrimination and injustices suffered by the Dutch-speaking community in Belgium. The symbolic importance of the *IJzertoren* to the Flemish national identity was confirmed in 1986, when the Flemish Parliament officially proclaimed the monument as the "memorial of Flemish emancipation."[282]

6.1.3 The 'Occupation' of Flanders and the Cultural Division of Labour

A founding principle of the Flemish Movement was the linguistic 'decolonization' of Flanders, which had said to have been 'occupied' by the French language.[283] During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Dutch language in Flanders was associated with small agricultural producers and industrial workers in Walloon-owned factories, while middle and upper-class Flemings were assimilated into the French language and culture as a means of obtaining social mobility.[284] This cultural division of labour has deeply impacted Flemish nationalists' sentiments of territoriality regarding Flanders, and it is largely rooted in the perception that the Flemish Movement has been a crusade of re-conquest of Flemish territory occupied by a 'mafia' of Francophone bourgeoisies.[285]

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Flemish nationalists adopted a 'territorial principle', calling for a monolingual Dutch Flanders. The sentiment among many Flemish nationalists was that it was necessary to erase any trace of the intrusion of the French language in Flanders, a sentiment that was reinforced by the shared memories of what had been regarded as the painful linguistic colonization and oppression of the Flemish people at the hands of the Francophone invaders.[286] Flemish nationalists argued that the characteristics of the Flemish people could only find fullest expression when the Flemings had finally acquired a natural political unit of their own in their historical territory. Thus, the concept of the 'Flemish people' is intimately linked to the territorial conception of Flanders.

It is taken among Flemish nationalists as absolutely self-evident that Flemings have their own culture, their own peculiar characteristics, and their own *eigenheid* (unicity). This

[282] Lode Wils, *Histoire des nations belges*, (Brussels: Éditions Labor, 2005), 225.
[283] Pol Vandromme, *Belgique: La Descente Au Tombeau*, (Paris : Éditions du Rocher, 2008), 89.
[284] Jan Erk, "Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du nationalisme québécois," *Recherches Sociographiques* 43, no. 3 (2002): 502.
[285] Ibid., 70.
[286] Ibid., 94.

Flemish culture, or 'unicity', is assumed to be age-old and is said to have persisted throughout Flanders' history of occupation and oppression by 'others'.[287] Therefore, as a means of maintaining the sense of national struggle by an oppressed and martyred people (tenets embodied within the Flemish ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest), *Flamingants* have perpetuated the image of a Flanders that was occupied, dominated, and exploited throughout the history of the region (most notably by the Franco-Belgian bourgeoisie); and these characteristics have come to define the identity of the Flemings.[288]

In this context of territoriality and 'occupation', the linguistic situation in Brussels is used to evoke important shared memories for Flemish nationalists, who view the Belgian capital as historically Flemish. The present predominance of French in Brussels is seen as the product of the historic oppression by Francophones in Belgium. Jan Blommaert explains that, as far as Flemish nationalists are concerned, Brussels is not naturally a Francophone city, but it has been made into a Francophone city by the 'Flemish-hating Belgian bourgeoisies'.[289] For *Flamingants*, Brussels has become the Jerusalem of the Flemish people, with the Francophones who have installed themselves in the Flemish municipalities on the periphery of the city being viewed as veritable Walloon 'colonizers' of Flemish territory.[290] Thus, Flemish nationalists view Brussels as a symbolic link to the collective memory of the Francophone colonization of Flanders, and the Brussels periphery remains a battle-ground for Flemish nationalists who fear a re-*Frenchification* of Flanders, due to an ever-expanding *olievlek* (oil-stain) of Francophone migration into the region. Having successfully established the linguistic integrity of Flanders, Flemish nationalists are staunchly determined to defend their national homeland against any possible aggressor, and in that respect language has maintained its great symbolic value for the Flemish identity.[291]

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[287] Jan Blommaert, "Languages and nationalism: comparing Flanders and Tanzania," *Nations and Nationalism* 2, no. 2 (1996): 240.
[288] Denise Van Dam and Jean Nizet, *Wallonie Flandre: Des Regards Croisés* (Brussels: Éditions De Boeek Université, 2002), 41, 48.
[289] Jan Blommaert, "Languages and nationalism: comparing Flanders and Tanzania," *Nations and Nationalism* 2, no. 2 (1996): 239.
[290] Eric Vanneufville, *Le coq et le lion : La Belgique à la croisée des chemins* (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1998), 136.
[291] Ludo Beheydt, "The Linguistic Situation in the New Belgium," in *Languages in Contact and Conflict: Contrasting Experiences in the Netherlands and Belgium*, edited by Sue Wright (Bristol, PA: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1995), 56.

6.2 Use of Shared Memories and Symbols within the Québécois Nationalist Movement

The nationalist *intelligentsia* in Québec began the conceptualization of a *Québécois* identity in the 1950s, when nationalist academics pursued a scholarly inquiry into the state of the French-Canadian community in Québec. Then, over the course of the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, and on into the 1970s, the conception of the Québécois national identity was further shaped and propagated by the agitation of the Québécois nationalist movement, relying heavily on the shared memories and symbols of the past. The Québécois national identity has been defined by nationalists in the context of the 'melancholia' and 'trauma' caused by the historical injustices and indignity suffered by the French-Canadian community;[292] and therefore, the Québécois nationalist movement has been developed as an expression of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest. By the late 1970s, the sovereignty movement had become the predominant voice of the Québécois nationalist movement. As a result, the shared memories and symbols that perpetuate the Québécois national identity have emphasized a sense of the Québécois nation's struggle to completely and freely assert itself as an independent state.

6.2.1 Trauma of 'La Conquête' and the Plains of Abraham

The shared memories of the so-called 'Conquest of New France' have been a fundamental component in shaping Québécois nationalism and national identity. On September 12th, 1759, during the Seven Years War, British soldiers clashed with French and militia forces on the Plains of Abraham in New France (modern-day Québec), with the British emerging victorious. The British victory signalled the subjugation of the French colonists in North America; shortly after the defeat on the Plains of Abraham, France was resolved to the fact that it was too expensive to maintain the defence of New France and ceded it to British control in the 1763 Treaty of Paris. The loss of New France to British rule has profoundly impacted the collective memory of Francophones in Québec to this very day.[293] The shared memories of the 'Conquest' are used by Québécois nationalists to explain the phenomenon of an uneven socio-economic development disfavouring Francophones, and to highlight the

[292] Jocelyn Maclure, *Quebec Identity: The Challenge of Pluralism* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), 20.
[293] Michael Lane Bruner, *Strategies of Remembrance: the Rhetorical Dimensions of National Identity Construction* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2002), 71.

subsequent imposition of a cultural division of labour resulting in historic socio-economic and political inequalities for Francophones in Québec.[294]

During the period following the Second World War, debate arose among Québec historians over the real social, economic, and political ramifications of the Conquest. This focus on analyzing the lasting effects of the British capture of New France was led by nationalist historian Lionel Groulx, who inspired a group of young historians at the *Université de Montréal* (such as Guy Frégault, Maurice Séguin, and Michel Brunet) to develop what would became the nationalist interpretation of the Conquest.[295] According to this nationalist perspective, the Conquest was a decisive setback for the French-Canadian community, which had previously been progressing comfortably, both socio-economically and politically. The community was 'decapitated' by the return of many of its elites to France in the wake of the Conquest, and those who did remain were only permitted to occupy subordinate roles in an economy and a political system that was dominated and controlled by the British. These nationalist historians also claim that due to the uneven development in Québec, French-Canadians established a Catholic conservative ideology, which helped lead to the entrenchment of the myth that Francophones were unsuited for leadership in business, and which exacerbated the cultural division of labour, thus setting back Francophones in Québec even further. The interpretation of the Conquest by the nationalist historians from what has come to be known as the 'Montreal school', helped to lay the foundations for the resurgence of nationalism in Québec during the 1960s, and has greatly influenced the Québécois nationalist movement over the last half-century.[296]

In the context of the Conquest, contemporary nationalists in Québec have perpetuated the sentiment that the Québécois nation is a 'conquered' and 'colonized' people, and that the only way for them to overcome this plight is to obtain their own country through secession from Canada.[297] This fact was clearly exemplified by René Levesque, the first leader of the Parti Québécois, who would often make reference to the Conquest in his writings and

[294] Denis Monière, *Pour comprendre le nationalisme: au Québec et ailleurs* (Montréal: Les Presses de L'Université de Montréal, 2001), 76-77.
[295] Garth Stevenson, "The Politics of Remembrance in Irish and Quebec Nationalism," *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science poltiqiue* 37, no. 4 (2004): 917.
[296] Ibid., 917-918.
[297] Michael Lane Bruner, *Strategies of Remembrance: the Rhetorical Dimensions of National Identity Construction* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2002), 70.

speeches.[298] For many Québécois nationalists the spectre of the Conquest lies behind the contemporary political debates concerning Québec and the 'rest of Canada'. The military loss of New France at the hands of the British has been turned into a 'psychological trauma' for the Québécois people, with the Plains of Abraham being the symbolic link to the shared memories of the tragedies and injustices suffered by the French-Canadian community in Québec under British, and later English-Canadian domination.[299] Thus, despite the fact that a large and ever increasing number of Canadians are not of British descent, let alone from Anglo-Saxon origins, sovereigntists still view the paradigm of Québec's place in Canada in the context of the Conquest. The '*Canada anglais*' (English-Canada) have superseded '*les Anglais*' (literally the English, but also a term employed to refer to all peoples of British descent) as the imposing force for the Francophones of Québec—with Québec's Anglophone minority (concentrated in Montréal) regarded by many Québécois nationalists as the uninvited and unwanted successors of the British conquerors.[300] This perspective is the embodiment of the ethno-linguistic delimitation of the Québécois national identity, defining those who speak French in Québec and having ancestral links to the *anciens Canadiens français* (the original French colonists of New France) as having ethnic membership in the Québécois nation, and those who speak English as defined as 'Canadians'. Subsequently, the shared memories of the Conquest encourage an exclusive and ethnic definition of the Québécois nation that is subscribed to by many within the contemporary Québécois nationalist movement.

For sovereigntists, the independence of Québec is viewed in the context of the liberty of an adult, with Québec's place in Canada being akin to the outmoded dominance of a parent over a child. Such rhetoric allows nationalists to psychologise history and to discuss the shared memories of the nation's historical narrative as if they were the history of a person.[301] Richard Handler explains that nationalists often make use of the concept of normalcy. Handler states that for nationalists "the period of submission, in its very length, is said to be 'abnormal'—an

[298] André Bernard, "L'histoire de la revendication souverainiste québécoise," *Féderalisme Regionalisme* 1 (1999-2000): http://popups.ulg.ac.be/federalisme/document.php?id=277.
[299] Susan Mann, *The Dream of Nation: A Social and Intellectual History of Quebec*, 2nd ed. (Montréal: McGill University Press, 2002), 16-17.
[300] Garth Stevenson, "The Politics of Remembrance in Irish and Quebec Nationalism," *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science poltiqiue* 37, no. 4 (2004): 918.
[301] Richard Handler, *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 41-42.

unnaturally prolonged childhood."[302] It is for this reason that the shared memories of the Conquest have been vital to the propagation of the contemporary Québécois nationalist movement, in terms of maintaining its character as an expression of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest. This includes the continued nationalist discourse conveying the abnormality of Québec's situation as a Canadian province. It is the opinion of sovereigntists that only independence can return the Québécois nation to a sense of normalcy because it is assumed that the development of New France would have proceeded normally had it not been interrupted by the Conquest. A prime example of this sentiment can be drawn from influential nationalist scholar Fernand Dumont, who stated that with the sovereignty of Québec certain struggles ensuing from the Conquest would finally "die quiet deaths," providing the foundation for a new discursivity, a new vocabulary of identity, and a new referent for the Québécois in the definition of their collective identity.[303]

Therefore, the shared memories of the Conquest and the symbolism of the Plains of Abraham remain vital to the contemporary nationalist movement in Québec as a vehicle for the continued sentiment of protestation against the status of the Québécois people, in terms of being 'conquered' and 'dominated', as well as finishing the process of decolonization, which for sovereigntists can only be finalized through the independence of Québec.

6.2.2 Lower Canada Rebellions of 1837-1838 and Les Patriotes

In Lower Canada (modern-day Québec) during the autumn of 1837, a group of men referred to as *les Patriotes* (the Patriots), who were predominantly of French descent but also counting a number of Englishmen and Irishmen among them, revolted against British colonial forces leading to a direct armed conflict with the British army in 1837, and then again in 1838. In the aftermath of the rebellions, the British government sent Lord Durham to investigate the uprising; after which Durham concluded that one of the measures needed was the immediate populating of Lower Canada with subjects loyal to the British Crown, as well as the implementation of the Act of Union in 1840, which united Upper and Lower Canada.[304]

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[302] Ibid., 42.
[303] Jocelyn Maclure, *Quebec Identity: The Challenge of Pluralism* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), 44.
[304] Leigh Oakes and Jane Warren, *Language, Citizenship and Identity in Quebec* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 26-27.

As a means of survival, French Canadians developed an ethnic nationalism founded on traditional Catholic and rural values; and therefore, the Catholic Church initially discouraged commemorating the Lower Canada Rebellion or *les Patriotes* because of their republican, non-sectarian, and anti-clerical overtones.[305] The evocation of the shared memories of the Patriots would coincide with the rise of more liberal and left-wing varieties of Québec nationalism during the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, which looked more towards the independence of Quebec. With more nationalist rhetoric calling for Québec's independence, the red, white, and green flag of the Patriots came to be a symbolic representation of Québec's struggle against British (and later English-Canadian) oppression and the fight for independence.[306]

The 1837-38 Lower Canada Rebellions were inspired by the ideals of the French and American Revolutions, and were also related to the similar demands for autonomous political institutions of responsible government during the rebellion in Upper Canada (present-day Ontario), which was led by William Lyon Mackenzie, a Scottish immigrant.[307] In fact, the movement of *les Patriotes* consisted of a partnership of likeminded Francophones and Anglophones in Lower Canada at the time. Despite this fact, certain contemporary nationalist elites and academics in Québec have re-interpreted the Patriots' republican motivation as being within the context of the larger struggle of the Québécois, making the British repression of the Patriots' fight for liberty interchangeable with the socio-economic repression and political domination of the Québécois at the hands of 'English-Canada'.[308]

The leaders and combatants of the Patriots' Rebellions have become 'martyrs' in the collective memory of Québécois. For example, Louis-Joseph Papineau, who was the political voice of the Patriots movement as leader of the *Parti des patriotes* (Party of the Patriots), is regarded as a glorious leader who was valiant in defeat; this is regardless of the fact that Papineau was not a combatant, nor had he ever taken up arms during the Lower Canada Rebellions in 1837 and 1838. Moreover, Papineau was part of the 'seigneurial' class of Lower Canada at the time (the semi-feudal, landowning class that originated in the North American

[305] Garth Stevenson, "The Politics of Remembrance in Irish and Quebec Nationalism," *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science poltiqiue* 37, no. 4 (2004): 914.
[306] See Appendix C.
[307] Ibid., 915.
[308] Gilles Bibeau, "Tropismes québécois. Je me souviens dans l'oubli," *Anthropologie et Société* 19, no. 3 (1995): 161.

colonies of New France), while other Patriot leaders were members of Lower Canada's bourgeoisie. Therefore, some historians have pointed to an ideological ambivalence and limitation to the political ambitions of the leadership of *les Patriotes.*[309] Nevertheless, during the Quiet Revolution nationalist intellectuals in Québec at the time, who voiced their opinions in the political revues "*Liberté*" and "*Parti pris*," attempted to shape the shared memories of the 1837 and 1838 Lower Canada Rebellions by describing the struggle for independence of *les Patriotes* as analogous to the movements towards independence of the colonized people of Africa and Asia.[310]

In recent years, mainstream Québec nationalists have come to embrace the images, names, and symbols of *les Patriotes*. A significant example of this came in 2002, when Québec Premier Bernard Landry, of the sovereigntist *Parti Québécois*, announced that the former *fête de Dollard* would henceforth be known as the *fête des Patriotes* (celebration of the Patriots).[311] In the official motion by the PQ declaring *une Journée nationale des patriotes* (a national day of the Patriots), Premier Landry explained that the day was to underline the importance of the struggle of *les Patriotes* of 1837-1838, for the recognition of the Québécois nation, for its political liberty, and for the establishment of a democratic government. Premier Landry also stated that, "the collective memory (of the Québécois) will never forget the tragic and bloody outcome of this episode."[312]

6.2.3 *La Révolution Tranquille, Territoriality, and the Cultural Division of Labour*

In the wake of the Second World War, Québec's economy entered a period of modernization largely due to a massive influx of American capital investment aimed at exploiting Québec's natural resources. However, this modernization would exacerbate the socio-economic inequalities suffered by Francophones as industry was still controlled by American or English-Canadian interests, and the language of the workplace and commerce was English. Moreover, the social mobility of Francophones was limited, leaving them heavily present in the industrial and tertiary sectors, while preventing French speakers from obtaining

[309] Ibid.
[310] Ibid.
[311] Garth Stevenson, "The Politics of Remembrance in Irish and Quebec Nationalism," *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science poltiqiue* 37, no. 4 (2004): 914-915.
[312] Micheline Labelle and Kim O'Bomsawin, "Politiques de la mémoire," *Centre de recherche sur l'immigration, l'ethnicité et la citoyenneté* (2007): 14-15, http://www.criec.uqam.ca/Page/Document/cahier/031.pdf.

positions of economic importance and decision-making. Faced with continued limits on their social mobility despite Québec's modernization, nationalist elites sought to create a greater awareness of the shared memories of the historic cultural division of labour in Québec, which, as nationalist academics belonging to the 'Montréal School' explained, stemmed from British domination of Québec after the Conquest.[313] Ultimately, Québécois nationalists would characterize this linguistic discrimination as evidence of a national oppression and the forced subordination of the Québécois nation to English-Canada.[314]

During the *Révolution Tranquille* (Quiet Revolution) of the 1960s, Francophone political elites in Québec's Liberal Party set out to use the provincial political and economic institutions as a means of reversing the effects of what had been a linguistically defined cultural division of labour, and as a vehicle of promoting socio-economic mobility for Francophones.[315] It was during this period that the nationalist movement in Québec, whose authority and influence were greatly enhanced, adopted a more restricted, neo-nationalist, and territorially based identity of being *Québécois*.[316] As a result, Québec became the national territory of the Québécois nation and Québec's political and economic institutions became a veritable 'nation state', which was viewed as the means of achieving the socio-political emancipation of this newly 'awakened' ethno-linguistic nation.[317] As a result, the shared memories of the Quiet Revolution continue to have an important impact in terms of the definition of the Québécois national identity, and remain a powerful and significant instrument of perpetuating a sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest within the contemporary Québec sovereigntist movement. In particular, the shared memories of the Quiet Revolution serve the purposes of reinforcement and inspiration, promoting pride in the Québécois nation and its achievements, and for a great number of people, confidence that Québec has the capabilities to achieve and maintain the status of a sovereign state.[318]

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[313] Denis Monière, *Pour comprendre le nationalisme: au Québec et ailleurs* (Montréal: Les Presses de L'Université de Montréal, 2001), 111.
[314] Ibid., 112.
[315] Ibid., 115; Louis Balthazar, *Bilan du Nationalisme au Québec* (Montréal: l'Hexagone, 1986), 132-133.
[316] Kenneth McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997), 56.
[317] Raphaël Canet, *Nationalismes et Société au Québec* (Outremount: Athéna éditions, 2003), 188.
[318] Garth Stevenson, "The Politics of Remembrance in Irish and Quebec Nationalism," *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science poltiqiue* 37, no. 4 (2004): 922-923.

In 1969, the final report from the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism provided tangible evidence of the economic disadvantages faced by French-Canadians, including a level of salary earnings dramatically lower compared to that of Anglophones.[319] This would act as a catalyst for the Québécois nationalist movement to become increasingly preoccupied with the socio-economic situation of Francophone Québécois during the 1970s, especially concerning language rights, as a means of overcoming the cultural division of labour. Québécois nationalist leaders, namely the political leaders of Québec's sovereignty movement, would compare the situation of Francophones in Québec to that of English-Canadians, underlining the socio-economic disparities.[320]

Then in 1974, the Liberal government of Québec passed Bill 22, making French the official language of Québec and promoting the use of French at the workplace. And as the Québécois nationalist movement transitioned to being focused on obtaining 'sovereignty' for Québec, which came in the wake of the election of the *Parti Québécois* in 1976, the entrenchment of French as the vehicular language of work and commerce in Québec was furthered with the passing of Bill 101.[321] The territorialization of Québec as the homeland of the Québécois identity was established through the construction of this linguistic frontier, defining Québec as Canada's only officially unilingual French-speaking province, and where the society was first and foremost a French-speaking one; and therefore, the French language has become the essence of Québec nationalists' claims of Québec society being 'distinct'.[322]

Furthermore, the defence of the French language within Québec, most notably in Montréal, acts as a clarion call for contemporary Québécois nationalists, who utilize the shared memories of the historic socio-economic injustices suffered by Francophones in Québec—namely the limitations on socio-economic mobility due to the imposition of a cultural division of labour—as means of perpetuating the sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest within the Québécois nationalist movement. More specifically, one of the means by

[319] The Royal Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism found that the average salary for a unilingual Anglophone was $6,049 annually, compared to $4,523 annually for a bilingual Francophone, and $3,107 annually for a unilingual Francophone: Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, "Book IV: The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups (1969)," http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/dunton1967-1970-ef/dunton1967-70-eng.htm.
[320] André Bernard, "L'histoire de la revendication souverainiste québécoise," *Féderalisme Regionalisme* 1 (1999-2000): http://popups.ulg.ac.be/federalisme/document.php?id=277.
[321] John A. Dickson and Brian Young, *Brève Historique Socio-Économique du Québec,* (Sillery, QC: Les Éditions du Septentrion, 2003), 357.
[322] Leigh Oakes and Jane Warren, *Language, Citizenship and Identity in Quebec* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 29.

which the contemporary Québec sovereigntist movement engages in its nationalist agitation is by relying on the shared memories of the victory for the Québécois nation that was the Quiet Revolution, in overcoming the cultural division of labour and the limits to socio-economic mobility, while simultaneously warning of the enduring threat of a return to a pre-Quiet Revolution domination of Québec by English-Canada.

Conclusion

The primary objective of this dissertation has been to develop a clear understanding of why the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have maintained strikingly similar nationalist profiles. In analyzing the present state of both nationalist movements it becomes evident that they share a paralleling discourse, cultural-linguistic agenda, political strategy, and objectives, despite clear structural and socio-demographic differences. This is exemplified most notably by the fact that in Flanders, just as in Québec, the nationalist movement continues to be focused on socio-political concerns in seeking the full political independence of the nation; and in both nationalist movements, the justification for separation is that it is viewed as the sole means of assuring the protection and vitality of each nation's culture and language. However, when considering the similarities between the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, in juxtaposition with a comparison of the current economic, political, and socio-demographic situation of Flanders within Belgium and Québec within Canada, an explanation for the analogous nature of the two nationalist movements becomes less evident.

The paralleling profiles of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements are particularly curious when considering the present situation of the region of Flanders, which carries the demographic weight in Belgium, has considerable political autonomy (as well as having the most representation in the Belgian federal Parliament), and possesses the strongest economy out of Belgium's three regions. Having established such an advantageous position in Belgium, the question arises as to why the Flemish nationalist movement has not transitioned to manifesting an expression of 'majority nationalism',[323] rather than maintaining an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest similar to that which is found in Québec?

It is only when tracing back along the historical development of both the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements that we find a common antecedent variable, a linguistically based 'cultural division of labour', which resulted in the development of similar

[323] Rather than seeking to impose an institutional and political recognition of the national identity on the state (as is the case with 'nationalism of protest'), 'majority nationalism' is expressed by state institutions and organisms that act as an intermediary in articulating the national identity and mobilisation, while the politics of the state are concerned with 'nation-building' in terms of affirming a national language, culture, or common identity to citizens: André Lecours and Geneviève Nootens, "Comprendre le nationalism majoritaire," in *Les Nationalismes majoritaires contemporains: identité, mémoire, pouvoir*, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon, André Lecours, and Geneviève Nootens (Montréal: Les Éditions Québec Amérique, 2007), 32-33.

manifestations of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest that has continuously defined the conception of both national identities. It is this common causal variable that most clearly explains why the contemporary nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec share comparable nationalist profiles. As Miroslav Hroch explains, in order to compare national movements it is necessary to establish a 'periodization', which not only permits a synchronic comparison, but also one according to analogous situations.[324] Therefore, as a means of understanding the similar nature of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, our comparative analysis has demonstrated the necessity of analysing the 'causal chain' of a nationalist movement's development; or more specifically, the historical factors that act as a catalyst in providing the political and social environment that permits the nationalist movement to germinate and resonate within a society. In the case of Flanders and Québec, that catalyst was a cultural division of labour defined along linguistic lines, which limited the socio-economic mobility of Dutch-speaking Flemings in Belgium and French-speaking Québécois in Canada. Ultimately, our historical comparative analysis has illustrated that the similar nature of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist profiles has not simply been the result of both cases being mobilizations of 'stateless' nations that have mirroring linguistic characteristics; instead, we have demonstrated that the analogous historical socio-economic factors have been extremely important in terms of understanding the comparable nationalist profiles of both nationalist movements today.

By incorporating the vast scholarship that has been developed on the study of nations and nationalism, as well as the studies focusing on the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements themselves, we have been successful in gaining a comprehensive understanding of the paralleling factors that have resulted in the development and continuation of the similar expressions of nationalism in Flanders and Québec. Specifically, we have relied upon the modernist analysis of the effects of an 'uneven development' and the subsequent cultural division of labour, which, in turn, has the capacity to act as a galvanizing force in establishing a community's solidarity and a sense of cohesiveness for the perception of the national identity. This effect comes to fruition through a nationalist agitation on the part of academics

[324] Miroslav Hroch, "Real and Constructed: the nature of the nation," in *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, edited by John A. Hall (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 92.

and elites who are seeking to overcome the imposed limitations to their socio-economic mobility—a phenomenon explained by the 'reactive ethnicity perspective'.

However, as we have demonstrated in this dissertation, it does not suffice to simply analyze and compare the historical events that have acted as antecedent variables in influencing a nationalist movement's inception. In addition to this, equal attention must be paid to the manner in which the character of a nationalist movement has been perpetuated through its development, right up to its present state—in other words, the 'causal mechanism'. In the case of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, this causal mechanism has essentially been the perpetuation of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest through the use of shared memories and symbols. Thus, within our analysis the principles of ethno-symbolism were employed in regard to the importance of shared memories and their symbolic reflections, which are used by nationalists as a means of reaching back into history to shape the present nature of the nationalist movement. Nationalists use symbols and nationalist rhetoric to evoke, interpret, and transmit shared memories of pivotal events within the historical narrative of the nation, which oftentimes already have a substantial presence in the collective memory of the community, and which are easily fitted to embody the desired sense of nationalism and national identity that are sought after by nationalists.

Our analysis has demonstrated the important role that shared memories and symbols play in the development and perpetuation of the nature of a nationalist movement. In the case of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, the evocation of key shared memories is contextualized in an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, reflecting the sentiments of historic injustices and struggle to overcome a limitation on socio-economic mobility, which was endured by both communities due to the imposition of a linguistically based cultural division of labour. More specifically, as a means of perpetuating the vitality of this ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, nationalists in Flanders and Québec have relied heavily on the evocation, interpretation, and transmission of key shared memories that embody a national sense of injustice and struggle. The subsistence of this ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest has continually influenced the conception of the national identity in Flanders and in Québec, in terms of being nations defined along oppositional ethno-linguistic lines and characterized by a sense of injustice and struggle. It is this phenomenon that ultimately accounts for the similar nationalist profiles of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, despite

differences in their structure and the divergent socio-demographic realities that exist between Flanders and Québec.

The framework of our historical comparative analysis has proved effective in attempting to understand the root causes for the essential character of a contemporary nationalist movement. In going beyond a simple linear analysis, where the historical development of the nationalist movement is traced moving forward from a set point in time, we have established a more comprehensive approach by including the principles of ethno-symbolism, which call for the study of nations and nationalism (or in our case nationalist movements) by analyzing the present and the past with equal weight and measure. In our study of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, this was achieved by incorporating an analysis of the lasting effects of the historic presence of a cultural division of labour, as well as taking into account the role of shared memories and symbols, which nationalists evoke as a means of reaching back in history to effect the present.

The framework used in our analysis is potentially useful and applicable elsewhere, namely when analyzing and attempting to gain an understanding of the core causes that have shaped contemporary nationalist movements. This approach of examining the antecedent variables, specifically socio-economic factors, as well as the utilization of shared memories and symbols, is imperative in determining the primary causal variables for a nationalist movement's development. The present state of a nationalist movement is not simply the product of contemporary influences, as has been exemplified by our comparative historical analysis of the nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec. The factors contributing to the development and nature of a nationalist movement originate long before the actual inception of the nationalist movement itself. Therefore, the study of nationalist movements should not be limited to a categorical analysis of defined ethno-cultural, territorial, and socio-economic factors. Instead, these factors should be viewed as overlapping in terms of their influence on a nationalist movement's development.

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Appendix A

IJzertoren (Tower of Yser).[325]

[325] Image Source: Toerisme Diksmuide, http://www.mlnq.org/indexp/pubdrape.gif.

Appendix B



Left: Flag of the Flemish Movement.[326] Right: Official flag of Flanders.[327]

[326] Image Source: Vlaamse-vlag.jpg, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/42/Vlaamse_vlag.jpg.
[327] Image Source: Flag of Flanders.svg, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2b/Flag_of_Flanders.svg.

Appendix C



Left: Original flag of *les Patriotes* during the Lower Canada Rebellions of 1837 and 1838.[328]

Right: Contemporary adaptation of the flag of *les Patriotes*, with the addition of a gold star on the left corner, and the image of artist Henri Julien's 1904 drawing "*le Vieux de '37*" (see below), which depicts a combatant of the 1837 Lower Canada Rebellion.[329]

"*Vieux de '37*" – by Henri Julien in 1904[330]

[328] Image Source: Radio-Canada, http://img.src.ca/2011/05/23/240x135/110523_c3l01_drapeau-patriotes-original_4.jpg.
[329] Image Source: mlnq.org, http://www.mlnq.org/indexp/pubdrape.gif.
[330] Image Source: GrandQuébec.com, http://grandquebec.com/upl-files/henri_julien_vieux_patriote.jpg.